Telecommunications Interconnection Regulation, 2018 (2023)

Telecommunications Interconnection Regulations, 2018

(Law No. 1 of 2018)

Last updated on July 13, 2020

[Dated January 1, 2018]

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India

F. Nr. 10-10/2016-BB&PA.- In exercising the powers conferred by Article 36 to read with subsections (ii), (iii) and (iv) of subsection (b) of subsection (1) of Article 11 of the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of the India Act, 1997 (24 of 1997), the Indian Telecom Regulatory Authority provides the following regulations, namely:

Chapter I

Provisionally

1. Short title, extension and beginning.- (1) These Regulations may be referred to as the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulations, 2018 (1 of 2018). (2) It comes into force on February 1, 2018.2. The definition.- In these regulations, unless the context otherwise requires, -

(1)"Law"means the Indian Telecommunications Regulatory Authority Act, 1997 (24 of 1997);

(2)"Authority"means the Telecoms Regulatory Authority of India established pursuant to Subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Act;

(3)"rush hour"means the continuous period of one hour falling entirely within a specified time interval when traffic is at its peak;

(4)"Interconnection"means the business and technical arrangements under which service providers connect their devices, networks and services to enable their customers to access the customers, services and networks of other service providers;

(5)"connection fee"means charges payable by one service provider to another service provider for interconnection;

(6)"Connection Usage Fees"Ö"IUC"means the fee payable by a Service Provider to one or more Service Providers for the use of network elements to initiate, route or terminate calls;

(7)"license"means a license granted or valid under Section 4 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, (13 of 1885) and the Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933 (17 of 1933);

(8)"connection point"Ö"SO"means a mutually agreed demarcation point (based on the TRAI rule/regulations/license agreement) at which the exchange of traffic between the two parties takes place;

(9)"Puerto"denotes a termination site in a switching/distribution framework for providing ingress and egress traffic between two interconnected networks;

(10)"Regulations"bezeichnet die Telecommunications Interconnection Regulations, 2018 (1 of 2018);

(11)"timeline"means the appendix attached to these regulations;

(12) All other words and expressions used but not defined in this regulation and defined in the law and the rules made pursuant to it and other regulations have the meanings assigned to them in the law or the regulations. or other regulations, as the case may be.

Chapter Two

Interconnection Agreement

3. Interconnection Agreement.- Each service provider must, within 30 days of receiving a service provider's request, enter into an interconnection agreement with that service provider on a non-discriminatory basis.4. Procedure for Executing the Interconnection Agreement.- (1) A service provider who intends to conclude an interconnection agreement with another service provider applies to this service provider together with

(a) a copy of your license agreement;

(b) the name of the services for which interconnection is requested;

(c) the proposed location of its interconnection points; And

(d) Name of technology used for connection in each POI.

(2) The service provider to which an application for an interconnection contract has been submitted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall, within five business days of receipt of the application, submit a draft interconnection contract to the service provider from which the application was submitted. (3) Upon receipt of the draft interconnection agreement issued pursuant to sub-rule (2), the service provider that has requested the conclusion of the interconnection agreement shall submit its proposals and any objections to the transfer to the other service provider within five business days.

Chapter III

Bank guarantee

5. The bank guarantee.- (1) The service provider who has applied for the conclusion of the interconnection contract is obliged to provide a bank guarantee for the total number of ports searched during this period for a period of six months from the date of establishment of the original interconnection, if provided by the service provider requested to conclude an interconnection contract: provided that the amount of such bank guarantee is determined in the manner set out in Annex I to this Regulation. (2) After six months. From the date of establishment of the first interconnection or 1 February 2018, whichever is later, the obligation to provide a bank guarantee is determined as follows:

(a) Interconnection usage charges payable between the two Interconnection Service Providers for the two months prior to the expiry of six months from the date of initial interconnection or 1 February 2018 shall be calculated, whichever is later. and the service provider who is obliged to pay interconnection usage charges after prior adjustment to the other service provider is obliged to provide a bank guarantee for a period of six months if requested by the other service provider;

(b) the bank guarantee is limited to the amount of interconnection usage charges payable by a service provider after adjustment in accordance with clause (a); And

(c) This process of determining a service provider's responsibility for providing the bank guarantee is repeated at the end of six months.

Chapter IV

Provision and expansion of ports at points of interest

6. Search for ports at points of interest.- (1) For a period of two years from the date of initial establishment of interconnection, the service provider that has applied to enter into an interconnection agreement shall search for ports at the points of interest of the other service provider in order to meet incoming and outgoing demand. outbound traffic to POIs. (2) After two years from the date of establishment of the first connection or February 1, 2018, whichever is later, all existing ports will be converted into a POI to carry traffic in a single recorded way so that the number of ports for sending the egress traffic from each service provider to the other service provider is proportional to their egress traffic averaged over a period of the previous three months; and (3) after port conversion according to sub-regulation (2), each service provider will search for ports to meet its outbound traffic requirements.[Provided that port dues and infrastructure charges for all ports provided prior to February 1, 2018 continue to be payable on the terms in effect prior to February 1, 2018.]7. Request for initial provisioning of ports.- After the conclusion of an interconnection contract, the service provider who has requested the conclusion of an interconnection contract may request the other service provider to provide such a number of ports in the points of interest that meet the requirements of its outgoing and incoming traffic at the points of interest to one Period of three months from the date of the first interconnection.[8th. Request to increase points of interest.- (1) Each service provider shall provide the interconnection service provider with its outbound peak-time traffic forecasts for the following six months at each POI at six-monthly intervals, and the first of such forecasts shall be provided within sixty days. from the commencement of the Telecommunications Interconnection (Amendment) Regulations, 2018 and thereafter on 1 April and 1 October of each year. (2) A service provider may request additional ports at a POI from another service provider if the expected usage of the capacity of that POI, calculated in accordance with Annex II to this Regulation, at the end of sixty days from the filing date of the request is likely to be more than eighty-five Percent, and such a predicted capacity utilization of the PDI is determined based on the daily traffic during the previous sixty days at the PDI during peak hours: so long as the service The provider requests such a number of additional servings. ts, which is likely to bring the capacity utilization of the POI to less than seventy-five percent at the end of sixty days from the date of filing the application.]9. Framework for Port Provisioning.- (1) A service provider shall, upon receipt of the request for ports under Rule 7 and Rule 8 and, where applicable, collocation space, issue a declaration of acceptance and, where applicable, a request notice[seven business days]after receipt of the application. (2) A Service Provider shall pay the amount pursuant to sub-provision (1) upon receipt of the solicitation notice[five business days]from receipt of the reminder. (3) The service provider who issued the approval notices in accordance with paragraph 1 shall inform the requesting service provider about the provision of the ports and, if applicable, the allocation of colocation areas,

(a) within[ten business days]from the date of issuance of your admission notice, if no requisition notice has been issued; And

(b) within[ten business days]from receipt of payment by the requesting service provider against the reminder, provided a reminder has been issued.

(4) A service provider shall, upon receipt of the information referred to in sub-provision (3), within[ten business days]after receiving the notification, inform the other service provider about the establishment of the transmission connection between the POIs of the two service providers. (5) A service provider shall, upon receipt of notification pursuant to sub-provision (4), within[ten business days]after receiving the notification, carry out the acceptance tests and issue the ports final letter of commissioning to the other service provider. (6) A service provider shall provide STM-1 ports at points of interest when a service provider requests the provision of such ports. Ports for POI addition: As long as the two service providers can agree on a POI addition at a lower or higher level, e.g. B. DS-3 or STM-16.[9A. Link layer for PSTN-to-PSTN connectivity.- (1) Within a service area, the location of the POI for calls between PSTN and PSTN or between PSTN and NLD network is at the location agreed between the interconnection provider and the interconnection seeker. (2) In the event that the interconnection provider and the interconnection applicant do not reach an agreement under sub-regulation (1), the location of the POI for calls between PSTN and PSTN or between PSTN and the NLD network in LDCC is: As long as the charge for the transmission of calls from LDCC to SDCC and vice versa is paid by the applicant for interconnection to the interconnection provider: as long as the points of interest existing at SDCC level for calls between PSTN and PSTN or between PSTN and NLD network operate for a period of at least five years remain or until the providers of interconnected services mutually decide to close such points of interest, whichever occurs first: provided that the point of interest falls under The SDCC level for calls between PSTN and PSTN or between the PSTN network and NLD may be terminated if the services of any of the interconnected service providers in this SDCA are suspended be smelled.]

Chapter V

Interconnection Fees

10. Connection Fees.- Interconnection charges such as installation charges and infrastructure charges may be mutually negotiated between service providers, subject to any regulation or instruction issued by the Authority from time to time: provided that such charges are reasonable, transparent and non-discriminatory.

Chapter VI

Separation of points of interest

11. POI-Trennverfahren.- Before disconnecting a POI, a service provider must:

(a) give the other service provider fifteen business days' notice of the reasons for the proposed disconnection;

(b) if you are dissatisfied with the response to, or no response to, the justification notice issued pursuant to clause (a), notify such service provider fifteen working days in advance and indicate the date of deactivation of points of interest; And

(c) Failing to Disconnect POIs before the end of the notice period specified under clause (b):

Provided that nothing in this provision shall apply if a POI is disconnected by mutual consent or by designation of the licensor or authority.

Chapter VII

Misguided financial incentives in interconnection issues

12. Consequences of breaching the provisions of this regulation.- If a service provider breaches the provisions of this Regulation, without prejudice to any sanctions imposed by virtue of its license or the provisions of the Act or any rules or orders made or instructions made under them, it shall be required to pay an amount as a financial deterrent which Rs one lakh per day per licensed service area as directed by the Authority: provided that the Authority will not order the payment of any amount as a financial deterrent unless the Service Provider has been given a reasonable opportunity to object to the breach of the to resist the standards maintained by the authority.

Chapter VIII

Other

13. Authority to give instructions.- Notwithstanding the provisions of the Law or any other regulation made pursuant to the Law or the instructions given pursuant thereto, the Authority may, from time to time, issue to the service providers the instructions it deems relevant to interconnection provided for in this Regulation.

Zeitplan-I

Bank guarantee for E1 link in a POI

(VerRule 5.)

Note: The explanatory memorandum explains the aims and rationale of the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulations 2018 (1 of 2018).

justification v

“The Telecommunications Interconnection Regulations, 2018"

A. Introduction1. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) defines interconnection as “the commercial and technical arrangements under which service providers connect their equipment, networks and services to provide customers with access to the customers, services and networks of other service providers.¹

1 http://www.citi.columbia.edu/elinoam/articles/interconnection_pricing.htm

2. Connectivity is extremely important from a consumer perspective. Consumers of telecommunications services cannot communicate with each other or connect to the services they request unless the necessary interconnection agreements are in place between the telecommunications service providers (TSPs). International experience suggests that interconnection is key to the success of 'open competition' in telecommunications services.B. The need to regulate interconnection3. When two TSPs are not in direct competition with each other, such as B. those operating in different countries, they connect voluntarily because interconnection increases the value of a network for its subscribers by increasing the number of people they can call and the reach of telecommunications. Services they can access (network externality effect). However, international experience shows that in a competitive market (e.g. a market for access services in a country where several TSPs provide access services to the same group of consumers) interconnection is not freely available from an incumbent operator. Licensee generally seeks to restrict competition and thereby maintain market power by: (a) refusing interconnection; (b) offering interconnection at a price or on terms that make it difficult for a new entrant to compete; or (c) attempting to sabotage the new entrant by providing an interconnection service of lower quality than that which it itself offers.4. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Basic Telecommunications Reference Document specifies the following guidelines for interconnection:

"2.2 Interconnection to be guaranteed: Interconnection with a major provider is ensured at every technically possible point in the network. Such a connection is provided:

(a) on terms (including technical standards and specifications) and tariffs that are non-discriminatory and of a quality no less favorable than those charged for its own similar services or for similar services provided by independent service providers or their affiliates or other affiliated companies;

(b) timely on terms (including standards and technical specifications) and cost-based tariffs that are transparent, reasonable, taking into account economic feasibility and itemized sufficiently so that the supplier does not have to pay for components or network facilities. which are not required for the provision of the service; And

(c) upon request at points offered in addition to the network termination points offered to the majority of users, against charges reflecting the cost of building the required additional facilities.”

5. Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Union (Access Directive) states: “National regulatory authorities … shall ensure, in accordance with the provisions of this Directive, adequate access and interconnection and interoperability of services by assuming their responsibilities in a way that promotes efficiency, sustainable competition, efficient investment and innovation, and delivers maximum value to end users.”6 The United States “Telecommunications Act of 1996” states that:

"... every established local network operator has the following tasks: .....................

(2) INTERCONNECTION - The obligation to provide interconnection to the network of the local exchange carrier for the facilities and equipment of each applicant telecommunications operator -

(A) for the transmission and routing of the telephone exchange service and access to the exchange;

(B) at any technically feasible point within the Carrier's network;

(C) of a quality at least equal to that provided by the local exchange carrier to itself or to any subsidiary, affiliate or other party for which the carrier provides the interconnection; And

(D) on tariffs, terms and conditions that are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory and consistent with the terms and conditions of the Agreement and the requirements of this Section and Section 252.”

7. It has been noted that many telecoms regulators worldwide have developed ex ante formal regulatory frameworks for interconnection based on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) principles with the general aim of promoting and facilitating competition.C. The Current Regulatory Framework for Interconnection in India8. In India, the regulatory framework for interconnection has been established by the Indian Telecoms Regulatory Authority (hereinafter the Authority or TRAI). Some of the important regulations and guidelines issued by the Authority in relation to the interconnection framework are described below.9. In 1999, the Authority directed all TSPs to register with the Authority all Interconnection Agreements to which they were party through the "Registration Rules for Interconnection Agreements 1999". 10. In 2001, the Authority issued an Interconnection Decision of 08.01.2001, establishing several interconnection points between fixed and mobile networks.11. In 2002, the agency issued the Telecommunications Interconnection (Reference Interconnection Offer) Regulations, 2002. Under the regulation, a TSP enjoying significant market power (SMP) status must submit its proposed RIO (which, among other things, describes the technical and commercial terms ). for interconnection based on the RIO model as an annex to the regulation) to the authority for approval and then publish the approved RIO on their website. From now on, this RIO forms the basis of all interconnection agreements concluded by and with the issuer of the RIO. The Telecommunications Interconnection (Reference Interconnection Offer) Regulations 2002 also contain three Schedules which (a) contain an explanatory memorandum to the Regulations to explain the reasons for the issuance of the Regulations; (b) the RIO model; and (c) Policies.12. Based on the provisions of the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulation (Reference Interconnection Offer) 2002, the then SMPs, i.e. M/s Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (BSNL), M/s Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. (MTNL), M/s Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (VSNL) and other TSPs submitted their RIOs for agency approval. On 09/10/2002 the Authority proposed 29 changes to the RIO draft submitted by M/s BSNL and M/s MTNL and instructed them to publish their RIOs immediately after incorporating the proposed changes.13. M/s BSNL and M/s MTNL have appealed to the Telecom Disputes Settlement & Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) (Appeal Nos. 11 and 12 of 2002) against the Authority's proposed changes. As a result, TDSAT ruled on the complaints on April 27, 2005. In accordance with the TDSAT regulation, M/s BSNL and M/s MTNL have published their RIOs on their websites. The TSPs that had already concluded interconnection contracts were also given the opportunity to switch to the notified RIO regime with effect from the date of the actual publication of the RIO.14. Although TDSAT did not repeal the Telecommunications Interconnection (Reference Interconnection Offer) Regulations 2002, it ruled that the agency would remain subject to service providers' interconnectivity terms as set out in licenses issued after the 2000 amendment to the Act. TDSAT asserted that the agency had the authority to amend the interconnectivity terms of licenses issued before the 2000 reform to the extent that they were consistent with the interconnectivity terms of licenses issued after the 2000.15 amendment. The agency appealed to the Honorable Supreme Court (Complaint No. 3298 of 2005) against the above-mentioned TDSAT regulation; the matter is pending before the Honorable Supreme Court. However, on 12/06/2013, the Honorable Supreme Court of Justice ruled the following in another matter of Civil Appeal No. 5253 of 2010:

"In exercising the powers conferred by Article 14(b) of the Act, the TDSAT shall have no authority to consider any challenge to the regulations made by the Authority pursuant to Article 36 of the Act."

16. Furthermore, in the Unified License (UL), the latest license, the licensor, ie the Department of Telecommunications (DoT), has placed interconnection between TSPs under the regulatory framework of TRAI interconnection. The relevant clauses of the license are reproduced below:

“27.3 The interconnection between the networks of different licensees for the transport of circuit-switched traffic is performed in accordance with the national standards of CCS No. 7 and its occasional amendments by the Telecommunications Engineering Center (TEC) and is also subject to the technical feasibility and technical integrity of the Networks and shall be within the general scope of Interconnection Rules/Instructions/Orders issued by TRAI/Licensor from time to time Licensee shall install a Media Gateway Switch. In addition, the Licensor may instruct THE LICENSEE to adopt any other technical standards issued by TEC relating to interconnection.

27.4 The Licensee will interconnect with other telecommunications service providers at the points of connection (POI), provided that the applicable regulations, instructions or provisions of TRAI are complied with. The fees for accessing other networks for Internet calls are based on the orders/regulations/guidelines issued by TRAI/the licensor from time to time. The Interconnection Agreements willAmong other, provide for the following: a) To meet all reasonable requirements for the transmission and reception of messages between the interconnected systems. (b) establish and maintain one or more points of interconnection that are reasonably necessary and of sufficient capacity and number to enable the transmission and reception of messages through the applicable systems, (c) connect to their applicable systems, and stay connected.

27.5 Charges for access to other networks for calls between networks are based on mutual agreements between service providers in accordance with IUC Regulations/Regulations/Guidelines issued by TRAI from time to time.

