Telecommunications Interconnection Regulation, 2018 (2023)

Telecommunications Interconnection Regulation 2018

(Lei nº 1 of 2018)

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[As of 1 Jan 2018] Telecommunication Regulatory Authority of India

F. No. 10-10/2016-BB&PA. - In use of the powers conferred by article 36, I read with subsections (ii), (iii) and (iv) of subsection (b) of subsection (1) of article 11, of the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 (24 of 1997), the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority of India provides the following regulations, namely: CHAPTER I

Preliminary

1. Abbreviated title, extension and beginning. - (1) This regulation may be referred to as the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulation, 2018 (1 of 2018). (2) It will be effective as of February 1, 2018.2. Definitions. - In these Regulations, unless the context otherwise requires, - (1) "Act" means the Indian Telecommunications Regulatory Authority Act, 1997 (24 of 1997);

(2) "Authority" means the Indian Telecommunications Regulatory Authority established pursuant to subsection (1) of section 3 of the Act;

(3) "busy hour" means the continuous one-hour period entirely within a specified time interval during which traffic is highest;

(4) "interconnection" means the commercial and technical arrangements by which service providers connect their equipment, networks, and services to enable their customers to access the customers, services, and networks of other service providers;

(5) "interconnection fee" means the fees paid by one service provider to another service provider for interconnection;

(6) "interconnect usage charges" or "IUC" means the charge payable by a service provider to one or more service providers for the use of network elements to originate, transit, or terminate calls;

(7) "license" means a license granted or having effect as if granted under Section 4 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, (13 of 1885) and the Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933 (17 of 1933);

(8) "Point of Interconnection" or "POI" means a mutually agreed point of demarcation (based on the TRAI stipulation/regulations/License Agreement) where the exchange of traffic between the two parties takes place;

(9) "port" means a termination location on a switch/distribution frame for providing inbound and outbound traffic between two interconnect networks;

(10) "regulations" means the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulations 2018 (1 of 2018);

(11) "Annex" means the Annex attached to these regulations;

(12) all other words and expressions used in these regulations but not defined, and defined in the Act and in the rules and other regulations made under it, shall have the meanings respectively ascribed to them in the Act or in the rules or other regulations, as the case may be can be.

CHAPTER II

Interconnection Agreement

3. Interconnection Agreement. - Each service provider must, within thirty days of receiving a request from a service provider, enter into an interconnection agreement, on a non-discriminatory basis, with that service provider.4. Procedure to enter into an interconnection contract. - (1) A service provider wishing to enter into an interconnection agreement with another service provider must submit an application to that service provider together with: (a) a copy of its license agreement;

(b) designation of the services for which the interconnection is intended;

(c) the proposed location of its interconnection points; Is

(d) name of the technology that will be used for the interconnection in each POI.

(2) A service provider that has been requested under subregulation (1) to enter into an interconnection agreement shall, within five business days of receipt of the request, submit a draft of the interconnection agreement to the service provider from whom the request was sent. received.(3) Once the draft of the interconnection contract issued under sub-regulation (2) is received, the service provider that made the request for the execution of the interconnection contract must, within five business days, present its suggestions and objections, if any, on said draft to the other service provider. CHAPTER III

Bank guarantee

5. Bank guarantees. - (1) The service provider that requested the execution of an interconnection contract will be obliged to grant a bank guarantee, for a period of six months, counted from the date of establishment of the initial interconnection, for the total number of ports claimed within said term, if required by the service provider who was requested to enter into an interconnection contract: Provided that the value of this bank guarantee is determined in the manner provided in Annex-I of this regulation. (2) After six months from the date of establishment of the initial interconnection or February 1, 2018, whichever occurs later, the responsibility to provide the bank guarantee will be determined as follows: (a) the interconnection usage fees owed by the two interconnection service providers to each other for the two months prior to the end of six months from the date of initial interconnection establishment or February 1, 2018, whichever be later, it will be cal and the provider that is obliged to pay the rates for the use of the interconnection, after the adjustment, to the other provider, will be obliged to grant a bank guarantee for a period of six months, if the other provider so requires. ;

(b) the bank guarantee will be limited to the amount of interconnection usage fees payable by a service provider after adjustment in accordance with clause (a); Is

c) This process of determining the responsibility of the service provider in providing the bank guarantee will be repeated every six months.