27.6 The provision of equipment and its installation for interconnection purposes are subject to the mutual agreement of the interested parties and comply with the rules and regulations of TRAI.

27.7 The interconnection tests for each individual interface with a telecommunications service provider are carried out by mutual agreement between the Licensee and the other party involved. In the event of differences of opinion regarding the elimination of deficiencies/deviations in the connection tests carried out, reference can be made to the licensor/TRAI."

17. In 2005, the Authority issued an order dated 06.07.2005 to provide interconnection to the applicant for interconnection within 90 days of the applicant making the relevant payments.D. The current exercise to review the regulatory framework for interconnection in India18. The Authority received several submissions from different service providers to review the regulatory framework for interconnection in order to make it useful and relevant. Consequently, on 10/14/2015, the Authority issued a Prior Consultation Document (PCP) and solicited TSPs' views on the following issues:

Question (a): Given the regulatory, market and technological changes in the telecommunications sector in recent years, is a revision of the existing rules on interconnection necessary to make interconnection agreements more effective? , non-discriminatory, fair and transparent? ? If yes, what kind of changes are needed in the regulatory framework for interconnection?

Question (b): Should TRAI notify/require a standardized interconnection agreement (default option) in the situations where the two service providers fail to negotiate mutually agreed interconnection terms within a certain timeframe?

19. After considering the comments received from the TSPs on the 10/14/2015 PCP and further analysis, the Authority decided to conduct a comprehensive review of the regulatory framework for interconnection in the country and published a Consultation Document (CP) entitled “Review of the Regulatory Framework for Interconnection” on 21.10.2016 to gather stakeholders' views on different aspects of interconnection. Stakeholders were asked to submit written comments by 21 November 2016 and counter-comments by 6 December 2016. At the request of some interested parties, the deadlines for submitting comments and counter-comments have been extended to 12/12/2016 and 12/26/2016, respectively. Written comments were received from three industry associations, 12 TSPs and two other interested parties. Countercomments were received from two TSPs. Comments and Counters - Comments from interested parties This data was published on the TRAI website: www.trai.gov.in. On March 17, 2017, an open house discussion with interested parties took place in Delhi. The issues raised in the PC and stakeholders' views on them are discussed in the following sections.E. Analysis of the key issues raised in the consultation document20. In the PC of 21.10.2016, the Authority had sought the views of interested parties on the following general interconnection issues:

(a) How to ensure fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms of the Interconnection Agreement between TSPs?

(b) Should the concept of seeker/provider persist?

(c) Is it appropriate to require that only the TSPs with significant market power (SMP) publish their Reference Interconnection Offers (RIOs)? If so, what criteria should apply to classifying a TSP as an SMP?

(d) What information must a new TSP provide in order to enter into an Interconnection Agreement?

e) What should be the deadline for entering into an interconnection agreement? Should a financial disincentive be imposed on TSPs if they fail to complete an interconnection contract on time?

(f) Is a Bank Guarantee (BG) required in the Interconnection Agreement? If so, how do you determine the BG amount?

(g) Should an interconnection agreement between TSPs continue if one of them acquires a new license?

(h) Should the migration of existing interconnection agreements to the new framework that will result from this consultation process also be allowed?

(i) Should interconnection agreements and points of interest be service specific or service independent? If points of interest are merged (service independent points of interest), what methods to detect, prevent and penalize any traffic manipulation by TSPs should be implemented? (j) Under what circumstances may a TSP separate points of interest? What procedure must be followed before separating the points of interest?

(k) Is a coordination committee required to enable effective and rapid interconnection between TSPs?

(l) Is there a need to verify the level of interconnection according to the guidance in the Annex of the RIO Regulations 2002?

(m) Should interconnection for fixed-line intercircle calls continue in the SDCA, should an alternative interconnection layer be specified for cases of technical impracticability (TNF) at SDCA level?

(n) What should be the framework to ensure timely deployment/boost of E1 ports?

(o) Should separate port provision periods be mandated for (a) fixed networks and (b) mobile/IP networks?

(p) Should a financial disincentive be imposed if (a) the initial POI is not provided and (b) the POI is not increased within the specified timeframe?

(q) Are higher level ports such as STM-1 allowed instead of E1?

(r) How to ensure that a TSP does not over-demand ports?

(s) If the interconnect applicant agrees to pay the full cost of the equipment required for the increase upfront, should a TSP provision the requested ports regardless of traffic at the POI?

(t) What should the IUC billing method be like and how should late payments between TSPs be dealt with?

(u) What regulatory strategies and measures are needed to encourage TSPs to move to IP level interconnection?

(v) Is there a need to create an interconnect exchange framework to address bilateral interconnection issues? Given that the new NLDO authorization allows NLDO transit traffic, is there a need for a separate framework for interconnect exchanges?

21. An analysis of these issues is provided below based on comments and input from stakeholders.1. How to guarantee fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms of interconnection agreement between TSPs?22. In the PP, stakeholders were asked to comment on the following question:

Question: Which of the following is the best option to ensure fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms of the Interconnection Agreement between Telecommunications Service Providers (TSPs) in view of technological, market, licensing, regulatory and legal developments in telecommunications? service sector? in India since 2002?

(i) Amendments to the Telecommunications Interconnection (Reference Interconnection Offering) Regulations 2002 to reflect technological, market, licensing, regulatory and legal changes since 2002;

(ii) require a standard Interconnection Agreement to be concluded between the interconnecting TSPs if they cannot agree on the terms of the Interconnection Agreement within a specified period;

(iii) impose only the general guidelines based on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory principles and to decide the details of the interconnection agreement jointly with the interconnected TSPs in a time-limited manner; either

(iv) Any other method.

Provide a rationale that supports your answer.23. In response to the above question, a variety of stakeholder views have been received. At one extreme is an interested party that has stated that interconnection agreements should be left to market forces and that the Authority should only retain regulatory oversight of interconnection matters and only intervene ex-post. In the middle are a few interested parties who believe that no change to the current regulatory framework for interconnection is needed. At the other extreme, most stakeholders have stated that the current regulatory framework needs to be changed to make it more effective and enforceable. However, stakeholders seeking to change the regulatory framework do not agree on a specific method; have expressed different views on the preferred method, i.e. H.

Yo View - 1: The authority should only prescribe general policies based on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) principles; the authority should leave the commercial and technical details of the interconnection agreement to mutual negotiation between the interconnected TSPs to allow for flexibility and innovation.

ii. View - 2: The Authority should only amend the RIO Regulations 2002 with a focus on ensuring that the principle of reciprocity is respected by the interconnected TSPs; And

iii. View - 3: The Standard Interconnection Agreement (SIA) is the best option to ensure fair and reasonable terms of interconnection agreement between TSPs.

24. A government TSP has stated that the SIA rule is not appropriate as a default option as it will always adversely affect one party or the other; a party will not agree to mutual negotiations if it is likely to benefit from such a predetermined agreement.25. Based on stakeholder feedback and additional analysis, the agency attempted to find answers to the following questions:

To. Which method is appropriate, ex-ante regulation or ex-post intervention on interconnection issues?

In a multi-service (or competitive) provider environment, interconnection is seen as an essential element of the telecommunications services industry. Internationally, strategic anti-competitive behavior on interconnection issues has delayed the onset of competition in many telecommunications markets around the world. According to ITU surveys4, many countries rank connectivity issues as the most important issue in developing a competitive market. It is widely believed that incumbent TSPs tend to delay interconnection by imposing unilateral terms in the interconnection agreement, charging a high price, etc.; such behavior leads to lengthy and costly negotiations between transport service providers who compete at the expense of efficient services to consumers. It is clearly in the interests of consumers that effective and fast interconnections between TSPs take place. Most countries in the world have pre-formulated regulatory guidelines to create an appropriate environment to facilitate interconnection. The Authority noted that in the recent past there have been several instances in the country of: (a) refusal to enter into an interconnection agreement; (b) refusal to provide reasonable connection capacity; and (c) positions for some TSPs to disconnect the connection installation for flimsy reasons. Based on the above facts and analysis, the Authority considers that the case for an ex post regulatory regime for interconnection in India remains weak. Consequently, the Authority has decided to proceed with the formal ex-ante regulatory regime for interconnection in India.

4 Source: Telecommunications Regulation Manual Module 3 Infodev Interconnection, available at https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Documentation/Infodev_handbook/3_Interconnection.pdf

B. Is the current regulatory framework for interconnection in India suitable for today's telecoms market?

The current regulatory framework for interconnection mainly depends on the Authority's three directives, viz. H. - (a) Date determination 01.08.2001; (b) Telecommunications Interconnection Ordinance (Reference Interconnection Offer), 2002 of 07.12.2002; and (c) the Authority's instruction dated 07/06/2005 to provide interconnection to the Applicant for Interconnection within 90 days of the applicant making the relevant payments.

The Telecommunications Interconnection (Reference Interconnection Offer) Regulations 2002 require a TSP that enjoys significant market power (SMP) status to submit its proposed RIO (which describesAmong other, to submit the technical and commercial conditions for interconnection based on the RIO model as an annex to the regulation) to the authority for approval and then to publish the approved RIO on its website. From now on, this RIO forms the basis of all interconnection agreements concluded by and with the issuer of the RIO. The Authority noted the fact that, given the current level of fragmentation in the telecommunications services market, not many TSPs can be considered SMPs and therefore the issue of entering into an interconnection agreement needs to be reviewed.

The authority's order of July 6, 2005 instructs the interconnection provider to provide the interconnection within 90 days of the corresponding payments by the interconnection applicant. Although the above-mentioned Directorate allowed the provision of PDI to interconnection applicants to some extent, the following facts indicate that the timeframe for the provision of PDI needs revision:

(i) The provisions of the Directive of 06.07.2005 shall only come into effect after the interconnection applicant has made the relevant payments to the interconnection provider, which is only possible after the interconnection provider has submitted an application for interconnection to the applicant; In the absence of a specific timeframe ordered for the interconnection provider to issue a solicitation notice upon receipt of the request to provide initial interconnection and increase interconnection points (POI), it is possible to comply with the Directorate's "letter" even without obeying its "spirit " to obey.

(ii) The expected period of 90 days to satisfy the Interconnection Applicant's demand has turned out to be quite long considering that many new entrants have acquired a large number of subscribers in a relatively short period of time, which in turn requires an increase in time in the capacities of the points of interest in a much shorter time.

The current regulatory framework for interconnection in the country clearly requires an overhaul to meet the needs of the current telecommunications market. Consequently, the Authority has decided to prescribe a broad regulatory framework to resolve contentious issues between providers of interconnection services through these regulations.

C. What should the comprehensive regulatory framework for interconnection look like?

The Authority examined the options available to design an interconnection regulatory framework to ensure effective and rapid interconnection between TSPs and has decided that the following is the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulation 2018 (hereinafter TIR 2018) with regulations on important Aspects of interconnection (e.g. interconnection agreement, bank guarantees, provision of initial interconnection and increase of points of interest, disconnection of points of interest, financial deterrence in interconnection matters, etc.) applies to all service providers offering telecommunications services in India. The provisions of the TIR 2018 take precedence over existing interconnection agreements between TSPs in India. Through this ordinance, the authority decidedAmong other, indicate the following in relation to the interconnection agreement between service providers:

(i) A service provider that intends to enter into an interconnection agreement with another service provider contacts that service provider.

(ii) The service provider that has been requested to enter into an Interconnection Agreement must send a draft Interconnection Agreement to the service provider that received the request within five business days of receipt of the request.

(iii) Upon receipt of the draft Interconnection Agreement, the Service Provider requesting the Interconnection Agreement shall submit its proposals and any objections to the draft to the other Provider within five business days. of services.

(iv) The service provider that has been requested to enter into an interconnection agreement shall enter into a non-discriminatory interconnection agreement with the service provider within thirty days of receipt of the request.

With respect to interconnection charges such as facility charges and infrastructure charges, PREPA has decided that subject to regulations or instructions issued by PREPA from time to time, interconnection charges may be mutually negotiated between service providers, provided that such charges are reasonable, transparent and non-discriminatory.

2. Should the interconnection seeker/interconnection provider concept be retained?26. Through the Telecommunications Interconnection (Shared Charges and Revenues) Regulations 1999, the Authority defined the interconnection provider and the interconnection applicant as follows:

"Interconnect-Provider"means the service provider to whose network interconnection is sought to provide telecommunications services.

"connection finder"means the service provider seeking interconnection with the interconnection provider's network.

27. According to traditional practice, an applicant for interconnection mainly has to pay the following charges to the interconnection provider:

(a) installation fees (payable for configuration, testing and commissioning of new points of interest);

(b) Port Charges (under the Telecommunications Interconnection (Port Charges) Regulations 2001, as amended); And

(c) infrastructure charges (charges for the infrastructure provided by the interconnection provider, i.e. colocation charges, etc.)

28. The RIO model contained in the Telecommunications Interconnection (Reference Interconnection Offer) Regulations 2002 specifies the following in relation to the cost of interconnection:

“12.3.1 The cost of upgrading/modifying interconnection networks to meet the service requirements of the service shall be borne by the party requesting interconnection. However, mutually negotiated arrangements to share the cost of upgrading/changing interconnection networks between service providers should be allowed.

12.3.2 Two years after the first interconnection has been set up, the service providers will negotiate who will bear the costs for the additional resources required. The general principle followed in these negotiations is that each party must bear the additional costs incurred by the additional ports required to meet the QoS standards in relation to their outbound traffic to the other party."

29. Below are the relevant clauses of the licenses dealing with which party bears the cost of interconnection:

Section 17.11 of the Basic Services, Section 17.9 of the NLD License and Section 17.10 of the ILD License:“Network resources, including the cost of upgrading/modifying interconnection networks to meet the service requirements of the service, are provided by the service provider seeking interconnection. However, negotiated exchange agreements are permitted. Mutual cost of upgrading/changing interconnection networks between service providers'..

CMTS Clause 28.4, UASL Clause 27.3 and UL Clause 28.2:"Network resources, including the cost of upgrading/modifying interconnection networks to meet Licensee's service requirements, are mutually negotiated taking into account orders and regulations issued by TRAI from time to time."

30. The issue of continuation (or discontinuation) of the interconnection applicant/interconnection provider concept is quite controversial since the concept in its current form generally requires that the applicant for interconnection pays the interconnection costs to the interconnection provider either permanently or at least for a certain period of time Start time. In this context, the following question was asked about the views of the stakeholders in the PP:

Question: Does the current concept of Interconnect Finder/Interconnect Provider have to be continued? If yes, what should the criteria be?

31. In response to the above question, some stakeholders have supported the continuation of the browser/interconnect provider concept, while other stakeholders have proposed the abolition of the browser/provider concept.32. Opponents of the interconnection requester/provider concept are of the opinion that the provision of interconnection is a mutually beneficial arrangement for both interconnection parties and therefore there should be no interconnection requester/provider concept and both interconnecting parties must bear their own costs. for providing the interconnection, while the cost of the interconnection connection between the two networks has to be shared by the interconnecting parties. These interested parties consider that the current concept of interconnection applicants/suppliers has led to an anti-competitive situation in which interconnection providers can dictate terms to interconnection applicants. One stakeholder opposed to the browser/provider concept of interconnection has argued that the browser/provider concept was relevant in the early days of liberalization when only one incumbent TSP had to bear the cost of upgrading to accommodate all new ones provide interconnection to market participants at this time; at that time the capacity of the exchanges was limited and the provision of interconnection with the other TSPs involved enormous costs; hence a cost causation principle was used and this led to the seeker/provider concept; However, at present there is already competition in the market and there is no such capacity constraint in exchanging new technologies, so the concept of seeker/provider is archaic. However, this interested party holds such views only in relation to interconnection between access service providers and has argued that the National Long Distance Operator (NLDO) and the International Long Distance Operators (ILDO) should always be treated as access service users. Provider.33. On the other hand, a large number of stakeholders have supported the browser/connection provider concept. They have put forward the following arguments to support their view:

(a) The interconnection provider must create capacity in its own network for the interconnection applicant in the initial phase of interconnection. Creating these capabilities has cost implications for the connection provider. Therefore, it must be borne by the applicant during a predefined period (by mutual agreement).

(b) The interconnection applicant may use a different technology than that used by the provider. Therefore, the provider may need to change their network to make it easier to connect with the browser. The interconnection browser/provider concept helps shift the responsibility of bearing the costs of such technological changes to the interconnection browser.

(c) The concept of browser/provider interconnection is dominant around the world.

34. However, stakeholders who support the broad 'concept' applicant/provider for interconnection do not agree on the 'description' of the concept. The views of these stakeholders on the "period during which the interconnection applicant/provider concept should apply" can be summarized as follows:

(a) View 1: Concept forever: Some stakeholders, including public sector service providers, have argued that there can only be one criterion to define the browser/interconnect provider, namely: the TSP. The existing TSP is the interconnect provider and a new TSP is the interconnect. search engine and will always be a search engine, regardless of market share; all other definitions are biased, mischievous, and messy. A public sector service provider has argued that since PSUs are incumbent service providers, their “connection provider” status should be perpetual.

(b) Opinion 2: Concept for application during the first two years for new entrants: Many stakeholders have expressed the opinion that the status of interconnection applicant/provider should only be applied when a new entrant is using the service for the first time in a certain license launches service area (LSA) for the initial period of two years from the date of launch of commercial services. After two years, each party must bear the cost of its outbound traffic, including the capacity built up in the first two years; this includes the cost of the interconnection means.

(c) View 3: Different application of the concept for different service segments: Some stakeholders have suggested the following method to implement the browser/provider concept:

(i) For interconnection between two access service providers, the latecomer should be considered as the applicant for interconnection during the initial period of two years, after which the costs should be borne by both parties on the basis of their respective traffic volumes.

(ii) For the interconnection between the access service provider and NLDO/ILDO, the NLDO/ILDO should be considered as an applicant for permanent interconnection.

(iii) In the event that an access service provider's license is renewed after 20 years, it should no longer be considered as an applicant for interconnection in the new interconnection agreement.

35. In assessing the suitability of the Interconnection Applicant/Provider, the Authority noted that the concept of Interconnection Applicant/Provider has been dominant since the beginning of competition in the telecommunications services sector in India. Likewise, the licenses for the basic service, the NLD service and the ILD service recognize the condition of the interconnection applicant as opposed to the interconnection provider (regarding the assumption of the interconnection costs).36. It has been observed that in any interconnection agreement, the interconnection service provider who benefits most from the interconnection takes on the role of interconnection seeker. For example, when the government licensed private operators to offer mobile telephony in India, basic service operators, i.e. H. The Ministry of Telecommunications (now BSNL) and MTNL were the incumbent operators in this sector. At that time, wireless carriers would benefit the most from interconnecting with utility companies because wireless carriers were starting from scratch and utility providers had a fairly large subscriber base. This was one of the reasons why mobile operators took on the role of interconnection seekers vis-à-vis basic service operators.37. A similar situation arose when the government issued new licenses for wireless services and introduced third-party and fourth-party providers into the wireless services market. In this case, new entrants not only sought interconnections with basic service providers, but also with existing mobile operators at the time. As the National Long Distance (NLD) and International Long Distance (ILD) sectors were opened up to private participation in the country, the new NLDO and ILDO sought interconnection of access service providers (both basic and mobile)38. Parties interconnecting in an access-to-access (A2A) connection (where both parties are access service providers) maintain a peer-to-peer relationship. In this respect, while they cooperate by entering into interconnection agreements, they compete on the market at the same time, generally for the same customer base. In the initial phase of interconnection between a new entrant and an incumbent operator, there is a significant asymmetry of traffic entering and leaving the POI. However, once the new entrant gains a worthwhile market share, the two related parties begin to slowly move towards symmetry in traffic at the POI. Therefore, at some point after the interconnection is established, not only the interconnection seeker but also the interconnection provider begins to receive the advantages of the interconnection through positive network externalities. The argument that new entrants benefit most from interconnection is clearly only valid in the short and medium term39. In the light of stakeholder feedback and further analysis, the Authority has decided to set up the following mechanism:

(a) For a period of two years from the date of initial establishment of interconnection, the service provider that has applied for the conclusion of an interconnection agreement shall search for ports at the other service provider's points of interest in order to meet the inbound and outbound demand. Traffic at points of interest.

(b) After two years from the date of establishment of the first connection or 1 February 2018, whichever occurs later, all existing ports in a POI will be converted to one-way traffic such that the number of ports to be broadcast will be reached egress traffic from each service provider to the other service provider is proportional to their egress traffic averaged over a period of the previous three months; and after port conversion, each service provider searches for ports to meet the needs of its outbound traffic.

3. What information does a new TSP need to provide in order to enter into an Interconnection Agreement?40. Interested parties have expressed differing views as to what information a new TSP must provide when submitting an application for an Interconnection Agreement. At one extreme is an interested party who has argued that the authority should not prescribe any information/documents that a new entrant must provide to the existing service provider; instead, these must be decided and negotiated jointly by the interconnection service providers. At the other extreme, some stakeholders have suggested that a new TSP should provide a great deal of detail and documentation, including the following:

(a) Letter issued by DoT informing MSC SPC for each LSA;

(b) a letter issued by the Department of Transportation notifying the tier allocation of MSISDN/TFN Tiers/Fixed Number Series for Provisioning Subscribers;

(c) company profile and market share;

(d) TEC interface approvals for all equipment to be connected for interconnection;

(e) network architecture with low and high level POP details;

(f) Prognosis of likely reasonable demand for E1 capacity of the connection site for six months after commercial launch (sites to be provided with detailed address and longitude and latitude);

(g) estimated date of commencement of commercial operations;

(h) proposed services to be offered and proposed connectivity (with justification);

(i) connection technology, e.g. B. TDM/IP, SMPP, ISUP, SCCP, etc.;

(j) details of means of transport such as satellite, microwave, PDH, SDH, DWDM, ATM, etc.;

(k) KYC documents from the requesting service provider, i. H. Service Tax Certificate/PAN Card/GST Registration Certificate etc.

(l) a copy of the company's memorandum of incorporation;

(m) a copy of the Articles of Association,

(n) the latest annual report of the company,

(or) a list of directors with DIN,

(p) a certified copy of the board resolution,

(q) Original notarial power,

(r) sample signature,

(s) Copy of the Articles of Association at CIN

41. Between the two extremes above are some service providers who have suggested that a new TSP should submit few documents while seeking interconnection. One of them suggested that the new TSP should only provide two documents, namely: (a) a copy of your license agreement; and (b) the location of its exchanges/infrastructure, while another interested party has indicated that the services proposed by the new entrant must also be provided by the new entrant.42. In examining the views of interested parties, the Authority found that if the documents and details to be submitted by the new entrant when applying for interconnection are left to mutual negotiation between the interconnecting parties, this may lead to a situation in which the existing The service provider can use delaying tactics by looking for a large amount of unnecessary details. At the same time, the Authority is aware of the fact that existing service providers require certain information and documents from new entrants before entering into an interconnection agreement, for reasons such as the following:

(a) determine whether the requesting service provider is licensed for the service for which interconnection is requested;

(b) know the location of the POIs and the connection technology of the requesting service provider.

43. In the light of stakeholder feedback and further analysis, the Authority has decided to require that a service provider intending to enter into an interconnection agreement with another service provider must contact that service provider together with - --

(a) a copy of your license agreement;

(b) the name of the services for which interconnection is requested;

(c) the proposed locations of your points of interest; And

(d) Name of technology used for connection in each POI.

4. What should be the deadline for entering into an interconnection contract?

44. As already described, by issuing TIR, 2018, the Authority decided that providers of interconnection services are granted a period of 30 days to conclude an interconnection agreement between them through mutual negotiations in accordance with TIR, 2018, date on which a service provider submits a formal application (along with the required information and documents) to the other service provider.

5. Is a bank guarantee (BG) required in the Interconnection Agreement? If so, how do you determine the BG amount?

45. Various opinions from interested parties were received on the question of the need for a bank guarantee5 in interconnection agreements. While some stakeholders have argued that there is no justification for requiring bank guarantees in interconnection agreements, others have argued that there is a great need for bank guarantees. At the center of these two sides are an industry body and a TSP, which have argued that issuing bank guarantees does not require regulatory intervention.46. Opponents of providing a bank guarantee in interconnection agreements believe that there is no obligation to request a bank guarantee in the interconnection agreement since both interconnected parties receive the benefit of the interconnection. One interested party considered that the risk (ie the amount that could be lost) is generally limited in interconnection agreements; However, in the case of interconnection agreements for access service providers with ILDO, there could be a significant financial risk and therefore there is a need for bank guarantees in such agreements. An interested party has stated that the provision of bank guarantees is not justified except in the following two cases, namely:

(a) An interconnecting TSP uses the points of interest only to terminate traffic and is in a net payer position at all times (e.g. in the case of interconnection with independent NLDOs/ILDOs), and

(b) An Interconnection TSP is more than 10 days late in payment for three consecutive months of the year.

47. On the other hand, proponents of the provision of the bank guarantee in interconnection agreements have put forward the following in support of their position:

(a) Bank guarantees are required to securitize the Interconnection TSP's net claim. The licensor also follows this practice in order to securitize its net claim from license fees and frequency usage fees.

(b) Certain Travel Service Providers have not paid their installments of interconnection charges to the interconnected Travel Service Providers in the course of their business. Bank guarantees are required to protect against such eventualities.

48. Public sector TSPs, while supporting the provision of bank guarantees, have argued that bank guarantees should and should not be provided by private TSPsand vice versa. A public sector TSP has also submitted a letter from the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) requesting that it obtain appropriate bank guarantees from other TSPs, where appropriate, before launching its services. and receive additional bank guarantees as needed over the course of your activity. Another public sector TSP has stated that bank guarantees are required from interconnected TSPs for the purposes of audits and investigations by various regulatory bodies.49. Proponents of bank guarantee leniency believed that all commercial aspects of interconnection should be left to the interconnected TSPs to be mutually agreed upon on a reciprocal basis.50. In examining the adequacy of providing bank guarantees in the interconnection contracts, the Authority noted the reports that when many TSPs gave up operating telecom services in the country due to license cancellation or other commercial reasons, they failed to pay interconnection usage fees and other of fees payable to them by other TSPs. At the same time, the Authority has also become aware of reports that certain incumbent TSPs are providing bank guarantees of the order of Rs. ten lakh per E1 link on access to access interconnection agreements.51. Based on stakeholder feedback and further analysis, the Authority has decided to impose a cap on the bank guarantees that a TSP can request from another interconnected TSP according to the following scheme:

A bank guarantee is a guarantee from a credit institution that ensures that a debtor's obligations will be met. This means that if the debtor fails to pay a debt, the bank takes it over.

Those: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bankguarantee.asp

To. The service provider that has requested the execution of the interconnection contract is obliged to provide a bank guarantee for the total number of ports requested during this period for a period of six months from the date of establishment of the first interconnection, if this is the case. Required by the service provider from whom an interconnection contract has been requested: Provided that the amount of this bank guarantee is determined in the manner set out in Annex I to this Regulation.

B. Upon the expiry of six months from the date of establishment of the first interconnection or February 1, 2018, whichever is later, the obligation to provide a bank guarantee shall be determined as follows:

(i) Interconnection usage charges payable between the two Interconnection Service Providers for the two months prior to the expiry of six months from the date of initial interconnection or 1 February 2018 shall be calculated, whichever is later. and the service provider who is obliged to pay interconnection usage charges after prior adjustment to the other service provider is obliged to provide a bank guarantee for a period of six months if requested by the other service provider;

(ii) the Bank Guarantee will be limited to the amount of Interconnection Usage Charges payable by a Service Provider after adjustment in accordance with the clause above; And

(iii) this procedure for determining a service provider's responsibility for providing the bank guarantee is repeated every six months.

52. Since the charges for the use of interconnection are billed monthly between travel service providers, the Authority considers that during the period of six months from the date of establishment of the first interconnection, the maximum amount of the bank guarantee payable by a service provider has to be paid correspond to the maximum net IUC to be paid by the service provider for a period of two months. The table below has attempted to estimate the maximum net difference in minutes sent from one service provider to another service provider in two months per E1.

53. Given that the maximum amount to be paid by the requesting service provider to the other service provider in two months per E1 connection, by multiplying the applicable connection usage fee by the requesting service provider's maximum net MOUs to the other service provider (under the Assuming all voice traffic flows from the requesting service provider to the other service provider and not in the opposite direction) in two months per E1, the Authority has decided to mandate the bank guarantee limit per E1 link for POIs for a period of six months from the date of establishment of the initial connection as follows:

54. As an illustration, for E1 connections between two access service providers, the bank guarantee cap per E1 connection at the POI at the current IUC rate can be calculated as follows:

55. As another example, the bank guarantee to be delivered at the end of six months from the date of initial interconnection or 1 February 2018, whichever is later, can be calculated as follows.

(a) If the IUC payable by Service Provider-1 to Service Provider-2 for the previous two months is Rs. 50 lakh and IUC payable by Service Provider-2 to Service Provider-1 for the period of the previous two months is Rs .35 lakhs;

(b) then Service Provider-1 is responsible for paying a maximum bank guarantee of Rs. 15 lakh for a period of six months if required by the service provider-2.

6. Should an interconnection agreement between TSPs continue if one of them acquires a new license?56. In the last three or four years, many travel service providers have acquired new licenses after their previous licenses have expired. Previously, these TSPs submitted statements to the Authority indicating that their interconnection agreements with the public sector TSPs ran concurrently with their previous licenses and therefore new interconnection agreements will have to be concluded after the previous licenses expire and new licenses start. ; however, even after several rounds of discussions with the public sector TSPs, they have not been able to finalize new agreements with the public sector TSPs and traffic at POIs is exchanged without a formal agreement. In this context, the following question was asked in the PC for stakeholder feedback:

Question: Should an interconnection agreement between TSPs continue if an interconnected TSP purchases a new license after a previous license has expired? Alternatively, should new agreements be concluded at the express request of one of the parties involved in the interconnection?

57. In response to the above question, a large number of replies were received from interested parties. One interest group has claimed that existing interconnection agreements between TSPs should continue to operate when an interconnecting TSP purchases a new license after a previous license has expired. The second interest group believes that when an interconnecting TSP purchases a new license after the previous license has expired, a new contract should be concluded. A variant of this view is that if both parties to the interconnection state in writing that they will continue to be bound by the same interconnection terms, the interconnection agreement may continue, but if either party requests a review, a new agreement must be entered into. through the connecting TSPs. The third group of stakeholders has argued that there is no need for regulatory intervention on this matter; affiliated TSPs should be free to decide matters related to bilateral agreements.58. Stakeholders supporting the continuation of existing Interconnection agreements between TSPs when an Interconnection TSP acquires a new license after a previous license has expired have made the following arguments:

(a) As long as there is continuity in interconnectivity, the terms of the existing interconnection agreement between the TSPs shall continue to apply.

(b) The expiry of the existing license and the issuance of a new license is a commercial issue as the interconnection is never interrupted and no new interconnection requests are made. Also, the equipment is not usually replaced or even the existing system is not modified in any way. Therefore, merely some technical changes in the license/license change cannot be a valid reason to challenge the existing agreement between the parties as it was signed on mutually agreed terms.

(c) Existing Interconnection Agreements do not contain a termination/renewal clause as a result of license renewal.

59. Interested parties campaigning for a new contract to be concluded when an interconnection FDA acquires a new license after the old one has expired have put forward the following arguments in support of their view:

(a) 20 years is a long time and there may have been many changes related to technological, market, licensing, regulatory and legal developments that require changes to the Agreement. Therefore, new agreements need to be concluded as existing agreements will expire when the license expires. However, the status of interconnection applicant/provider should not apply to such new interconnection agreements.

(b) The interconnection agreement between the TSPs is legally based on the valid licenses of the interconnecting TSPs. In the event of the expiration of the license of either Interconnection FDA, the existing Interconnection Agreement will remain in force unless both Interconnection FDAs agree and register it in the form of addendums to the existing Interconnection Agreement. Otherwise, the Interconnection FDA must enter into a new Interconnection Agreement.

60. In examining the matter in question, the Authority found that when the Government issues a new license to a licensee after a previous license has expired, the same resources (series numbers, MSC and SP codes, etc.) that authorize lawful interception and SACFA entitlements for the licensee, etc., continue to operate and therefore the term of an interconnection agreement need not be linked to the expiry of an old license agreement by either party if that party has already signed a new license agreement.61. In any case, the legitimate interests of interconnection service providers in existing interconnection contracts would remain protected as the provisions of the TIR 2018 take precedence over existing interconnection contracts between service providers.7. Should existing interconnection agreements be able to be migrated to the new framework that will result from this consultation process?62. Since the Authority has already decided that the provisions of the TIR 2018 will take precedence over existing Interconnection Agreements, the issue of the applicability of the new framework for Interconnection has already been addressed in the existing Interconnection Agreement.8. Should interconnection agreements and points of interest be service specific or service independent? If points of interest are merged, what methods of detecting, preventing and penalizing any traffic manipulation by TSPs should be implemented?63. Under the existing terms of the interconnection agreements, UASL's fixed, full mobility and restricted mobility networks have separate points of interest with the public sector TSPs. Such POIs are treated independently for all purposes, including installation costs, port charges, etc. During the pre-consultation process, some TSPs reported that after the licenses were migrated to the Single License, changes would need to be made to the Interconnection Agreement to allow any infrastructure taken under a license with the same may be shared licensee who is entitled to provide other services as well. In this context, the following questions were asked on the PC for stakeholder feedback:

Question: Should the interconnect and interconnect agreement be service-specific or service-independent (i.e., a TSP can send any type of traffic at an interconnect point that is permitted under the terms of the license it has been granted?)? What are the pros/cons of service specific points of interest when TSPs are equipped with Call Data Record (CDR) based billing systems?

Question: When points of interest are merged, what methods should be implemented to detect, prevent and penalize any traffic manipulation by TSPs (which causes higher IUC traffic to be recorded as lower IUC traffic in the source TSP's CDR)?

64. Various responses were received from interested parties to the above questions. With the exception of one stakeholder, who stated that the decision on the issue of service-specific or service-independent POIs should be left to the TSPs on the basis of their mutual interconnection agreement, other stakeholders have expressly supported or have joined the provision of a specific interconnection of the service and the interconnection agreement opposes such provision.65. Proponents of the Service-Specific Interconnection Rule and the Interconnection Agreement have put forward the following to justify their views:

(a) Regarding the service-specific interconnection agreement: While the license may allow a wide range of services to be offered, the interconnection agreement must be service-specific, as interconnection involves different technical and commercial aspects for different services. The Interconnection Agreement covers the charges incurred in setting up an interconnection network such as port dues, facility charges etc. These charges vary depending on the applicable installation/connection scenario and therefore there cannot be a standard connection. Agreement covering all scenarios. Fees are to be agreed on a case-by-case basis.

(b) Regarding Service Specific Interconnection (Interconnection Points/Trunk Groups): The type of traffic that an Interconnection TSP delivers to another Interconnection TSP at the POI depends on the terms of the Interconnection Agreement. ATSP can have a POI in a specific location for different services with a different TSP; However, trunk groups (TGs) must be kept separate for different services to ensure that only traffic for services destined for a particular TG is carried. Although TSPs are equipped with a CDR-based billing system, a unified POI without demarcation would encourage TSPs to manipulate CLIs, resulting in a loss for the terminating TSP. In such a situation, the TSP has no way of inspecting and blocking this traffic. Routing, numbering, IUC charges etc. They are also service specific and any attempt to be a service independent interface would lead to abuse and arbitrage. The CDR in the target exchange/network is not able to identify the location of the calling subscriber, leading to billing disputes between the TSPs.