CHAPTER IV

Provisioning and increase of ports in points of interest

6. Port search in POI. - (1) For a period of two years from the date of establishment of the initial interconnection, the service provider, which made the request for the execution of the interconnection contract, must search for ports in the POIs of the other service provider to meet the outgoing and incoming traffic of the demand in the POIs.(2) After two years from the date of establishment of the initial interconnection or on February 1, 2018, whichever occurs later, the total number of existing ports in a POI shall be converted to carry one-way traffic such that the number of ports to send outbound traffic from each service provider to the other service provider is proportional to their average outbound traffic over the previous three months; and (3) After port conversion in accordance with sub-regulation (2), each service provider must search for ports to meet the requirements of its outgoing traffic.7. Initial port provisioning request. - After the execution of the interconnection contract, the service provider that requested the execution of the interconnection contract may request the other service provider to provide the number of ports in the POIs that meet the requirement of their outgoing and incoming traffic in the POIs within a period of three months from the date of the initial interconnection.8. PDI increase request. - A service provider may request additional ports at a POI from another service provider if it is likely that the projected capacity utilization of the ports at that POI, at the end of thirty days from the date of the request, will exceed seventy percent of the ports. at the POI and that the projected capacity utilization of the ports at the POI will be determined based on the previous thirty days' daily traffic at the POI during peak hours: whenever the service provider requests a number of additional ports that it is probable that they will bring the capacity utilization of the ports in the POI at the end of thirty days from the date of the request, to less than sixty percent.9. Framework for port provisioning. - (1) A service provider, upon receiving the request for ports in accordance with rule 7 and rule 8, and the colocation space, if necessary, will issue a letter of acceptance and a notice of demand, if any. , within five business days from receipt of the order.(2) A service provider, upon receipt of the billing note pursuant to sub-regulation (1), shall pay the amount within three business days after receipt of the order. the receipt of the date of receipt of the billing note. (3) The service provider, which issued the acceptance letter pursuant to sub-regulation (1), must inform the requesting service provider about port provisioning and space co-location allocation, if any,-( a) within five business days from the date of issuance of your letter of acceptance, if no invoice has been issued; Is

(b) within five business days from the date of receipt of payment by the service provider requesting the bill of lading, if a bill of lading has been issued.

(4) A service provider, upon receipt of the subpoena pursuant to subregulation (3), shall, within three business days of receipt of the subpoena, notify the other service provider of the establishment of the transmission link between the POIs of the two service providers. (5) A service provider, upon receipt of the subpoena pursuant to sub-regulation (4), shall, within five business days of receipt of the subpoena, perform acceptance tests and issue the final commissioning letter. port service to the other party. service provider. (6) A service provider must provide STM-1 ports on POIs, if any service provider requests the provision of such ports for POI augmentation: provided that the two service providers can agree on the POI augmentation at any time lower or higher, such as DS -3 or STM-16.CHAPTER V

interconnection charges

10. Interconnection Rates. - Interconnection charges, such as installation and infrastructure charges, may be mutually negotiated between service providers subject to the regulations or instructions issued by the Authority from time to time: Provided that such charges are reasonable, transparent, and non-discriminatory.

Disconnection of points of interest

11. PDI disconnection procedure. - A service provider, before cutting a POI, must (a) present to the other service provider a justification of fifteen business days with the reasons for the proposed disconnection;

(b) if you are not satisfied with the response to the notice of cause issued under clause (a) or no response to the notice of cause is received, notify the service provider within fifteen working days, specifying the subsequent disconnection date ; Is

(c) not disconnect the POI before the end of the notification period provided for in clause (b):

Provided that nothing contained in this regulation applies if a POI is disconnected with mutual consent or by indication of the Licensor or the Authority. CHAPTER VII

Financial disincentive in interconnection issues

12. Consequences of infraction of the provisions of this regulation. - If any service provider violates the provisions of this regulation, it will be, without prejudice to the sanction that may be imposed by virtue of its license, or the provisions of the Law or the rules or orders issued or the instructions issued, in under these, you will be required to pay an amount as a financial disincentive not to exceed Rs one lakh per day per licensed service area, as determined by the Authority: Provided that the Authority does not issue a payment order of any amount by way of financial disincentive, unless the service provider has been given a reasonable opportunity for representation against non-compliance with the standards observed by the Authority. CHAPTER VIII

Several

13. Power of the Authority to issue instructions. - Notwithstanding any of the provisions of the Law or any other regulation prepared under the Law or the instructions issued therein, the Authority may, from time to time, issue the instructions it deems pertinent to service providers. services on any aspect of the interconnection. for which it has been provided in this regulation.