66. On the other hand, advocates of interconnection-independent service provision and interconnection agreements have put forward the following arguments in support of their position:

(a) Regarding the Service Independent Interconnection Agreement: Currently the dominant regime for licensing is Uniform Licensing and therefore multiple interconnection agreements should not be insisted on. There must be a single interconnection agreement for all services permitted under the terms of the license signed by the TSP, with specific provisions for each type of license authorization, such as: e.g. NLD, ILD etc.

(b) Regarding Service Independent Interconnection: Service specific POIs result in an inefficient use of resources as there will be a level of idle capacity across multiple POIs. The requirement for service-specific POIs stems from the requirement to distinguish between the types of calls terminating in a TSP's network, as different types of calls have different IUC charges. However, enhanced CDRs can achieve the same goal without the need for service-specific POIs. Each TSP shall maintain CDRs recording originating and terminating numbers, originating and terminating type of call ie fixed line, wireless, fixed line WLAN access (FWA), internet telephony. Once these CDRs are exchanged at the end of the month, the IUC to be paid would be easy to determine and there would be no need to call up service specific POIs and POIs can be made service independent. This would increase the efficiency of the network and also serve the purpose of being able to determine the correct connection type to determine the final IUC bill.

67. In examining the appropriateness of providing a specific or agnostic service of the interconnection service and the interconnection agreement, the Authority noted the following:

(a) The Interconnection Agreements will be concluded by the TSPs that have been granted one of the following licenses in the country:

(i) Access Service License (ie BSO/CMTS/UASL);

(ii) License for NLD Services;

(iii) License for ILD Services;

(iv) Unified License entitled to at least one of the Access/NLD/ILD Services.

(b) Currently the termination rates for - domestic calls from fixed networks; national calls from wireless networks; and international calls; - They're different.

(c) Historically, there have been allegations that some TSPs are impersonating higher IUC calls as lower IUC calls by manipulating the caller's CLI.

(d) CDR-based billing systems cannot detect whether the caller's CLI has been tampered with.

68. In the light of stakeholder feedback and further analysis, the Authority believes that service providers should be able to conclude an interconnection agreement for multiple services; however, the question of service-independent or service-specific points of interest should be left to mutual negotiation between interconnection service providers. Consequently, by this Regulation, the Authority instructed the service provider applying for the conclusion of an interconnection contract to indicate, when submitting the application, the name of the services for which interconnection is requested.9. Is it necessary to have a coordination committee to facilitate effective and rapid interconnection between TSPs?69. Regarding the need for one or more coordination committees to facilitate effective and fast interconnection between travel service providers, most stakeholders consider that one or more coordination committees is not necessary. These interested parties have stated that the issue of interconnection is a bilateral matter that should be left to mutual negotiation between the interconnected TSPs within the overall regulatory framework for interconnection; Finally, the TSPs have the possibility to contact TDSAT to reach a decision on disputes between the TSPs. Some stakeholders have said that the agency is already collecting reports on connectivity issues and is holding meetings with company-level representatives of the TSP to resolve issues. On the other hand, one interested party has expressed the view that a coordination committee is urgently needed to facilitate the effective and timely interconnection between the TSPs; the Committee should have the power to intervene when a TSP fails to meet the deadlines and compel the TSP to meet the deadlines by imposing financial penalties on the TSP.70. The Authority noted the fact that problems related to interconnection between travel service providers continue to arise at different stages, even when formal interconnection agreements between them are well established. When such matters are brought to the attention of the Authority by the interconnected TSPs, the Authority will attempt to assist the TSPs to ensure effective interconnection between them. Such a facilitation mechanism for interconnection issues has so far worked quite well. In case of deadlock situations between service providers, they turn to TDSAT to seek resolution of disputes between them. As the current mechanism has worked reasonably well, the Authority did not see the point in introducing a coordination committee system to resolve connectivity issues. At the same time, the agency is aware that new service providers sometimes face difficulties in securing interconnection agreements and the required ports at points of interest. With a view to facilitating effective and expeditious interconnection, the Authority has decided to provide that it may from time to time, at its discretion, issue instructions to service providers on any aspect of interconnection for which provision has been made under these Regulations.10. Under what circumstances can a TSP separate points of interest?71. In response to the above question, a large number of replies were received from interested parties. While one stakeholder suggested that no TSP should be allowed to disconnect POIs under any circumstances, some other stakeholders have suggested that an extreme step such as disconnecting POIs should only be done in exceptional cases. On the other hand, various stakeholders have stated that deactivation of points of interest should be allowed under certain justifiable circumstances.72. Stakeholders opposed to POI blocking have argued that POI blocking is against the interests of the consumer and also violates the license terms, there should be no POI blocking based on the consumer's own interpretation of the terms and conditions for non-payment TSPs based on fees etc...; Separation of points of interest should only be permitted by order of the authority or the licensor. Some other stakeholders have argued that shutting down points of interest is an extreme step that should not be resorted to except in exceptional circumstances such as: (a) the closure of Services by Licensee; (b) Licensee closes the relevant POP; (c) on the basis of a mutual agreement; or (d) for breach of the Interconnection Agreement.73. Stakeholders who have supported the POI segregation provision for legitimate reasons have cited the following reasons as justifying POI segregation:

(a) When a TSP bypasses traffic, i. H. the TSP delivers traffic intended to be delivered at a certain POI to other POIs destined for other services, mainly to pay lower termination/carrying fees;

(b) when a TSP routes traffic through a third party, i.e. the TSP transmits its traffic via another TSP to the interconnecting TSP without its consent;

(c) When a TSP routes no-CLI/fake CLI/CLI calls that have been spoofed to route higher IUC calls than lower IUC calls;

(d) when a TSP provides a service not defined in its license;

(e) if a TSP fails to make the IUC payment in accordance with the agreed interconnection terms;

(f) If a TSP uses the Services in violation of national security or in violation of the law, the terms of the License or the Regulations;

(g) when a TSP's network interferes with the normal operation of the interconnected TSP's network;

(h) if a TSP breaches the confidentiality provisions of the Interconnection Agreement;

(i) if a TSP has been declared bankrupt or insolvent;

(j) The defaulting party is no longer licensed under Section 4 of the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885.

74. The Authority noted the following in assessing the point of interest shutdown provision:

1 Government-issued licenses requiredAmong otherthat interconnected networks connect and remain connected to their Applicable Systems.

2 The authority, see directive of December 31, 2003,Among other, pointed out that a TSP wishing to switch off the POIs must give reasonable notice (at least 10 days) that the POIs will be switched off. M/s BSNL appealed to TDSAT against the above Directorate (Complaint No. 2 of 2004). TDSAT canceled the TRAI management by order of April 21, 2004, with the exception of the notice period (at least 10 days) for the deactivation of POIs.

3 The Authority has received numerous statements from various TSPs in the past alleging that some TSPs unilaterally segregate POIs under certain circumstances based on their own interpretation of the Terms and Conditions for non-payment of fees etc. Such segregation of POIs results to block services for consumers.

75. After considering feedback from stakeholders and further analysis, the Authority is of the opinion that (a) the separation of POIs should only be used in exceptional circumstances; and (b) if relied upon, it shall be done only under due process. Consequently, the Authority has decided to order that, before detaching a POI, a service provider:

(i) give the other service provider fifteen business days' notice of the reasons for the proposed disconnection;

(ii) if you are dissatisfied with the response to the Good Cause Notice issued pursuant to the clause above, or no response to the Good Cause Notice is received, notify such service provider fifteen business days in advance of the date of the cutoff point of interest notify; And

(iii) Failing to Disconnect POIs before the expiration of the notice period specified under clause (ii) above:

However, the above provision does not apply if a POI is disconnected by mutual consent or at the direction of the Licensor or the Authority.11. Is there a need to review the level of interconnection mentioned in the guidance attached to the RIO Regulations 2002?76. In response to the question of the need to review interconnection levels, many stakeholders have stated that there is a need to review interconnection levels, particularly in relation to the PSTN. On the other hand, the public sector telecommunications service providers have argued that the current level of interconnection should be maintained.77. The Authority examined the views of interested parties and found that certain provisions of the licences, transit/transport charges and numbering system, etc. have a significant impact on connection levels. The Authority believes that further discussion is needed on the issue of interconnection levels.12. What should be the framework to ensure timely deployment/scaling of E1 ports?78. In 2005, the Authority issued an Interconnection Provision Order directing all TSPs to provide interconnection at the request of the Interconnection Applicant within 90 days of the relevant payment by the Interconnection Applicant. It should be noted that some TSPs have indicated in their response to the Authority's PCP dated 10/14/2015 that the 90-day period begins from the date of payment against a reminder, issued by a service provider against a binding request of a requesting service provider; However, in many cases some service providers do not collect the reminder for significantly long periods of time and therefore the maximum period of 90 days for provisioning the interconnection becomes futile. On the other hand, some TSPs have stated that interconnection seekers sometimes tend to make unreasonable demands for the provision of interconnection ports that are difficult to fulfill in short periods of time. In this context, the following question was asked to collect the opinions of stakeholders:

Question: What should be the framework to ensure timely deployment/boost of E1 ports? Provide a full framework with timelines that include the following aspects:

(a) minimum number of E1 ports for service initiation;

(b) the maximum period for the issuance of the deposit slip by the Interconnection Provider;

(c) maximum payment term for E1 ports requested by the interconnection applicant;

(d) order to provide the E1 ports requested by the Interconnection Provider;

e) space allocation for the common location of transmission facilities;

(f) maximum time for the establishment of transmission links by the applicant for interconnection;

(g) maximum time for acceptance tests;

(h) maximum period for the issue of the final order letter by the Interconnection Provider; And

(i) Maximum period for picking up traffic at the POI after provisioning/expansion of the E1 ports already paid for.

79. In response to the above question, two sets of responses were received from interested parties. While one stakeholder has stated that no further regulatory intervention is required in relation to the deployment and increase in interconnection ports, the other stakeholder has argued that clear and unambiguous timelines for each interconnection step are urgently needed. Some stakeholders have also stated that the framework to ensure the timely provision/expansion of ports should be process-oriented, compliance with which should be closely monitored by the Authority.80. A stakeholder who believes that no further regulatory intervention is needed on the issue of interconnect port deployment and scaling has stated that scaling is a complex process involving multiple domains such as core and transmission; the capacity increase requirements can be related to switching ports, a single card in the transmission box or coverage of an entire ring/network in transmission; The procurement process for central and transmission equipment typically takes 6-8 weeks from order to delivery and an additional 2-4 weeks for the justification, ordering, installation and commissioning process depending on whether it is an upgrade to card or network level. Therefore, the period of 90 days stipulated in the authority's order of 07.06.2005 is appropriate and justified.81. On the other hand, one interested party, who has argued that clear and unambiguous timetables for each step of the interconnection are urgently needed, has stated that the Authority's instruction of 07/06/2005 is of little help as the incumbent TSPs are doing traffic forecasts and POI elevation requests disapprove of new TSPs; Most importantly, incumbent service providers do not issue Demand Notices to new TSPs, resulting in applicants for interconnection being unable to make the appropriate payments. Established TSPs only allocate meager ports for POI supplements, and that too at their own discretion.82. The stakeholder who argued that the framework to ensure timely deployment/scaling of ports should be process-oriented stated that:

(a) Demand must be reasonable: The interconnection applicant must submit the demand for interconnection ports together with the justification of the traffic, since the provision of the interconnection ports requires not only increasing the capacity at the points of interest but also into the access network. Since the interconnect requester only compensates the interconnect provider for the cost of the cumulative interconnect capacity for its traffic, a significant portion of the investment made in the access network to handle the additional traffic is wasted if it turns out that the actual needs of the service provider applies are well below the demand he has forecast.

(b) The interconnection provider shall conduct due diligence prior to accepting the request: Considering that the interconnection provider has an existing network which may require extensions and other modifications to meet the demand of the interconnection applicant, the Interconnection providers do demand due diligence using historical traffic trends at the points of interest. This is important to ensure that a connection provider does not have to invest in building unnecessary capacity in their network.

(c) Initial E1s for the pre-launch phase should be limited to 1-2 E1s to test inter-network interconnectivity.

(d) The connection provider must provide the location of the POIs to enable the connection finder to make appropriate planning and arrangements.

(e) Provision of space, power and infrastructure: If the agreement provides for the provision of space, power and infrastructure to the interconnection applicant, the interconnection provider must assess the feasibility of allocating space, power, etc. a certain period of time. If it is determined that this is not practicable, the applicant for interconnection should be required to make alternative arrangements within a specified timeframe.

83. Stakeholders supporting the need for clear and unambiguous timelines for interconnection and those advocating a process-oriented framework to ensure timely deployment/scaling of ports have proposed timeframes for various aspects of port deployment and ramp-up. The time periods proposed by many of them vary quite a bit.84. In considering the need for a framework for interconnection port deployment and expansion, the agency recognized that the deployment and expansion of point-of-interest ports has always been a contentious issue among interconnection service providers. Several TSPs have brought the issue of lack of cooperation and filibustering by holders to the attention of the Authority on numerous occasions. Therefore, the claim by stakeholders that the Authority should set clear and unambiguous deadlines for each interconnection step and do so in a process-oriented manner to ensure effective and timely interconnection does not seem entirely unjustified. At the same time, it does not seem advisable to micromanage the various aspects of the procurement and expansion process.85. Based on stakeholder feedback and additional analysis, PREPA has decided to create the following framework to ensure the delivery of the initial connection and port growth at points of interest within a given time frame:

(a) A Service Provider shall, upon receipt of the request for ports and collocation space, if required, issue an Admission Letter and, if applicable, a Solicitation Notice within five business days of receipt of the request.

(b) A Service Provider shall pay the amount upon receipt of the reminder within three business days from the date of receipt of the reminder.

(c) The service provider who issued the declaration of acceptance informs the requesting service provider about the provision of the ports and, if applicable, the allocation of collocation space,

(i) within five Business Days of the date of issue of your Acceptance Letter if no Notice of Invitation has been issued; And

(ii) within five business days of receipt of payment from the requesting Service Provider against the reminder, if a reminder has been issued.

(d) A service provider, upon receipt of notification of the provision of ports and allocation of collocation space, if any, shall notify the other provider of services of the establishment of transmission within three business days of receipt of the notification. Connection between the points of interest of the two service providers.

(e) A Service Provider shall, upon receipt of the notification of establishment of the transmission link between the POIs, perform acceptance tests and issue the final commissioning letter to the other Service Provider within five business days of receipt of the notification.

86. For illustrative purposes, the chart below shows the different deadlines that need to be respected in relation to the provision of the initial interconnection and the increase of the ports at the points of interest, in case the service provider issues a demand notification. prompted to provide the initial connection. or elevated ports are placed:

13. Should separate port provisioning periods be mandated for (a) fixed networks and (b) mobile/IP networks?87. With the exception of three interested parties, all other interested parties that commented on the above issue opposed the need for separate time periods for port provisioning for scheduled, fixed and mobile networks /IP.88. Stakeholders opposing the requirement for separate time periods for port provisioning in fixed and mobile/IP networks have expressed the following views:

(a) Interconnection takes place in the core network, be it fixed or mobile/IP network and therefore there is no justification for separate time periods for the provisioning of technology-based ports.

(b) Regulations must be technology independent.

(c) The interconnection of fixed and mobile networks is no different. Especially now with the ability to connect over IP networks, the cost and complexity of connections has been significantly reduced.

89. In support of the need for separate time periods for port provisioning in fixed and mobile/IP networks, one interested party has inter alia stated that the PSTN fixed networks in the country are predominantly owned by PSU. that is, BSNL and MTNL that have legacy networks. The capacity of such exchanges is limited and their expansion is time-consuming and expensive. On the other hand, there is no capacity limitation for the new technology switches deployed by various TSPs in their cellular networks. Therefore, separate time periods can be prescribed for port provision for fixed network and mobile/IP network.90. It is worth mentioning that when asked, the PSTS explained to the public authorities that the deadlines for the provision of ports in fixed and mobile/IP networks should be the same and there should be no distinction between the deadlines Technology base 91. At the In considering the appropriateness of separate timeframes for provisioning ports in fixed and mobile/IP networks, the Authority noted that the different steps in the interconnection process are generally service technology neutral. Providers Accordingly, the Authority has decided not to impose separate port provision periods for fixed and mobile/IP networks.14. Will higher level ports like STM-1 be allowed instead of E1?92. In response to the previous question, the other interested parties, with the exception of one interested party that supported the requirement for initial interconnection and increasing the points of interest at STM-1 level, commented on the following approach :

(a) The expansion of ports is already permitted at the STM-1 level and therefore does not require any regulatory provision.

(b) The increase of STM-1 or other levels must be mutually agreed upon by the contracting parties instead of being mandatory.

(c) Depending on the traffic requirements, the increase of the STM-1 level can also be allowed.

(d) If the existing POI 63 exceeds E1, a further increase of the STM-1 level can be made depending on the technical feasibility in both nodes of the TSPs.

e) The Telecommunications Interconnection (Port Charges) Regulations 2001 prescribe port charges based on E1 ports.

(f) The expansion of the ports should be based exclusively on the capacities required on both sides.

(g) Port scaling may be allowed at higher levels such as STM-1 instead of E1. It results in lower hardware costs and much better bit rates, and is capable of carrying both circuit-switched and packet-switched calls. For smaller requirements, the existing practice of ports at E1 level should be allowed to continue.

93. The interested party that has applied for a regulatory mandate to provide the initial interconnection as well as the POI augmentation at STM-1 level has stated that in order to handle the high pattern of POI traffic in the current environment, also during the initial stages of the network, the initial connection capacities must be revised to an STM-1; Even for port expansion on a modern switch, the minimum unit should be in terms of STM-1.94. The Authority is aware that a new entrant does not necessarily need an STM-1 capability (63 E1 equivalent) in the early stages. Also, the POI boost requirement does not necessarily have to be as high as the STM-1 capacity in all cases. In such a scenario, it can be counterproductive to require interconnection at a minimum level of STM-1, as in certain cases this can lead to a waste of resources and can also result in the requesting service provider having to pay unnecessarily high connection fees.95 . At the same time, the Authority is aware that increasing the points of interest at the STM-1 level would generally be beneficial for interconnecting TSPs for the following reasons:

(a) Most TSP connecting devices (ie Media Gateways, MSCs, etc.) are equipped with STM-1 ports. The ratio of STM-1 ports to E1 ports on such devices is growing in favor of STM-1 ports.

(b) STM-1 ports are not only inexpensive, but also take up much less rack space. As a result, the same equipment rack/shelf can accommodate a much higher interconnect capacity if it contains STM-1 ports compared to the scenario where it only contains E1 ports. Therefore, interconnection at the STM-1 level can be a win-win for both interconnecting TSPs.

96. In the light of stakeholder feedback and further analysis, the Authority has decided to require a service provider to provide STM-1 ports at POIs when a service provider requests the provision of such ports to extend POIs, provided that the two service providers may agree to increase POIs at any higher or lower level, such as B. DS-3 or STM-16.15. How to ensure that port overdemanding is not being performed by a TSP?97. In response to the above question, interested parties have expressed a variety of views. While some stakeholders felt that no regulatory requirements on the issue were necessary as such issues could be resolved amicably, others argued that it was unpredictable how and why a requesting service provider would overcharge. to the interconnection provider; If the actual traffic turns out to be less than the demand, the two interconnected TSPs can revoke the additional ports from each other. Most other stakeholders have responded with suggestions to ensure that a TSP does not over-demand ports. A number of views expressed by these stakeholders are summarized below:

(a) View-1: The increase must be based on a current capacity utilization of more than 70% during the Network Peak Hour (NBH) throughout the past week. The increase amount should be a reasonable increase that should bring the utilization in the 50-70% range.

(b) View-2: Some connection seekers tend to forecast inflated demands due to their ambitious traffic forecasts. Meeting such excessive demands would be a costly affair and could also lead to the creation of redundant capacity at the port, radio, and switch levels, as well as other wasted investments. Therefore, it should be the responsibility of the interconnection applicant to justify the demand from the technical and commercial point of view of the ports and it is up to the supplier to accept the calculations presented by the interconnection applicant.

(c) View 3: To ensure that the requesting TSP does not make excessive demands on ports, port charges should be abolished. In the event that even after three months, the average peak hour occupancy of the original POI is less than 10% for one month continuously, the port charges prescribed by TRAI should apply to the applicant for interconnection for a specified period of six months. If the average POI peak hour occupancy remains below 30% for a month after the end of the six month period since the last POI increase, the TSP may withdraw this increased port capacity.

98. In examining the matter, the Authority realized that the problem of excess demand among the interconnected travel service providers has always been quite controversial and often led to disputes between them. While demanding an unreasonably high number of ports is likely to result in wasteful spending on networks, denying adequate demand under the pretense of calling such demand excessive would result in congestion at points of interest and therefore consumer inconvenience . Therefore, clear rules would need to be established to determine how much port demand is reasonable at a POI.99. In order to ensure the optimal use of expensive network resources, the Authority has decided to specify the following in relation to the requirement of ports to provide initial interconnection and increase POIs:

To. Request for Initial Provisioning of Ports: Upon completion of an Interconnection Agreement, the Service Provider that has requested the establishment of an Interconnection Agreement may request the other Service Provider to provide such number of ports at the points of interest that it must comply with the requirement of their outgoing and incoming traffic at the points of interest for a period of three months from the date of first interconnection.

B. Request for More Points of Interest: A service provider may request additional ports at a point of interest from the other service provider if the forecast capacity utilization of the ports at that point of interest occurs after thirty days from the submission date of the request, it is likely that it is more than 70% of the ports in the POI, and such forecast capacity utilization of the ports in the POI is determined on the basis of the daily traffic over the thirty days at the POI during peak hours: provided that the service provider has an additional number of ports requests, which is expected to reduce the capacity utilization of the ports at the POI to less than 60% by the end of thirty days from the date of the request.

16. If the interconnect applicant agrees to pay the full cost of the equipment required for the increase upfront, should a TSP provision the requested ports regardless of traffic at the POI?100. In response to the previous question, three stakeholder positions have emerged. The first point of view is that the matter should be left to the discretion of the TSPs themselves and should not be dictated by the regulator. The second point of view is that the provision and increase of POIs should be based exclusively on the traffic at the POIs and therefore the thesis proposed in the question is not justified. The third view is that an interconnecting TSP must provide the requested number of ports if the other party is willing to pay the full cost of the equipment required for the increase up front.101. The interested parties who have claimed that it would not be reasonable to require interconnecting TSPs to offer the requested ports regardless of the traffic at the POI if the other party agrees to pay the full cost of the equipment required for the rollout to carry in advance have disclosed the following arguments in support of his view:

(a) Interconnection must be optimal and efficient and no carte blanche can be given at the request of either party. It should be noted that the license specifies this"...The interconnection contracts willAmong other, shall: (a) meet all reasonable requirements for the transmission and receipt of messages between the interconnected systems."Therefore, the adequacy of interconnection needs is a sine qua non for interconnection licenses and agreements. The interconnection agreements provide for the measurement of peak-hour traffic on the agreed routes in order to estimate future capacity needs. Therefore, there can be no reason for the connecting TSP to increase ports, regardless of the traffic volume at the POI.

(b) The total equipment cost includes both capital expenditures and operational expenditures for network elements such as BTS, BSC, MSC, transmission links, connection terminals, passive infrastructure such as masts, etc. The interconnection applicant only pays the port dues and this for a period of two years. If the traffic is less than the requested capacity, the provider's cost of implementing the additional network is wasted. Therefore, port provisioning must be reasonable and based on reasonable traffic forecasts, confirmed by actual traffic.

102. On the other hand, the interested parties have supported the arrangement that if the other party agrees to bear the full cost of the equipment required for the increase in advance, the Interconnection TSPs offer the requested ports regardless of the traffic in the POI, having the following arguments in support her point of view:

(a) In the event that a new entrant or a requesting TSP provides advance estimates and agrees to bear the full cost of the equipment required for the increase up front, the other TSP must provide the requested ports regardless of traffic levels of the POI. A possible underutilization of the capacity and the capital tied up with it could be the only fear that an interconnect provider will be too late with the provision of ports (since otherwise the provider would also be interested in creating this capacity if the utilization is sufficient). By paying for this feature, the browser addresses this issue, and therefore the provider must provide the requested ports regardless of the traffic levels at the points of interest.

(b) Since sufficient time is required for upgrading the equipment, there should be no restrictions on deployment (in terms of capacity) as the interconnect provider receives the cost of the interconnect browser up front.

(c) Depending on the technical feasibility of the Interconnection Provider, the Interconnection Provider should be able to provide the requested ports regardless of the traffic volume if the applicant for interconnection agrees to bear in advance the full cost of the equipment required for the increase in POI. However, this should be phased in over time based on the vendor's back-end capabilities and associated operational issues. The search engine request must be validated by Traffic Engineering in the assumptions made for forecasting traffic and number of subscribers.

103. The Authority, in examining the above matter, noted that when an interconnecting TSP provides ports at a POI, it not only has to bear the cost of the ports but also has to plan to deploy a pro rata share of the radio network. (BTS, BSC, transmission lines) and basic equipment to cope with the increase in traffic, and therefore port development must be based on legitimate demand well supported by actual traffic. At the same time, the Authority believes that interconnected TSPs should be allowed to jointly decide on the massive increase of a POI, with one TSP paying the full cost of the equipment required for the increase from the other TSP upfront. Consequently, the Authority has decided to leave the above matter to the mutual decision of the interconnected TSPs.17. Should there be a financial disincentive for not providing the initial POI and not increasing the POI within the specified timeframe, etc.?104. For the stakeholder consultation in the PP, the following question was asked:

Question: Should a financial disincentive be imposed on TSPs for

(a) Failure to conclude an Interconnection Agreement within a specified period;

(b) fail to provide the initial POI;

(c) failure to increase the POI within the stipulated period;

(d) for breach of any clause prescribed in the Regulations.

If so, how high should such false financial incentives be?105. In response to the above question, while some stakeholders have supported the need for financial disincentives, other stakeholders have argued that it is not necessary to impose financial disincentives on TSOs in interconnection-related matters.106. Stakeholders who have opposed the imposition of financial disincentives on travel service providers have put forward arguments in support of their position, including:

(a) The conclusion of an agreement, the provision of the original POI, the expansion of POIs and compliance with the clauses prescribed in the regulations imply continuous efforts at ground level by both interconnected TSPs, which makes it very difficult to determine the cause. Delay in actual agreement/extension scenario. It would therefore be frivolous, unfair and unjust to impose a sanction on the interconnection provider for providing high quality services to customers. The provider cannot be held responsible unilaterally, since the interconnection of two networks involves. Any claim of infringement, upon due investigation, should accrue only to the infringing party.

(b) Financial disincentives should not be imposed on TSPs as interconnection deployment depends on various parameters including technical feasibility/network upgrade etc.

(c) There is no need to impose perverse financial incentives as the existing practice of TRAI to solve problems between operators works well and should therefore be continued. In the event that either party is not satisfied with the solution provided by TRAI, the parties also have the right to appeal to TDSAT or any other high court to settle such a dispute. In addition, TRAI can recommend suitable measures to the DoT in accordance with the license conditions.

107. On the other hand, stakeholders who have supported the imposition of financial disincentives on travel service providers in interconnection-related matters:Among other, made the following arguments:

(a) Currently, incumbent TSPs can block interconnection, provision of credit points and increase of credit points with impunity without imposing any financial burden on them. Therefore, there is an urgent need for TRAI to impose financial disincentives of Rs. 5 lakh per breach day from incumbent TSPs should they fail to (a) provide interconnection agreements within a specified time frame; (b) provide initial points of interest to interconnection applicants within a prescribed period of time; (c) increase points of interest within the specified time frame; and (d) for breach of any other provision of the Regulations and their licenses. It is only after embracing such punitive financial disincentives that incumbent TSPs begin to comply with the terms of their license and interconnection regulations.

(b) Delays and refusals by existing TSPs to interconnect with the new entrant violate licensing conditions, disrupt the principles of a level playing field, stifle competition and harm innovation and consumer interests. Therefore, severe penalties must be imposed as a deterrent if initial interconnection is not provided or interconnection capacities are not increased in a timely manner.

108. In considering the appropriateness of the need to impose a financial disincentive in interconnection-related matters, the Authority became aware of several recent cases where new entrants have notified the Authority that (a) they are not in incumbent TSPs enter into an interconnection agreement in good time; and (b) not increasing POIs in a timely manner, as a business strategy to ensure that they do not have to be populated against such new TSPs. As the Authority has already established a framework for the conclusion of an interconnection agreement and for the timely provision and extension of points of interest, it seems imperative to put in place a deterrent mechanism to ensure the applicability of such a framework. Consequently, the Authority has prescribed that, without prejudice to any sanctions which may be imposed by virtue of its license or the provisions of the Act or any rules or orders made or instructions given pursuant thereto, a service provider which breaches the provisions of this Regulation shall: shall be required to pay an amount as a financial incentive not to exceed Rs 1 lakh per day per licensed service area as directed by the Authority: Provided no payment of any amount shall be made as a financial deterrent by the Authority unless: the service provider has been given a reasonable opportunity to defend themselves against a violation of the rules followed by the authority.18. What should be the methodology for billing interconnection usage charges and how should late payments between TSPs be dealt with?109. Regarding the method of winding up IUC, different views were received from interested parties, which are summarized below:

(a) Opinion - 1: Mutual Interconnection Agreements should settle the issue of IUC liquidation.

(b) View - 2: IUC accounting must be on a net basis.

(c) Opinion - 3: The current accounting method on a gross basis should be retained. This is advisable not only for easy documentation to claim deductions, but also in light of the forthcoming GST regulation which will require CENVAT availability only after the TSP has issued the invoice, made the GST payment to the government and required Details also uploaded to the government website.

110. In addition, stakeholders have expressed a variety of views on how to deal with late IUC payments, which are summarized below:

(a) Opinion - 1: The issue of late payments between TSPs should also be able to be dealt with bilaterally.

(b) Opinion - 2: Any undisputed amount not paid by the TSP within the stipulated time limit must be the subject of a criminal interest.

111. In view of the comments of the interested parties and the subsequent analysis, the Authority has decided to leave the issues related to the liquidation of the IUC and the late payment of the IUC to the interconnection service providers by mutual agreement. The Authority expects interconnection service providers to adequately address the issue of IUC residues.19. What regulatory policies and measures are required to encourage TSPs to migrate to IP-level interconnection?112. In response to the above question, with the exception of a few stakeholders, the vast majority of stakeholders have stated that there is no need for regulation of TSPs to encourage migration to interconnection at the IP level, or that it is premature to do so to address the issue of mandatory interconnection at the IP level.113. Stakeholders who have supported the call for policy and regulatory action to encourage interconnection at the IP levelAmong other, stated the following:

(a) The Authority shall prescribe guidelines for the gradual and phased transition to IP-to-IP Interconnection.

(b) Currently, the costs of the media portal required for the interconnection between the IP-based network and the TDM network are borne by the TSP, which has a new technology IP-based network. In order to stifle competition, mobile operators, even after having IP-based networks, do not offer IP-based interconnection. The real purpose will only be achieved if IP-based interconnection is mandatory and there is an appropriate regulatory framework for IP-based interconnection.

114. The following is a summary of comments from stakeholders who did not support the need for policy and regulatory action to promote interconnection at the IP level:

(a) It is premature to address this issue as IP-level interconnection can only take place effectively once all TSPs' networks have migrated from circuit-switched to packet-switched networks. It is necessary to launch a separate consultation on IP Interconnection.

(b) Regulators around the world have moved towards technology neutrality. In India, technology neutrality is anchored in the existing NTP-2012/NTP-99 and UAS/CMTS/UL licenses. The mandatory use of a certain technology would contradict the principles enshrined in the NTP and license agreements.

(c) TSPs in India have made huge investments in existing TDM-based networks based on the original license order and these investments have been made for longer time horizons. A mandate to migrate to IP Interconnection would result in redundancy of the currently deployed networks, which have a remaining lifetime of 5-10 years. Therefore, any regulation towards mandatory IP Interconnection will lead to unnecessary deletion of existing installations with no corresponding techno-economic benefit for existing TSPs. A migration to IP interconnection will also result in a very high cost burden for the TSPs as it will involve the deployment of network elements such as media gateways, signaling gateways, soft switches, session border controllers and the supporting transport network, etc.

d) The dominant technological ecosystem changes very dynamically, making it difficult to predict the emergence of new advanced technologies. Investments to build IP networks may become redundant in the future as new network technologies emerge. Therefore, favoring any one technology limits TSPs' flexibility in choosing the most appropriate technology and may result in sub-optimal use of infrastructure.

115. In assessing the need for policy and regulatory measures to encourage TSPs to migrate to IP level interconnection, the Authority became aware of the fact that most interconnections in the country are currently based on in-circuit switching technology. Most of the country's telecommunications networks (both wired and wireless) are traditionally optimized for voice traffic. On the other hand, new-age telecommunications networks are increasingly being optimized for data traffic. Such networks use packet switching. Some of these networks also carry voice traffic. It can be expected that when telecommunications networks are switched to All-IP networks in the future, the interconnection of voice services will also be based on IP.116. It is worth noting that according to its recommendations of 11/02/2016, the authority issued recommendations to the government to allow IP-based interconnections. These recommendations were accepted by the government and consequently the licenses were changed to allow IP-based interconnection on 04/19/2016. The amended general terms and conditions of Section 27.3 of Chapter 1, Part I of the Single License read as follows:

“27.3 The interconnection between the networks of different licensees for the transmission of circuit-switched data traffic shall comply with the national CCS standards No. 7 and for the transmission of IP-based data traffic with the standards of the Telecommunication Engineering Center (TEC) and its periodic amendments Telecommunications Engineering Center (TEC) and is also subject to the technical feasibility and technical integrity of the networks and must be within the general framework of the regulations/instructions/connection orders issued by the TRAI/licensor from time to time, the licensee must install the media gateway switch . In addition, Licensor may direct LICENSEE to adopt any other technical standards issued by TEC on interconnection-related matters.”

117. The Authority also noted that:

(a) Most TSPs have IP-based core networks. However, the network elements at the POI are still predominantly circuit-switched, mainly for legacy reasons. Although the licenses now allow IP-based interconnection, there has not been much progress in this direction.

(b) Both IP-based and circuit-switched access networks are currently used to provide voice telephony. In the recent past, many TSPs have announced the introduction of IP-based access networks in the near future.

118. Based on the feedback from stakeholders and further analysis, the Authority considers that further discussions on the issue of IP-based interconnection are needed.20. Is there a need to set up an interconnect exchange framework to eliminate bilateral connectivity issues?119. In response to the previous question, all but two stakeholders have stated that it is not necessary to create a framework for the liaison exchange. Such interested parties have cited,Among other, the following reasons for his statement:

(a) As the interconnection regime in India has developed on a bilateral basis, there is no immediate need at this late stage to create a framework for interconnection exchanges as it would serve no useful purpose.