Annex-I

Bank guarantee for E1 connection at a POI

(verrule 5.)

Note: The Statement of Reasons explains the objects and reasons of the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulation, 2018 (1 of 2018).

explanatory memory of

"The Telecommunications Interconnection Regulation, 2018"

A. Introduction1. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) defines interconnection as "the commercial and technical arrangements under which service providers connect their equipment, networks and services to enable customers to gain access to the customers, services and networks of others." Service providers". /www.citi.columbia.edu/elinoam/articles/interconnection_pricing.htm

2. Interconnection is extremely important from the consumer's point of view. Consumers of telecommunications services cannot communicate with each other or connect to the services they demand unless there are necessary interconnection agreements between telecommunications service providers (TSPs). International experience suggests that interconnection is the key to successful 'open competition' in telecommunication services.B. The Need for Regulation of Interconnection3. If two TSPs are not in direct competition with each other, such as those operating in different countries, they will voluntarily interconnect because interconnection increases the value of a network to its subscribers by increasing the number of people they can call and the range of services. of telecommunications. They offer. can access (network externality effect). However, international experience shows that in a competitive market (such as an access services market in a country where several TSPs provide access services to the same set of consumers), interconnection is not freely available from a holder for its competitors; the licensee generally seeks to limit competition and thereby preserve its market power by: (a) refusing to interconnect; (b) offer interconnection at a price, or on terms and conditions, that make it difficult for a new entrant to compete; or (c) try to sabotage the new entrant by providing an interconnection service of lower quality than the one it provides itself.4. The Reference Document on Basic Telecommunications of the World Trade Organization (WTO) establishes the following guidelines for interconnection: "2.2 Interconnection that must be guaranteed: interconnection with a major provider will be guaranteed at any technically feasible point of the network. Said interconnection it is provided:

(a) on terms, conditions (including standards and technical specifications) and prices that are non-discriminatory and of a quality no less favorable than that provided by its own similar services or by similar services of unaffiliated service providers or for its subsidiaries or other affiliates;

(b) in a timely manner, on terms, conditions (including standards and technical specifications) and cost-based rates that are transparent, reasonable, considering economic feasibility, and sufficiently unbundled so that the provider does not have to pay for network components or facilities that do not require the provision of the service; Is

(c) upon request, at points additional to the network termination points offered to the majority of users, subject to charges that reflect the cost of construction of the necessary additional facilities”.

5. The European Union Directive 2002/19/EC (Access Directive) states that "National regulatory authorities shall, ... be responsible for promoting efficiency, sustainable competition, efficient investment and innovation and providing the maximum benefit to end users. The US 'Telecommunications Act of 1996' states that - "... each incumbent local exchange carrier has the following duties: ...............

(2) INTERCONNECTION - The duty to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting telecommunications operator, interconnection with the local exchange operator's network -

(A) for transmission and routing of switchboard service and switchboard access;

(B) at any technically feasible point within the operator's network;

(C) that is at least equal in quality to that provided by the local exchange operator to itself or to any subsidiary, affiliate or any other party to which the operator provides interconnection; Is

(D) about fees, terms, and conditions that are fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract and the requirements of this section and section 252."