(b) Replacing the interconnection will be an additional cost burden for the industry with no added benefit. This is because most TSPs have established bilateral points of interest after large investments and therefore link exchange is an additional/unproductive cost burden. Direct peering, for both TDM and IP technology, is the only economical option given the high volume that POIs currently handle. This is evident from the fact that TSPs have established peer-to-peer connectivity instead of using any kind of transit/connection points not only for TDM connectivity but also for IP connectivity. Therefore, exchanging traffic exclusively via the interconnect switch should be ruled out from the outset.

(c) Currently, TSPs are connected through points of interest in different cities and towns. Point-of-interest locations are currently based on low-cost routes. Interconnect Exchange avoids using the shortest path, which results in increased latency and network congestion. The introduction of the interconnection exchange will also imply the transformation of the transmission network for POI traffic, which will entail additional costs and huge cancellations.

(d) TRAI at your address"Direct connectivity between service provider networks"vide act no. 101-13/2003-MN of July 22, 2003 recognized that through traffic is associated with avoidable costs and thus justified the need for a direct connection.

(e) The required connection switch will have a very large capacity corresponding to the combined size of the STP networks implemented by all TSPs. Interconnect Exchange cannot be compared to MNP exchanges in any way as the size and scope of an MNP exchange accounts for only 5-7% of the subscribers who choose MNP every month.

(f) Failure of the interconnection switch would cause the collapse of the entire telecommunications network.

120. The two interested parties who supported the need for the establishment of the liaison exchange have argued:Among other, the following to reinforce your points of view.

(a) Interconnection exchange would help significantly to speed up the interconnection process as a new TSP would not need to negotiate individual interconnection agreements with each TSP which as its competitors has no reason to cooperate.

(b) Given the numerous delays in the conclusion of interconnection agreements, the interconnection hub will eliminate all bilateral interconnection problems and remove a significant barrier to entry into the telecommunications industry, thus opening the telecommunications industry to newer players, which will improve competition and benefit end-users. The agency must provide a glide path to move toward an interconnection exchange over a period of time. A glideslope is proposed as all TSPs have already established the interconnection and incurred the necessary costs and infrastructure to set up the interconnection. Therefore, the requirement of Interconnect Exchange would be an additional cost for TSPs, which can arise with a suitable access path.

121. The Authority, in examining the suitability of the Interconnect Exchange, became aware that TSPs within each LSA have established a large number of peer-to-peer points of interest among themselves in accordance with the licensing and regulatory framework; a substantial investment has been made in establishing the points of interest and the means of connecting them; A regulatory mandate to route all traffic between carriers through the interconnect exchange would require TSPs to redesign their transmission network and thusprima facie, such a mandate would have significant financial implications for travel service providers. The introduction of Interconnect Exchange may also affect the current numbering and routing system. After careful consideration, the authority has decided not to issue any regulations with regard to the Interconnection of Exchange for the time being.F. Review122. The Authority will closely monitor the implementation of this Regulation by service providers. The Authority may revise this regulation from time to time as it deems necessary.

[Appendix II]

For a given number of POI channels, their capacity for a 0.5% grade of service is derived from the Erlang B table. POI port increase calculation example is given below: Considering that Service Provider has services A for its outbound services traffic, existing POIs of 600 channels at Service Provider B, then the capacity of this POI is according to Erlang-B table at 0.5% of Quality of Service 562.3 Erlang. Now, if the predicted outbound traffic from Service Provider A at the end of sixty days from today is greater than 477.95 Erlang (i.e. 85% of the POI's capacity), you can request Services B from Service Provider B, who will increase the capacity of the PDI through such a number of ports that it reaches more than 637.27 Erlang (i.e. 477.95/0.75). According to the Erlang B table, this would mean increasing the number of ports in said POI by about 77 channels.

Note 1: The main standards were published vide F.No.10-10/2016-BB&PA of 01/01/2018 (1 of 2018).

Note 2: The Explanatory Memorandum explains the aims and rationale of the Telecommunications Interconnection (Amendment) Regulations, 2018 (4 of 2018).

Justification of the "Ordinance (amendment) on telecommunications interconnection, 2018 of 07.05.2018

1 The Authority notified the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulations 2018 on January 1, 2018. These Regulations came into force on February 1, 2018. 2 Some of the interested parties had written to the Authority and pointed out difficulties in the implementation of the above regulation. Accordingly, meetings with service providers took place on March 9th and 19th, 2018 at TRAI in order to understand their perspective. During the discussions in the sessions, the service providers mainly brought up the following topics:

(a) After the conversion of ports from two-way to one-way ports under the Regulation, what will be the status of existing annual port dues paid between travel service providers?

(b) Since TRAI has already mandated a 0.5% POI congestion rule by the QoS regulations, there may be no need to have an additional rule to reduce the capacity utilization of POIs to less than 60%. According to this, POIs are currently being used at 85% to 90% of their capacity while still complying with the QoS standard. However, the regulation has stipulated that the usage of POIs can only be 60% to 70%, which is unnecessary as it leads to inefficient use of network resources, leading to unnecessary costs.

(c) For time-bound provisioning of ports, they suggested that, according to existing practice, the seeker should continue to forecast the required port capacity for the next 6 months to allow the other party to size their network accordingly.

(d) According to service providers, increasing the capacity of points of interest is a complex process that requires the involvement of multiple domains such as core, transmission and switching, etc., as well as various technical, commercial, procurement and logistics aspects related to these domains and thus becomes the 21-day deadline set in the regulation into a challenge.

3 The authority examined the issues raised by the service providers and on May 8, 2018 published the "Draft Telecommunications Interconnection (Amendment) Regulations, 2018" for consultation of interested parties. The draft regulations have been posted to the TRAI website, ie www.trai.gov.in, for public consultation. Interested parties were asked to submit their comments by May 18, 2018. Comments were received from 8 interested parties.A. Analysis of the main issues raised in the "Draft Regulations on Telecommunications Interconnection (Amendment), 2018" of 05.08.2018.4 The following questions were raised for the consultation:

(i) In Regulation 6 of the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulations, 2018 (1 of 2018) (hereinafter the principal Regulations), the following condition is inserted after sub-regulation (3), namely:-

"Provided that port and infrastructure charges for all ports made available prior to February 1, 2018 continue to be payable on the terms applicable prior to February 1, 2018."

(ii) Rule 8 of the Main Rules is replaced by the following rule:

Request to increase points of interest.- (1) Each service provider shall provide the provider of the interconnection service with its forecast for peak outbound traffic for each POI every six months and the first such forecast shall be made within sixty days of the commencement of the Telecom Interconnection Regulation (Amendment), 2018 ' and subsequently on April 1st and October 1st of each year.

(2) A service provider may request additional ports at a POI from the other service provider if the expected utilization of the capacity of that POI, calculated in the manner contained in Annex II to this Regulation, is likely to increase after sixty days from the filing date of the application than eighty-five percent, and such predicted occupancy of the POI's capacity is determined based on the daily rush-hour traffic at the POI during the previous sixty days:

Provided that the Service Provider requests such a number of additional ports that it is expected to bring the capacity utilization of said POI to less than seventy-five percent at the end of sixty days from the date of the request.” .

(iii) In Rule 9 of the Main Rules,

(a) in sub-rule (1), the words "five business days" are replaced by the words "seven business days";

(b) in paragraph 2, the words “three business days” are replaced by the words “five business days”;

(c) in sub-provision (3), the words "five business days", wherever they appear, are replaced by the words "ten business days";

(d) in sub-provision (4), the words “three business days” are replaced by the words “ten business days”;

(e) in paragraph 5, the words “five business days” are replaced by the words “ten business days”;

(iv) The following Schedule is inserted after Schedule I of the Main Regulations, namely:-

"Appendix II

For a given number of POI channels, their capacity for a 0.5% grade of service is derived from the Erlang B table. POI port increase calculation example is given below: Considering that Service Provider has services A for its outbound services traffic, existing POIs of 600 channels at Service Provider B, then the capacity of this POI is according to Erlang-B table at 0.5% of Quality of Service 562.3 Erlang. Now, if the predicted outbound traffic from Service Provider A at the end of sixty days from today is greater than 477.95 Erlang (i.e. 85% of the POI's capacity), you can request Services B from Service Provider B, who will increase the capacity of the PDI through such a number of ports that it reaches more than 637.27 Erlang (i.e. 477.95/0.75). According to the Erlang B table, this would mean an increase of ports in said POI in approximately 77 channels.” 5 An analysis of these issues is presented below based on the comments and contributions of the interested parties:

(1) In Regulation 6 of the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulations, 2018 (1 of 2018) (hereinafter the Main Regulations), the following condition is inserted after sub-regulation (3), namely:-

"Provided that port and infrastructure charges for all ports made available prior to February 1, 2018 continue to be payable on the terms applicable prior to February 1, 2018."

6 While some stakeholders opposed the inclusion of this condition, one stakeholder supported the proposed change. Another interested party has stated that as the content/subject of the draft amendment is under the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, the Authority can await the outcome of the matter before making changes to the main regulations.7 Stakeholders support the proposal in the amendment it was suggested that the proposed change should also include TSPs that have been issued a new UL after their old access service licenses have expired and that continue their interconnectivity with other TSPs without renewing their interconnection contract. According to this interested party, the responsibility for the increase in ports lies only with another TSP; therefore, it should not be asked to pay for port expansion, which could also be related to several ongoing court cases on port dues.8 On the other hand, interest groups opposed to the inclusion of this condition have argued that the proposed clause exposes the principle of fairness and justice and violates the spirit of reciprocity in networking and regulation. They also argued that each service provider should bear all costs and media requirements for their egress traffic. In their view, the regulation cannot require existing ports to maintain the existing conditions for port and infrastructure charges. It has also been argued that interconnection charges can be imposed by regulation or by mutual agreement. An interested party also argued that once existing ports are switched to one-way traffic, you are no longer allowed to pay for ports used by another service provider for your outbound traffic. According to this actor, according to the amendment of the Port Tariffs Regulation, also for the existing ports, each party should bear the cost of the E1s needed to carry the outbound traffic of their network9. Arguing that the Authority can await the outcome of the matter before making changes to the main rules which are untenable as the subject of the proposed change is a lower jurisdiction in the Hon'ble Delhi High Court. By issuing a notice to that effect, the Honorable Court did not prevent the Authority from taking further action.10 Questions relating to the renewal of interconnection contracts after licenses have expired and the development of ports have essentially already been ruled on. These are not subject to this change. Furthermore, this change is unrelated to the port dues rate.11 The argument of the interested parties that the proposed clause breaks the principle of equality and fairness and violates the spirit of reciprocity in interconnection is wrong, as fairness is justified, the requirement that after port conversion, each service provider will look for ports that ensure fairness and reciprocity in interconnection to carry its outbound traffic. The interconnection charges for new ports are mutually agreed between the service providers. In order to implement this decision, the conversion of existing ports from bidirectional traffic to unidirectional traffic is necessary. The existing ports and the associated infrastructure, e.g. B. the collocation area, the means of connecting the ports of two service providers, etc. have already been implemented according to the agreement signed between the two interconnection service providers. An interested party's argument that once existing ports are switched to one-way traffic it is not permissible to pay for the ports used by another service provider for its outbound traffic is not tenable as the existing ports would continue to be used by both service providers according to the conversion as it was done before. The conversion of the existing ports for one-way traffic has no relation to the existing infrastructure and thus to the commercial ones. With the enactment of the main ordinance of January 1st, 2018, it was never the intention of the authority to affect the existing agreement between service providers on port and infrastructure charges. This caveat is for clarity only and to avoid any possible confusion at a later date.12 Accordingly, the Authority notes that in relation to issues related to existing port charges (provided before 1 February 2018) these two need to be converted -One-way ports to one-way ports should not affect the pre-existing commercial arrangement between the two feeder service providers.13 In the light of stakeholder feedback and further analysis, the Authority has decided that: In Regulation 6 of the Telecom Interconnection Regulations 2018 ( 1 of 2018) the following condition is inserted after sub-provision (3), namely:-

"Provided that port dues and infrastructure charges for all ports made available before February 1, 2018 continue to be payable under the conditions that applied to them before February 1, 2018."

(1) Rule 8 of the Main Rules is replaced by the following rule:

Request to increase points of interest.- (1) Each service provider shall provide the provider of the interconnection service with its forecast for peak outbound traffic for each POI every six months and the first such forecast shall be made within sixty days of the commencement of the Telecom Interconnection Regulation (Amendment), 2018 ' and subsequently on April 1st and October 1st of each year.

(2) A service provider may request additional ports at a POI from the other service provider if the expected utilization of the capacity of that POI, calculated in the manner contained in Annex II to this Regulation, is likely to increase after sixty days from the filing date of the application than eighty-five percent, and such predicted occupancy of the POI's capacity is determined based on the daily rush-hour traffic at the POI during the previous sixty days:

Provided that the Service Provider requests such a number of additional ports that it is expected to bring the capacity utilization of said POI to less than seventy-five percent at the end of sixty days from the date of the request.” .

14 Regarding the first point, ie Rule 8(1), most service providers have expressed support for the proposed clause or have made no comments. A service provider supporting the proposed clause has explained that the forecast should also include the number of ports and the expected increase in traffic in Erlangs. On the other hand, a service provider has requested that the proposed clause be deleted. In support of this argument, he has argued that the semi-annual traffic forecast in the Amending Act only serves to inform the interconnection partners of forthcoming traffic growth patterns and bears no relation to the actual demand for the E1 ports. According to this stakeholder, given the ongoing process to increase E1 due to past and upcoming traffic growth, this requirement is redundant. It was further argued that this would create a new point of contention between a new entrant and the TSPs, who would start contesting the projections for the E1 increase. It can also result in incumbent TSPs rejecting the immediate increase in the absence of traffic forecasts, which may only be twice a year. An interested party has requested that the forecasting interval be reduced to three months instead of six.15 The interconnected telecommunications networks of different service providers operate as a system designed to ensure that the networks handle voice calls without congestion. In order to achieve this goal, regular traffic forecasts are important for planning the expansion of the capacities of coupling and transmission networks. In particular, it becomes more important when a service provider's decisions may affect the interconnection service provider's network capacity planning. Traffic forecasts on a semi-annual basis would provide any service provider with sufficient information for network expansion in good time and in advance. The traffic forecast is intended to help ensure the increase of points of interest within the deadline provided by the regulations. The fear that this will serve no purpose and lead to a new point of contention seems unfounded. With sufficient safeguards such as the definition of a timeframe for the provision of the initial interconnection as well as the increase in points of interest foreseen in the TIR 2018 and the current amendment of the TIR 2018, the possibility of rejection by some of the incumbents does not appear to be an issue. Reality. Consequently, the Authority considers that the requirement to provide traffic forecasts initially within 60 days and then every two years is justified. With regard to the requirement to include the number of ports and the traffic in Erlang in the extrapolation, this problem has already been solved with the inclusion of Appendix II in the present amendment.16 The second problem is, i.e. 8(2) are deviating from interested parties opinions received. Few stakeholders believe that the issue of port expansion should be left to mutual discussion between operators and that regulatory mandates should not be imposed. In addition, they have stated that the 0.5% POI congestion rule is already in effect; therefore no additional rules based on capacity utilization are required. Some stakeholders have also submitted that the POI boost request can start at 90% (instead of 85%) and still have enough headroom to perform the boost and maintain QoS. An increase request can be made for those additional ports that can bring the utilization to 80%. It has been argued that higher capacity of the circuits increases efficiency when using POIs. One interested party also submitted that in this regard it would be helpful if both Regulation 8 and Annex II clarified that rush hour is clearly defined as daily rush hour traffic that is constant over time for all Group Points of interest (POI) in the circle at network level for a service provider and do not use Bouncing Busy Hour (BBH).17 In contrast, one service provider has opposed changes to the existing clause de TIR, 2018 that the traffic monitoring period of the last 60 days is too long is to use as a traffic forecast for the next 60 days as traffic growth is expected to be similar for 4 months which is highly unlikely. Hence the current time The framework foreseen in TIR 2018 i.e. H. 30+30 days is optimal and should be continued unchanged The proposed revised loops of 42 business days for the increase will significantly increase the risk of POI congestion and dropped calls. The reasoning behind this is that if traffic falls to just 75% after the increase and demand is only realized at the forecast 85% traffic load factor, even a slight deviation in actual traffic growth corresponds to a higher load factor of more than 95%, therefore, by the time the surge occurs, dropped calls will have already begun.18 In analyzing feedback from stakeholders, the agency found that in ensuring compliance with POI congestion mandated by QoS regulations, it is also important ensure optimal POI capacity utilization. In order to ensure this conflict of goals, the decision to increase the POI capacities must not be left solely to the mutual understanding of the service providers. Congestion at points of interest can also spiral into the performance of other network elements. It is therefore always advisable to dimension the capacities of the POIs in such a way that traffic jams at the POIs can be avoided in most situations. On the one hand, POI usage of 60% to 70% can lead to inefficient use of network resources, on the other hand, POI usage of 90% or more can lead to network congestion. The Authority also noted that changing the time period from thirty days to sixty days will provide a reasonable window for analysis and deployment of additional ports. The fear that an increase in the utilization rate (85%) to initiate the request to increase the capacity of POIs or an increase in the period of analysis and projection (60 days) may lead to POI overload is unfounded. In addition, the Authority believes that time-consistent daily rush-hour traffic may not give a true picture of actual traffic as follows:

Request to increase points of interest.- (1) Each service provider shall provide the interconnection service provider with its outbound peak traffic forecasts for the following six months at each POI at six-monthly intervals, and the first such forecast shall be provided within sixty days. from the commencement of the Telecommunications Interconnection (Amendment) Regulations, 2018 and thereafter on 1 April and 1 October of each year.