7. It has been observed that many telecom regulators around the world have created ex ante formal regulatory frameworks for interconnection based on the Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) principles with the general objective of promoting and facilitating competition.C . The current regulatory framework for interconnection in India8. In India, the regulatory framework for interconnection has been established by the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India (hereinafter referred to as the Authority or TRAI). Some of the important rules and guidelines issued by the Authority in relation to the interconnection framework are described below.9. In 1999, the Authority, through the '1999 Interconnection Agreement Registration Rules', ordered all TSPs to register with the Authority any interconnection agreement to which they were a party.10. In 2001, the Authority issued a Resolution of 01.08.2001 on Interconnection, through which it established several interconnection points between fixed networks and mobile networks.11. In 2002, the Authority issued the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulation (Reference Interconnection Offer), 2002. In accordance with the Regulation, a TSP that enjoys the condition of Significant Market Power (SMP) must present its proposal for PRI (describing, among others, the technical aspects and commercial interconnection conditions based on the RIO model attached to the Regulation) to the Authority for its approval and subsequent publication of the approved RIO on its website. Said RIO, from that moment, constitutes the basis of all interconnection agreements that are entered into by and with the issuer of the RIO. The Telecommunications Interconnection Regulation (Interconnection Reference Offer) of 2002 also contains three Annexes containing (a) Explanatory Memorandum of the Regulation to explain the reasons for issuing the Regulation; (b) the RIO model; and (c) Guidelines.12. Based on the stipulations contained in the Telecommunications Interconnection (Interconnection Reference Offer) Regulations, 2002, the SMPs at that time viz. M/s Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (BSNL), M/s Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. (MTNL), M/s Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (VSNL) and other TSPs have submitted their RIOs for approval by the Authority. On 10.09.2002, the Authority suggested 29 changes to the PRI draft submitted by M/s BSNL and M/s MTNL and instructed them to immediately publish their RIOs after incorporating the suggested changes.13. M/s BSNL and M/s MTNL filed appeals (Appeal No. 11 and 12 of 2002) before the Telecommunications Dispute Resolution and Appeal Tribunal (TDSAT) against the modifications suggested by the Authority. Subsequently, on April 27, 2005, the TDSAT judged these appeals. Pursuant to the TDSAT Order, M/s BSNL and M/s MTNL have published their RIOs on their websites. The TSPs, which had already signed interconnection agreements, were also given the option of migrating to the notified PRI regime as of the date of its effective publication.14. Although the TDSAT did not revoke the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulations (Reference Interconnection Offer) of 2002, it did consider that the Authority would continue to be bound by the interconnectivity terms and conditions of the service providers as established in the licenses issued after the reform of the Law in 2000. The TDSAT determined that the Authority is authorized to modify the terms and conditions of interconnectivity of the licenses issued before the reform of 2000, provided that they comply with the terms and conditions of interconnectivity contained in the licenses issued. after the 2000 reform, 15. The Authority filed an appeal before the Supreme Court of Justice (Appeal No. 3298 of 2005) against the aforementioned TDSAT Order; the matter is still pending in the Federal Supreme Court. However, on 06.12.2013, the Federal Supreme Court, in another matter in Civil Appeal No. 5,253 of 2010, resolved the following: Faculty provided for in article 36 of the Law”.

16. Furthermore, in the Unified License (UL), which is the most recent license, the licensor, ie Department of Telecommunications (DoT) has placed the interconnection between TSPs under the TRAI interconnection regulatory framework. The relevant provisions of the License are reproduced below: "27.3 Interconnection between networks of different Licensees to carry circuit-switched traffic shall be in accordance with CCS National Standards No. 7, as amended from time to time by the Engineering Center of Telecommunications (TEC) and also subject to the technical feasibility and technical integrity of the Networks and must be within the general framework of the interconnection regulations/instructions/orders issued by TRAI/Licensor from time to time You must install Media Gateway Switch In addition, Licensor may direct LICENSEE to adopt any other technical standards issued by TEC in matters related to interconnection.

27.4 The Licensee will interconnect with other Telecommunications Service Providers at the points of interconnection (POI) subject to compliance with current regulations, guidelines or resolutions issued by TRAI. Charges for accessing other networks for inter-network calls must comply with Orders/Regulations/Guidelines issued by TRAI/Licensor from time to time. The Interconnection Contracts must provide, among other things, the following: (a) Meet all reasonable demand for the transmission and reception of messages between the interconnected systems. (b) Establish and maintain one or more Interconnection points as reasonably necessary and with sufficient capacity and in sufficient number to allow the transmission and reception of messages through the Applicable Systems, (c) Connect and maintain the connection to their Systems Applicable.

27.5 Other network access charges for inter-network calls shall be based on mutual agreements between service providers in accordance with IUC Orders/Regulations/Directives issued by TRAI from time to time.

27.6 The provision of any equipment and its installation for Interconnection purposes will be subject to mutual agreement between the interested parties and will comply with the rules and orders of the TRAI.

27.7 The Interconnection Tests for each and every one of the interfaces with any Telecommunications Service Provider will be carried out by mutual agreement between the Licensee and the other party involved. In case of disagreement to correct deficiencies/deviations in the interconnection tests carried out, reference may be made to the Licensor/TRAI.”