(2) A service provider may request additional ports at a POI from the other service provider if the probable utilization of the capacity of that POI, calculated in accordance with Annex II of these Regulations, after sixty days from the submission date of the request is likely to be more than eighty-five Percent, and such a forecast utilization of the capacity of the POI is determined based on the daily traffic during the previous sixty days at the POI during the rush hour:

Provided that the Service Provider requests such a number of additional ports that it is expected to bring the capacity utilization of said POI to less than seventy-five percent at the end of sixty days from the date of the request.” .

(3) In Rule 9 of the Main Rules,

(a) in sub-rule (1), the words "five business days" are replaced by the words "seven business days";

(b) in paragraph 2, the words “three business days” are replaced by the words “five business days”;

(c) in sub-provision (3), the words "five business days", wherever they appear, are replaced by the words "ten business days";

(d) in sub-provision (4), the words “three business days” are replaced by the words “ten business days”;

(e) in paragraph 5, the words “five business days” are replaced by the words “ten business days”;

20 Different views have been received from stakeholders on this issue. For one, few stakeholders have advocated extending the period from the proposed 42 business days. However, there are different points of view among them. While a government PSU has suggested that the overall timeframe should be at least 70 days for initial interconnection and at least 60 days for ramp-up, some stakeholders have stated that the revised timeframe should be 60 business days given the complexity and the interdependence involved. in POI activity and some believe the current 90 day runtime is ideal. It was also proposed to assess compliance within the general 60 business day period and the days mentioned for each of the activities should be symbolic and indicative. This offers both flexibility to the interconnected operators and achievement of the ultimate purpose within the overall timeframe. On the other hand, some stakeholders have opposed the proposed extension of the timeframe. An interested party considers these deadlines to be too long as both parties are monitoring traffic at the points of interest and are aware of the upcoming requirements. Therefore, the other TSP is also aware of the increase in its inbound traffic at the POIs and should be prepared for the increase. Therefore, the conditions in the TIR 2018 are optimal and there is no need to change them. According to this stakeholder, the draft change, if implemented, will increase the risk of dropped calls and non-compliance with service quality benchmarks.21 The agency recognizes that increasing the capacity of POIs is a complex process involving multiple domains such as Core, broadcast and switching, etc. and various technical, commercial, procurement and logistical issues related to these areas, and therefore the Authority took note of the related statements from service providers and proposed to extend the period for increasing the capacity of POI from 21 business days to extend to 42 business days. A further extension of this duration cannot be justified, especially when each service provider is expected to forecast its outbound peak traffic for each POI every six months. Now there should be no difficulty increasing POI capacities within 42 business days. Regarding the provision of time in general, the Authority noted that this provision may lead to a situation where the speed of the interconnection applicant may give the interconnection provider an undue advantage. To illustrate, if the connection requester pays the amount in one business day and is ready to set up the transmission connection between the POIs, the connection can be established in a much shorter period compared to 42 business days. However, if the general deadline is met, the interconnect provider may lose the speed displayed by the interconnect browser without violating the rules. The argument that the draft change, if implemented, will increase the risk of link outages and non-compliance with QoS benchmarks is far from accurate, as a 15% margin would still be available to handle fluctuations in traffic. Also, in emergencies, the applicant can shorten this time limit to 27 business days simply by having everything ready and promptly responding to communications from the provider.22 In light of stakeholder feedback and additional analysis, the agency has decided to extend the time limit from 21 business days to 42 business days to allow provisioning of ports for initial interconnection and port increases at points of interest in the following time-limited manner:

(a) A service provider shall, upon receipt of the request for ports and collocation space, if required, issue a certificate of approval and, if applicable, a notice of requirement within seven business days of receipt of the request.

(b) A Service Provider, upon receipt of the reminder, will pay the amount, if applicable, within five business days from the date of receipt of the reminder.

(c) The service provider who issued the declaration of acceptance will inform the requesting service provider about the provision of the ports requested in the POI and, if necessary, the allocation of collocation space,--

(i) within ten Business Days of the date of issue of your Acceptance Letter if no Notice of Invitation has been issued; And

(ii) within ten business days of receipt of payment from the requesting Service Provider against the reminder, if a reminder has been issued.

(d) A service provider shall, upon receipt of notification of port availability and allocation of collocation space, if any, notify the other service provider of transmission link establishment within ten business days of receipt of notification. between the points of interest of the two service providers.

(e) A Service Provider shall, upon receipt of the notification of establishment of the transmission link between the POIs, perform acceptance tests and issue the final letter of commissioning to the other party within ten business days of receipt of the notification. Service provider.

23. The figure below shows the different deadlines that have to be respected in relation to the provision of the initial interconnection and the increase of the ports in the POIs in case the service provider issues a request advertisement to which the request is addressed. Provision of initial interconnection or top-up. from ports is as in:

Rationale for the Telecommunications Interconnection (Second Amendment) Regulations, 2020

Introduction.. - 1.1 In India, as of January 31, 2020, the fixed line market segment comprises 1.75% of the total telecom subscriber base. Over the past decade, the number of fixed-line subscribers has shown a downward trend, falling from 36.76 million as of January 31, 2010 to 20.58 million as of January 31, 2020. Wireless subscribers, however, showed healthy growth, rising from 545.05 million in January 2010 to 1.15 billion in January 2020. The downward trend in fixed-line telecom subscribers is a cause for concern given that the same network is also used to provide fixed-line broadband service is used. These networks are known as the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN).1.2 The central government has notified the National Digital Communication Policy 2018 (NDCP-2018) to ensure harmonious growth and attract additional investment in the telecommunications sector. Considering that currently the teledensity of fixed line connections in the country is appallingly low, NDCP-2018 places special emphasis on the promotion of fixed line communication networks. A target has been set to enable 50% of households in India to have fixed broadband access between the PSTN and NLD networks by 2022. Interconnection is the lifeline of telecommunications services. Interconnection refers to the technical and commercial arrangement under which telecommunications service providers (TSPs) connect their equipment, networks and services to provide their subscribers with access to the subscribers, services and networks of other TSPs. 1.4 The Authority has issued the Telecommunications Interconnection (Reference Interconnection Offer) Regulations 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the Interconnection Regulations 2002). According to the Interconnection Regulations 2002, a TSP enjoying Significant Market Power (SMP) status must submit its Reference Interconnection Offer (RIO) Proposal (which, among other things, specifies the technical and commercial terms for interconnection based on the RIO model as an Annex describes) submit the Interconnection Regulations, 2002) to the Authority for approval and must then publish the approved RIO on their website. From now on, this RIO forms the basis of all interconnection agreements concluded by and with the issuer of the RIO. The Interconnection Regulations 2002 also contain three Annexes containing (a) Explanatory Notes (EM) of the Regulations to explain the reasons for the enactment of the Regulations; (b) the RIO model; and (c) Policies. The guidelines attached to the Interconnection Regulations 2002 provide for the interconnection of circuit switched networks using CCS7 signalling. These guidelines also provide the possible types of connections for different PSTN and PLMN (Public Land Mobile Network) calling scenarios. 1.5 Taking into account the regulatory, market and technological changes in the telecommunications sector over the past decade and with a view to creating a more effective, non-discriminatory, fair and transparent interconnection framework, the Authority initiated the review of the Framework Regulation governing interconnection in October 2016 by issuing a consultation document. After a detailed analysis of the comments of the interested parties during the consultation process and internal deliberations, the Authority notified the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulation, 2018 (1 of 2018), dated 1 January 2018, in which the Authority considered that the revision of the Connectivity requires further consideration. 1.6 The Authority then decided to carry out a review of the interconnection level for fixed networks. Consequently, a Consultation Paper (CP) on the "Review of the Regulatory Framework for Interconnection" was issued on May 30, 2019, requesting stakeholder feedback by June 27, 2019 and counter-comments, if any, by July 11, 2019. At the request of some interested parties, the deadlines for submitting comments and counter-comments have been extended to July 4, 2019 and July 18, 2019 respectively. A total of 15 comments and one counter-comment were received from stakeholders in response to the PC. On August 19, 2019, an Open Door Discussion (OHD) with stakeholders took place in New Delhi. 1.7 After reviewing all written submissions from interested parties, discussions in the OHD and internal review of the issue at hand, the Authority has finalized these Rules.2nd connection level.- 2.1 Currently, TSPs offer fixed line services with a Basic Service License, Unified Access Service License (UASL) or Unified License (UL). Under the license terms, licensees are required to adhere to the National Basic Plans such as the National Numbering Plan, the Signaling Plan, the Routing Plan, the National Frequency Allocation Plan and any other plans appropriate to the particular service license granted by the Telecom Department and prescribed by the licensor from time to time technical standards. To accommodate a multi-operator, multi-service environment, the[National Numbering Plan (PNN)], which provides the numbering and dialing schemes for various call scenarios, was revised in 2003 and issued by the Department of Transport. Short Distance Charging Area (SDCA) and Long Distance Charging Area (LDCA) are defined in the NNP. It also defines intra-SDCA calls as local calls. The NNP mandates a linked numbering scheme based on SDCA. It also provides for the use of prefixes in different call scenarios. Various terminologies used in these regulations such as B. PSTN, local call, SDCA, SDCC, LDCA, LDCC, SSA, long distance and NLD network are defined in the license agreements. 2.2 For billing and call routing purposes, the country has been divided into 22 License Service Areas (LSA), 322 Long Distance Charging Areas (LDCA) and 2645 Short Distance Charging Areas (SDCA). Calls within SDCAs are treated as local calls and calls between SDCAs are treated as long distance calls. 2.3 The UL General Conditions chapter contains, among other things, the following provisions in relation to the interconnection of networks:

27.4 The Licensee will connect to other telecommunication service providers at the points of connection (POI), subject to compliance with the applicable regulations, instructions or provisions of TRAI. The charges for accessing other networks for calls between networks are governed by the orders/regulations/guidelines issued by the TRAI/licensor from time to time. The Interconnection Agreements provide, inter alia, for the following:

(a) Fulfillment of all reasonable requirements for the transmission and receipt of messages between the interconnected systems.

(b) establish and maintain one or more points of interconnection reasonably necessary and of sufficient capacity and in sufficient number to enable the transmission and reception of messages via the Applicable Systems,

(c) To connect and remain connected to your Applicable Systems.

27.6 The provision of any equipment and its installation for the purpose of interconnection is subject to the mutual consent of the interested parties and is in accordance with the rules and regulations of TRAI.

2.4 In addition, the Chapter Access Service Authorization in UL contains, among other things, the following provisions in relation to its scope and network connection:2.1(a)(i) The Service accessed under this Authorization includes the collection, transport, transmission and delivery of voice and/or non-voice MESSAGES over Licensee's network in the Designated Service Area. Licensee may also use internet telephony, internet services including IPTV, broadband services and triple play, i.e. H. voice, video and data. During the provision of Internet Telephone Service, Licensee may connect the Internet Telephone Network to the PSTN/PLMN/GMPCS network. Licensee may provide the access service, which may be on wired and/or wireless media using full mobility, limited mobility, and fixed wireless access. 2.2 Licensee may carry intra-circle traffic over long distances on its network. However, subject to technical feasibility, the long-distance subscriber within the circle may, whenever possible, use another licensee's network in the same service area. Licensee may also enter into reciprocal arrangements with another UL licensee (authorized for access service)/another access service licensee/national long distance licensee to carry its long distance traffic within the county. 6.1 Traffic between circuits from one service area to another is routed through the network of the NLD Licensee or the Unified Licensee holding an NLD Service Authorization. Contract and TRAI provisions/orders/regulations issued from time to time) to ensure calls are made to all destinations. In addition, Licensor may direct Licensee to implement the process whereby subscribers are free to make international/inter-circle long distance calls through the NLD/ILD carrier. 6.3 International long-distance traffic must be routed through the NLD Service Provider's network to the ILD Service Provider's gateways for onward transmission to international networks, subject to compliance with the guidelines/regulations/instructions/regulations issued periodically by the LICENSOR/TRAI. However, Licensee may not refuse to connect directly to the ILD Service Licensee in situations where the ILD Service Licensee's POP and Licensee's switches (GMSC/Switch of Transit) are in the same Tier-I -TAX station are located.2.5 The Scope and Network Interconnection provisions in UASL are as follows:2.2 (a)(i) The SERVICES include the collection, transport, transmission and delivery of voice and/or non-voice MESSAGES via LICENSEE's network in the designated SERVICE AREA and include the provision of all types of access services. The access service provider can also provide internet telephony, internet services including IPTV and broadband services. separate license. The Access Service includes, but is not limited to, wired and/or wireless services, including full mobility, limited mobility as defined in Section 2.2 (c)(i) and fixed wireless access. LICENSEE may offer Residential Zone Rate Scheme(s) as a subset of full cellular service in clearly defined geographic areas at a tariff of its choice under TRAI's relevant orders. Numbering and interconnection for this service are the same as for full mobile subscribers. 2.3 LICENSEE may carry long-distance traffic within the service area without applying for an additional license. However, subject to technical feasibility, the long-distance subscriber within the service area may, whenever possible, use the network of another service provider in the same service area. The CONCESSIONARY can also enter into reciprocal agreements with national long-distance transport operators to carry out long-distance transport within the county.

26.1 The interconnection between the networks of different licensees for the transmission of circuit-switched data traffic takes place in accordance with the national CCS standards No. 7 and for the transmission of IP-based data traffic in accordance with the standards of the Telecommunication Engineering Center (TEC) and the periodic amendments of the Telecommunication Engineering Center ( TEC) and are also subject to the technical feasibility and technical integrity of the networks and are within the general scope of the Interconnection Rules/Instructions/Orders issued by the TRAI/Licensor from time to time. For networking between circuit-switched and IP-based networks, the licensee must install a media gateway switch. In addition, Licensor may direct LICENSEE to adopt other technical standards issued by TEC on interconnection-related matters.

26.2 LICENSEE may enter into appropriate arrangements with other telecommunications service providers to negotiate interconnection agreements whereby the interconnection network will provide:

(a) Fulfillment of all reasonable requirements for the transmission and receipt of messages between the interconnected systems.

(b) establish and maintain one or more points of interconnection reasonably necessary and of sufficient capacity and in sufficient number to enable the transmission and reception of messages via the Applicable Systems.

(c) To connect and remain connected to your Applicable Systems.

26.3 The provision of any equipment and its installation for interconnection purposes is subject to the mutual agreement of the interested parties.

26.4 The connection tests for each individual interface with a service provider are carried out by mutual agreement between the LICENSEE and the other party involved. The schedule of the connection tests is mutually agreed. LICENSEE will allow sufficient time, not less than 30 days, for these tests. Upon successful completion of connectivity tests or mutual agreement between Service Providers to resolve deficiencies/nonconformities, if any, LICENSEE may launch the SERVICE. In the event of a disagreement on how to remedy deficiencies/deviations in the connection tests carried out, the prior consent of the LICENSOR is required.

26.5 LICENSEE is obliged to provide interconnection/interconnection to all authorized telecommunications service providers (eligibility will be determined on the basis of the service provider's license agreement and TRAI rules/orders/regulations issued from time to time) to ensure calls are made to all destinations as well as NLD operators, giving subscribers a free option to make long-distance inter-county/international long-distance calls through the NLD/ILD operator. For international long distance calls, LICENSEE will normally access the international long distance carrier's networks through the national long distance carrier's network, subject to compliance with the policies/regulations/instructions/regulations issued by the LICENSOR/TRAI from time to time. LICENSEE may not refuse direct interconnection to LICENSEE's international long distance service in situations where the ILD Gateway/Point of Presence (POP) and Access Provider (GMSC/Transit Switch/Controller) between Media Gateway (MGC)/Media Gateway (MG) toggle. are located at the same Tier I TAX station.

26.6 Direct interconnectivity between all telecommunications service providers in the licensed SERVICE AREA is permitted. LICENSEE must connect to other service providers, subject to compliance with applicable regulations, instructions or provisions of TRAI. The interconnection with a telecommunications service provider must be revoked within one hour or within the period specified in writing by the LICENSOR in the event of termination of the license of this telecommunications service provider after receipt of the relevant notification from the LICENSOR. .

26.7 The connection point (POI) between the networks is subject to the guidelines/directives/instructions/regulations issued by the LICENSOR/TRAI from time to time. Interconnection conditions, including but not limited to standard interfaces, interconnection points and technical aspects, are subject to compliance with the applicable rules, instructions and regulations issued by TRAI/the Licensor from time to time.

2.6 The National Long Distance Authorization (NLD) chapter at UL contains, among other things, the following provisions regarding the scope of the NLD service license and network connection:

2.1(a) The Licensee of the NLD Service is authorized to carry circuit-switched bearer telecommunications traffic over its national long-distance network. Licensee may also transport switched traffic within the circle if such transport has been agreed with the originating access service provider.

(b) Licensee may also, in relation to the basic service, enter into amicable arrangements with the service providers involved to collect, transport and deliver the traffic of different sections between the Long Distance Load Center (LDCC) and the Distribution Centers Distance Charge (SDCC).

(c) In the case of mobile service traffic, inter-circle traffic is delivered/resumed at the Point of Presence (POP) in LDCA at the Level I TAX location in the origin/destination service area. For West Bengal, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir these locations will be Asansol, Shimla and Jammu respectively.

4.1 The concessionaire authorized for international long distance, domestic long distance and access services may have a single switch to provide ILD, LDN and access services. Due to the proper allocation of costs between the various services, separate accounts are kept for all services. However, the access service through this counter may only be provided if the licensee has the access service authorization for the service area in which the counter is located. For these purposes, Media Gateway or its equivalent is considered as a switch for which MGC/Soft Switch can be installed anywhere in the country. A separate TAX and gateway switch is not required. Licensee may implement a managed circuit-switched or packet-switched network to design its NLD networks. The level of points of interest in the case of PSTN-to-PSTN traffic, as defined in these guidelines, is as follows:Table 1.1 - PSTN to PSTN (outbound traffic)

Table 1.2 - PSTN - PSTN (incoming traffic)

Note 1. New National Long Distance Operators may enter into the necessary interconnection arrangements with other NLDOs to provide call termination in locations where the POP has not yet been deployed as part of their rollout commitments.