17. In the year 2005, the Authority issued a Directive dated 06.07.2005 to provide interconnection to the interconnection applicant within 90 days of the corresponding payments made by the interconnection applicant.D. This exercise to review the regulatory framework for interconnection in India18. The Authority received several statements from various service providers in order to review the interconnection regulatory framework to make it useful and relevant. In this sense, the Authority issued a Pre-Consultation Document (PCP) on 10.14.2015 and requested the opinion of the TSPs on the following topics: Question (a): Given the regulatory, market and technological changes that have occurred In recent years in the telecommunications sector, is there a need to review the existing regulations on interconnection with a view to making interconnection agreements more efficient, non-discriminatory, fair and transparent? If so, what kind of changes are needed in the regulatory framework for interconnection?

Question (b): Should the TRAI notify/prescribe a standardized interconnection agreement (default option) in those situations where the two service providers cannot negotiate mutually agreed interconnection terms and conditions within a specified time frame? ?

19. After analyzing the comments received from the TSPs on the PCP dated 10.14.2015 and a subsequent analysis, the Authority decided to carry out a comprehensive review of the regulatory framework for interconnection in the country and published a Consultation Document (CP ) on `Revision of the Interconnection Framework Regulation` on 10.21.2016 to find out the opinion of the interested parties on various aspects of interconnection. Interested parties were invited to submit written comments by 11/21/2016 and counter-comments by 12/06/2016. At the request of some interested parties, the dates for the submission of comments and counter-comments have been extended to 12.12.2016 and 12.26.2016, respectively. Written comments were received from three industry associations, 12 TSPs and two other interested parties. Counter comments were received from two TSPs. Comments and counter-comments received from stakeholders were posted on the TRAI website: www.trai.gov.in. An open discussion was held on 17.03.2017 in Delhi with the interested parties. The issues raised in the CP and the views of stakeholders are discussed in the following paragraphs.E. Analysis of the main issues raised in the consultation document20. In the CP of 10.21.2016, the Authority sought the opinion of interested parties on the following general issues related to interconnection: (a) How to guarantee fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions of the interconnection agreement between TSPs?

(b) Should the concept of seeker/provider continue?

(c) Is it appropriate to oblige TSPs that have Significant Market Power (SMP) to publish their Reference Interconnection Offers (RIOs) only? If so, what should be the criteria for considering a TSP as an SMP?

(d) What details must a new TSP provide to enter into an interconnection agreement?

(e) What should be the deadline for entering into an interconnection agreement? Should an economic disincentive be imposed on TSPs for not signing an interconnection contract within the stipulated period?

(f) Is a bank guarantee (BG) required in the Interconnection Agreement? If yes, how to determine the amount of BG?

(g) Should an interconnection agreement between TSPs continue to operate when one of them acquires a new license?

(h) Whether existing interconnection agreements should also be able to be migrated to the new structure that will emerge as a result of this consultation process.

(i) Should interconnection agreements and points of interest be service specific or service independent? If POIs (Service Independent POIs) are merged, what methods of detection, prevention and penalization of any traffic manipulation by TSPs should be implemented? (j) Under what circumstances can a TSP disconnect points of interest? What procedure should be followed before disconnecting points of interest?

(k) Is there a need for a coordination committee to facilitate effective and rapid interconnection between TSPs?

(l) Is there a need to review the level of interconnection as mentioned in the Guidelines attached to the IRP Regulation, 2002?

(m) If the interconnection of intercircle calls to the fixed network continues to be maintained in the SDCA, should an alternative level of interconnection in cases of technical non-feasibility (TNF) be specified at the SDCA level?

(n) What should be the framework to ensure timely provisioning/growth of E1 ports?

(o) Should separate time periods be prescribed for port provisioning for (a) fixed line networks and (b) mobile/IP networks?

(p) Should a financial disincentive be imposed for (a) not providing the initial POI and (b) not increasing the POI within the stipulated time frame?

(q) Is port expansion allowed at higher levels, such as STM-1 instead of E1?

(r) How to ensure that inflated port demand is not handled by a TSP?

(s) If the interconnect browser agrees to pay the full cost of the equipment required for the upgrade upfront, should the TSP provide the requested ports regardless of the traffic on the POI?