Note 2. Intra-circle traffic can also be transferred to an NLDO by mutual consent.

2.8 In the PC of May 30, 2019, the Authority asked interested parties for their views on the following issues:

(i) Should interconnection operators be given flexibility to interconnect PSTN with PSTN networks at SDCC/Tier II tax level (SSA)/Tier I tax level (LSA) according to their mutual agreements? If no, justify your comments with the reasons.

(ii) In the event that there is no mutual agreement between operators, what should be the level of interconnection to connect PSTN networks to the PSTN specified in the Regulation.

2.9 Stakeholders have expressed different views on this issue. While public sector TSPs have resisted, directly or indirectly, any change to the existing connectivity level of PSTN networks, other TSPs have generally preferred flexibility. Later, however, BSNL, a public sector TSP, also advocated flexibility. 2.10 Flexibility and mutual understanding of the level and number of points of interest have been favored by most stakeholders. A private TSP and COAI have argued that the current regulatory regime provides the required flexibility for the PSTN-to-PSTN connection through mutual agreements. In addition, they believe that IP-based networks have advantages over legacy TDM-based circuit-switched networks in terms of network architecture flexibility and traffic-handling capability. Private TSPs believe that a single IP-based core switch is now sufficient to meet the requirements for a full LSA compared to the requirement for multiple independent circuit-switched TDM switches in each SDCA. Based on these arguments, the private TSPs reported that they had agreed (among the private TSPs) for the PSTN-to-PSTN connection to have POIs in 3 or 4 locations in one LSA. Private TSP believe that PSTN-to-PSTN interconnections at SDCA level are no longer required due to the end of the rate differential between local and long-distance calls in an LSA that exist on the PSTN-to-PSTN connection at SDCA level, although sometimes they face limitations in providing such a connection. One of the interested parties said that a mutual agreement might affect the timely establishment of points of interest, and further said that the degree of interconnection and the deadlines for interconnection should be regulated by the authority and not left to the mutual agreement. 2.12 Some stakeholders have noted that the interconnection agreement for PLMN to PSTN and NLDO to PSTN should also be reviewed in the same direction and that flexibility should also be given to the level of interconnection of PLMN to PSTN and NLDO to PSTN in a LSA. 2.13 One interested party, MTNL, has commented on Legal Case No. WP(C) 4758/2019 it has filed challenging the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulations 2018 of 1 January 2018 and subsequent amendment of 5 July 2018 , which was previously pending at the Delhi High Court of Honor. Without commenting on the issues raised in the SC, she has asked the authority to await the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court before making changes to these regulations. 2.14 BSNL, a public sector company providing the largest network of fixed telephony services, commented in its initial comments that there should be no flexibility to interconnect operators for PSTN to PSTN interconnection. That is, calls from PSTN to PSTN must necessarily be terminated at the SDCC level. In support of his comments, he has argued that Tier I and Tier II taxes are part of his NLD network. In addition, it has stated that local calls do not involve transportation and are therefore not allowed by NLD operators. Referring to Section 2.2 of the Access Services Authorization under UL, you have argued that in order to enable subscribers to make long distance calls within the circle, SDCA-level PSTN-to-PSTN connectivity is mandatory for all TSPs. Referring to Section 11(1)(b)(vi) of the TRAI Act, it has interpreted that interconnectivity within the SDCA is mandatory for local calls. They further mentioned that private TSPs for PSTN-to-PSTN traffic connect at one or two sites in an LSA, although direct connectivity on the SDCA is mandatory and similar connectivity will cause huge losses during operation. and maintain exchanges across all SDCAs while incurring high network, setup, and labor costs. In addition, he believes that TSPs who have POIs in fewer locations are in breach of the concession terms/TRAI regulations. Therefore, instead of checking the degree of interconnection, measures should be taken against other TSPs. 2.15 BSNL has also stated in its comments that a TSP that can build a network in the SDCA to provide PSTN services should have no hesitation in aiming for local/SDCA level interconnectivity. It has also determined that provisions for interconnectivity outside of the local area for local calls are likely to sabotage and disrupt all communications in the SDCA. They also mentioned that it is neither feasible nor reasonable for them to close their PSTN connections in all SDCAs and have a similar network setup/configuration as private TSPs. Its vast PSTN network is mostly copper-based and cannot be quickly migrated to fiber. It was further mentioned that the current regulatory requirements for SDCA level interconnectivity for PSTN networks are consistent with the current DoT numbering plan and routing plan and should not be compared to TSPs in the private sector. He further said that BSNL has a large network of copper cables and cannot be expected to convert all copper cables to fiber cables to compete with private sector TSPs and should therefore be given a weight. BSNL has a Point of Presence (PoP) in all SDCAs and incurs costs for maintaining the same in anticipation of the delivery of POIs. 2.17 In light of the evolving technological structure of the wired network, BSNL revised its comments to the PC and did the same to the Authority on 13 June 2020. Through the revised comments, BSNL has this in view of As the technological structure of your fixed network evolves, there is a need to have flexibility regarding the mandate to have a fixed line to a fixed point of interest for future connectivity at SDCA level. 2.18 According to BSNL's revised comments, the existing connection between two wired networks should continue at SDCA level, as BSNL has already spent on setting up the infrastructure according to the existing rules to facilitate SDCA. Degree of connectivity to other fixed line service TSPs. If the annual infrastructure charges were not continued at the existing SDCA points of interest, he believes BSNL would have to suffer a loss as the infrastructure would not be used in the future either. In order to protect existing investments, he stressed that the new agreement should not affect existing POIs. the availability of its network elements. According to BSNL, if the POI in SDCA (of the new operator) where the services are planned is not possible/ expected to be initiated by the new operator, connectivity can be allowed at LDCA level. However, according to BSNL, in such cases the cost of transferring calls from LDCC to SDCC or vice versa should be chargeable by setting reasonable transfer rates per minute of use. 2.20 On the issue of the mandate for the interconnection layer in cases where there is no mutual agreement between the interconnected TSPs, most interested parties suggested that it should be LDCC/LEVEL II TAX. One stakeholder suggested that it should be Tier I LSA/control tier and another stakeholder said that it should be a single IP based site for the entire LSA. A stakeholder has suggested continuing the existing POI policy in the SDCA for local calls.Analyse2.21 The Authority believes that with ongoing changes in the telecoms market and the technologies used by service providers, regulations should also evolve that should not restrict the efficient use of available technologies, the expansion of existing TSPs and the entry of new service providers into the market. The purpose of the Interconnection Regulations is to give security to service providers and to facilitate adequate, efficient and timely interconnection of public networks. 2.22 In general, the networks of the private TSPs are interconnected at a maximum of 3 to 4 locations in each LSA. Now they also prefer fewer sites for interconnection with public TSPs. The plausible reason for this could be that the size of PSTN in terms of subscribers and traffic is very small compared to PLMN. The PSTN subscriber base accounts for approximately 1.75% of all telephone subscribers and is still declining. Consequently, the POI requirement for the interconnection of PSTN networks is also lower compared to mobile networks. Now even BSNL, which used to be against flexibility at the link level between PSTN and PSTN, supports it to some extent. Subscribers is the lowest level at which the POI is mandated in the guidelines annexed to the Interconnection Regulations 2002, the LDCC level. Therefore, the maximum number of places with POIs is never more than 322 (number of LDCC). In the case of fixed networks, as required by the guidelines annexed to the Interconnection Regulations 2002, the lowest level at which POIs can be set up is SDCC. Even if the fixed network only carries traffic for about 1.75% of all telecom subscribers, the maximum number of places with connections could reach 2645 (total number of SDCCs) if points of interest were established in each SDCC. It is important to note here that in 2002, when the POI requirement was mandated at the SDCC level, landline networks served approximately 80% of all telephone subscribers. 2.24 As regards fixed telephony, private TSPs have been late in entering this market. They have a patchy footprint and none of the private TSPs have a presence across India ie. H. in all 2645 SDCAs. According to the information provided by BSNL, the number of SDCAs with PSTN-to-PSTN POIs working with private TSP networks is currently 848. Therefore, it can be easily concluded that overall private TSPs are present in much less than a third of all SDCAs in the Country. In addition, they have a technological advantage over the fixed-line public TSPs due to late market entry.2.25 Of the two public TSPs, the presence of a (MTNL) TSP is limited to only two LSAs, which have neighboring LSAs, LDCAs and SDCAs. While the other public sector TSP (BSNL) is present in almost all remaining SDCAs. 2.26 BSNL, although in the process of upgrading its PSTN by migrating to a packet-switched network, still maintains the infrastructure and network elements such as ports for interconnection. , similar to that of the circuit-switched network, at the SDCC level. According to BSNL, it maintains such ports at SDCC level as it believes that the license terms/TRAI regulations for local calls require PSTN-to-PSTN interconnection at SDCC level with a smaller number of locations Points of interest for local PSTN-to-PSTN calls should only be established at the SDCC level. Therefore, according to BSNL, any TSP seeking interconnection for fixed line services must achieve the SDCC level for interconnection. One of the reasons given by BSNL for supporting SDCC level POI is that if any TSP can build a network to provide services in any SDCA, it should have no hesitation in aiming for SDCC level interconnection. Technically, the BSNL argument may be attractive, but one has to remember that interconnection refers to the commercial and technical agreement together. Even if it is technically feasible to have interconnection at each SDCC, it may not be economically feasible due to the lower traffic. This means that requiring SDCC level POIs for local calls may discourage newcomers to the fixed line market from entering smaller SDCA markets. This contradicts the stated goals of the NDCP-2018. However, as mentioned above, BSNL now also supports flexibility in setting points of interest at SDCC or LDCC level, but SDCC level is not sustainable. Section 2.2 of the Access Service Authorization under UL has been cited by BSNL in this regard. The full text of Section 2.2 of UL's Access Service Authorization is as follows:

“The licensee may conduct long-distance traffic within the district in its network. However, subject to technical feasibility, the subscriber of long-distance calls within the Circle may use another Licensee's network in the same area, provided that Licensee may also enter into reciprocal agreements with another UL Licensee (with Access Service Authorization)/other Access Service Licensee /national long-haul licensee to carry its long-haul intra-circle traffic.” ..

2.29 The clause above states that Licensee may carry its own long haul traffic within the ring on its own network. This license clause also states that, subject to technical feasibility, the subscriber has the option of using another licensee's network in the same service area to make long-distance calls within the circle. In this regard, it should be mentioned here that the choice of call-by-call to subscribers in the networks has not yet been implemented for intra-circle long-distance calls. Also, in most cases, local and long-distance calling rates are actually the same within the county. Therefore, this particular provision in the License Agreement provides no reason to justify or infer that PSTN to PSTN local calls require interconnection at SDCC level.2.30 BSNL has also referred to Subclause 11(1)(b)(vi). . ) of the TRAI Act 1997 to justify his argument that PSTN to PSTN interconnection should be done at SDCC level. In this regard, the aforementioned clause is reproduced below:

"Determining and ensuring the transit time for the provision of local and telecommunications lines between different service providers".

2.31 The above provision authorizes TRAI to determine the period of time for the provision of local and long-distance connections between service providers. This is to protect a service provider's interests when requesting local or long-distance connections from another service provider. This cannot be the reason for forcing service providers to use local lines for interconnection at each location. 2.32 One of the arguments put forward by BSNL to justify its claim was that Tier I and Tier II taxes are part of its NLD network and therefore interconnection of the fixed access network for local calls to the NLD network could not be required, i.e. H. Level I and II control switches. He has also stated in his comments that no non-BSNL NLD TSPs use these terminologies. The Authority has found that BSNL has not provided any justification to support the above statement. It was also noted that the term Tier I TAX has already been used extensively in the TRAI regulations as well as in licenses issued by the Department of Transport. Therefore, BSNL's statement that this terminology is specific only to BSNL is incorrect. In addition, the costs of the TAX network, both in the fixed network and in the NLD network, are shown in the Account Separation Reports (ASR) sent to TRAI. This shows that BSNL's TAX network is part of fixed line and NLD, and BSNL's statement that TAX Tier I and Tier II are only part of its NLD network is incorrect. 2.33 Another argument put forward by BSNL to justify its claim was that all emergency services should be reachable even if communication between SDCC and LDCC is broken, whether due to cable breaks, system failures, link failures or reasons of sabotage. It is important to mention here that the connection between PSTN and PLMN occurs at the LDCC or LSA center level. It appears to be an attempt to justify his point of view, as no such problem has been reported in the case of cellular services that meet the needs of more than 98% of subscribers. In addition, it is the responsibility of each TSP to ensure compliance with license terms and Quality of Service (QoS) regulations, which include access to emergency services. However, now that BSNL has reviewed its own position, all of these arguments originally put forward by BSNL are not very relevant to address the level of interconnection between PSTN and PSTN-to-NLD networks. Changes in the level of interconnection do not change the regulatory framework for Interconnection Usage Charges (IUC). For regulation of the IUC, the Authority has separately notified the Telecommunications Interconnection Charges Regulations 2003 (4 of 2003) with their occasional amendments. Different types of IUC, such as the transit charge TAX, the charge for intra-SDCA calls, the charge for long-distance carriage, etc. would not be affected by the present amendment to the Interconnection Regulations 2018. The choice of interconnection PSTs is to take into account the relevant regulatory to decide provisions on the degree of interconnection. Therefore, these IUC fees would remain unchanged. 2.35 In relation to an argument by an interested party that the Authority should await the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court before making amendments to the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulations, 2018 of 1 January 2018, it is appropriate to mention here that the issues discussed in this consultation process were not addressed in the Telecoms Interconnection Regulations 2018 of 1 January 2018 and its subsequent reform of 5 July 2018. As indicated above, on the subject of the review of the level of interconnection, the Authority previously considered that further considerations needed to be made before taking a decision. Therefore, the Authority believes that the court case pending before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court is unrelated to the current rule change. 2.36 Taking the above into account, the Authority considers that the level of PSTN-to-PSTN interconnection as well as the number of POI locations within an LSA should be left to mutual agreement between the interconnecting TSPs. The Interconnection TSPs can decide on the level of PSTN-to-PSTN interconnection to be SDCC, LDCC or LSA HQ ( Level I TAX) could trade. 2.37 For the sake of certainty, the Authority is also of the opinion that in the event that there is no mutual agreement between the interconnected TSPs regarding the interconnection level from PSTN to PSTN, this should alternatively be at the respective LDCC/Level II control level. This would lower the entry barrier for new service providers, ie call seekers, and enable faster interconnection between the call provider's and call seeker's networks. Therefore, it would encourage competition in fixed line services. This would also bring consistency at PSTN-to-PSTN connection and PLMN-to-PSTN connection level. Since local calls, by definition, begin and end within an SDCA, the agreement requires the connection provider to do more work to bring local calls from LDCC to SDCC and vice versa. In order to address this issue, the Authority considers that the charge for transferring calls from LDCC to SDCC and vice versa should be paid by the applicant for interconnection to the interconnection provider. In addition, with POIs in Tier II TAX/LDCC, one would have a sufficient number of POIs for fixed networks. Also, the call doesn't have to travel too far before it ends. The requirement of some stakeholders to require only 3 or 4 POIs in an LSA by regulations is unsustainable as the number of POIs depends on several factors such as traffic, redundancy, geography, etc. 2.38 Some interested parties have also requested to review the level of interconnection of the NLD network to the PSTN and the PLMN to the PSTN. As the PLMN to PSTN connection is already provisioned at LDCC level, it is currently not checked. With respect to the interconnection of the PSTN network to NLD and vice versa, it is important to note here that these arrangements were provided in the Interconnection Regulations 2002 solely under the heading PSTN-to-PSTN Interconnection. Therefore, the interested parties seem to have requested the revision of the same. 2.39 It should be noted that currently PSTN NLD traffic is also terminated at points of interest available at SDCC level. It also poses similar issues as PSTN-to-PSTN connectivity for local calls. Consequently, the Authority is of the opinion that the rules for the interconnection between the PSTN network and the NLD should correspond to the interconnection between the PSTN and the PSTN. Therefore, in order to exchange traffic between the PSTN and the NLD network within an LSA, the seeker's and provider's TSPs must have the flexibility to jointly decide on the degree of interconnection. In the event that no mutual agreement is reached between them, the interconnection of the NLD network to the PSTN as an alternative option will be similar to the interconnection of the PSTN to the PSTN, i.e. H. at LDCC level. In addition, the charge for transporting calls from LDCC to SDCC and vice versa, where applicable, is paid by the applicant for interconnection to the interconnection provider. Fast, efficient and timely connection between public networks. These legislative changes are intended to ensure orderly growth in the industry and protect the interests of service providers. It is a fact that the Interconnection TSPs have invested in setting up the existing POIs between PSTN to PSTN. As regulations are changed to facilitate the expansion of existing TSP networks into new areas and the entry of new service providers into the market, there is also a need to protect the investments made to set up existing POIs. Therefore, the Authority is of the opinion that such existing POIs should remain in place for a minimum period of five years from the date of entry into force of these Regulations. This would balance the need to protect existing investments and ensure orderly growth of the sector. In addition, those POIs should be allowed to be closed where there is a mutual agreement between interconnected service providers to close a POI or if one of the interconnected service providers ceases to provide services in an SDCA. The flexibility provided by these rules would only apply to new POIs. 2.41 On the PC, the Authority had also sought the views of interested parties on other related issues. In this context, some interest groups have called for the abolition of the transit charge/transit carriage charge. As different types of charges imposed in connection with interconnection are dealt with separately in the IUC Regulations, the issues of transit charge and transit fare charge etc. are currently not considered. Some stakeholders have also mentioned certain issues related to NLD, numbering scheme etc. which are not related to the present consultation and are therefore not considered.