(t) What should be the IUC settlement method and how should late payments be handled between TSPs?

(u) What regulatory policies and measures need to be taken to encourage TSPs to migrate to IP-level interconnection?

(v) Is there a need to establish a framework for Interconnect Exchange to eliminate bilateral interconnection issues? NLDO?

21. An analysis of these issues based on feedback and input received from stakeholders is provided below.1. How to guarantee fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions of the interconnection agreement between TSPs?22. At the PC, stakeholder comments were solicited on the following question: Question: Which of the following is the best option to ensure fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms and conditions of the interconnection agreement between telecommunications service providers (TSPs)? ), taking into account technological evolution, market, licensing, regulatory and legal developments in the telecommunication services sector in India since 2002?

(i) Amend the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulation of 2002 (Reference Interconnection Offer), taking into account technological, market, license, regulatory and legal changes since 2002;

(ii) Prescribe a Standard Interconnection Agreement, to be entered into between the interconnected TSPs, if the interconnected TSPs fail to reach a mutual agreement on the terms and conditions of the interconnection agreement between them within a specified period;

(iii) Prescribe only broad guidelines based on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory principles and let the interconnected TSPs mutually decide the details of the interconnection agreement within a specified time frame; either

(iv) Any other method.

Please justify your answer.23. A wide range of stakeholder views were received in response to the question above. At one extreme is an interested party that has asserted that interconnection arrangements should be left to market forces and that the Authority should retain only regulatory oversight over interconnection issues and should intervene only ex-post. In the middle are some actors who believe that no changes are needed in the current regulatory framework for interconnection. The other extreme is occupied by most of the actors who stated that the current regulatory framework needs to be modified to make it more effective and enforceable. However, stakeholders seeking changes to the regulatory framework are not unanimous on any particular approach; They expressed different opinions as to the preferred method viz.—i. Vision - 1: The Authority should prescribe only broad guidelines based on the Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) principles; the Authority should leave the commercial and technical details of the interconnection agreement to mutual negotiations between the interconnected TSPs to allow for flexibility and innovation.

ii. Vision - 2: The Authority should only amend the RIO Regulations 2002 with a focus on ensuring that the principle of reciprocity is followed by interconnected TSPs; Is

iii. View - 3: The Standard Interconnection Agreement (SIA) is the best option to ensure fair and reasonable terms and conditions of the interconnection agreement between TSPs.

24. A state TSP stated that the SIA prescription as a default option is not appropriate as it will always negatively affect one of the parties; a party will not agree to mutual bargaining if it is likely to benefit from such an arrangement by default.25. Based on stakeholder feedback and additional analysis, the Authority attempted to find answers to the following questions: a. Which method is appropriate: ex ante regulation or ex post intervention in interconnection issues?

In a multi-service (or competitive) service provider environment, interconnection is considered a lifeblood of the telecommunications service industry. At the international level, strategic anti-competitive behavior in interconnection matters has delayed the start of competition in many telecommunications markets around the world. According to ITU surveys4, many countries rank interconnection issues as the most important problem in developing a competitive market. It is widely believed that established TSPs tend to delay interconnection by prescribing unilateral terms and conditions in the interconnection agreement, charging a high price, etc.; such behavior leads to costly and time-consuming negotiations between competing transportation service providers at the expense of efficient service to consumers. Clearly, it is in the interest of consumers to have effective and rapid interconnections between TSPs. Most countries in the world have formulated ex ante regulatory guidelines to establish an adequate environment to facilitate interconnection. The Authority indicated that in the recent past in the country there have been several cases of: (a) refusal to enter into an interconnection agreement; (b) refusal to provide adequate interconnection capacity; and (c) position for the disconnection of the interconnection installation on fragile bases by some TSPs. Based on the above facts and analysis, the Authority considers that the case for an ex post regulatory regime for interconnection in India remains weak. Consequently, the Authority decided to proceed with the formal ex ante regulatory regime for interconnection in India.

4 Source: Telecommunications Regulation Manual Module 3 Infodev Interconnection, accessible at https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Documentation/Infodev_handbook/3_Interconnection.pdf

B. Is the current regulatory framework for interconnection in India adequate for the current telecom market?

The current regulatory framework for interconnection is fundamentally based on the three directives of the Authority viz. - (a) Resolution of 08.01.2001; (b) Telecommunications Interconnection Regulation (Interconnection Reference Offer), 2002 of 12.07.2002; and (c) Instruction of the Authority dated 6/7/2005 to provide interconnection to the interconnection applicant within 90 days of the corresponding payments made by the interconnection applicant.

The Telecommunications Interconnection (Reference Interconnection Offer) Regulations, 2002, requires a TSP with Significant Market Power (SMP) status to submit its PRI proposal (describing, among others, the technical and commercial conditions for interconnection based on in the RIO model attached to the Regulation) to the Authority for approval and then post the approved RIO on its website. Said RIO, from that moment, constitutes the basis of all interconnection agreements that are entered into by and with the issuer of the RIO. The Authority took note of the fact that, with the current level of fragmentation in the telecommunications services market, few TSPs qualify as SMPs and therefore the question of entering into an interconnection agreement requires review.

The Direction of the Authority of 06.07.2005 obliges the interconnection provider to provide the interconnection within a period of 90 days from the corresponding payments made by the interconnection applicant. Although said Directorate has allowed, to a certain extent, the provision of POIs to interconnection applicants, the following facts indicate that the deadline for the provision of POIs requires revision:

(i) The provisions of the Resolution of 06.07.2005 only enter into force after the interconnection applicant has made the due payments to the interconnection provider, which is only possible after the interconnection provider issues a demand note to the interconnection applicant; in the absence of a specific term ordered to the interconnection provider to issue a demand note after receiving the request for provision of initial interconnection and increase of points of interconnection (POI), it is possible to obey the 'letter' of Management even without obeying to his 'spirit'.

(ii) The 90-day period foreseen to meet the request of the interconnection applicant has turned out to be quite long given that many new entrants have acquired a large number of subscribers in very short periods, requiring, in turn, time, an increase in POI capabilities in a much shorter time frame.

Clearly, the current regulatory framework for interconnection in the country requires reformulation to meet the needs of the current telecommunications market. Consequently, the Authority decided to prescribe a broad regulatory framework to resolve contentious issues between interconnection service providers through this regulation.

w. What should be the comprehensive regulatory framework for interconnection?

The Authority examined the options available to design a regulatory framework for interconnection with a view to guaranteeing effective and expeditious interconnection between TSPs and decided that hereinafter the "Telecommunications Interconnection Regulation, 2018" (hereinafter, TIR, 2018) comprising of Regulations on important aspects of interconnection (for example, interconnection agreement, bank guarantees, initial interconnection provision and POI increase, POI disconnection, financial disincentive in interconnection matters, etc.) shall apply to all service providers offering telecommunication services in India. The provisions of TIR 2018 will take precedence over existing interconnection agreements between TSPs in India. Through this regulation, the Authority decided, among other things, to impose the following in relation to the interconnection contract between service providers:

(i) A service provider who wishes to enter into an interconnection agreement with another service provider must submit an application to that service provider.

(ii) The service provider that has been requested to enter into an interconnection contract must, within five business days of receiving the request, send the draft of the interconnection contract to the service provider from whom the request was received. .

(iii) Once the draft of the interconnection contract has been received, the service provider that requested the execution of the interconnection contract must, within five business days, present its suggestions to the other service provider and, where appropriate, the objections to said draft.

(iv) The service provider that has been requested to enter into an interconnection contract must, within thirty days of receipt of the request, enter into an interconnection contract, in a non-discriminatory manner, with the requesting service provider. .

With respect to interconnection charges, such as installation charges and infrastructure charges, Authority decided that interconnection charges may be mutually negotiated between service providers subject to regulations or instructions issued by Authority from time to time, provided that such charges are reasonable, transparent and non-discriminatory.

2. Should the interconnection seeker/interconnection provider concept continue?26. Through the Telecommunications Interconnection (Rights and Revenue Sharing) Regulations of 1999, PREPA has defined Interconnection Provider and Interconnection Provider as follows: "Interconnection Provider" means the service provider from whose network a request is made for interconnection to provide telecommunications services.

"Interconnection Finder" means the service provider that seeks interconnection to the interconnection provider's network.

27. In accordance with traditional practices, an interconnection finder is primarily responsible for paying the following charges to the interconnection provider: (a) Installation charges (payable for the configuration, testing and commissioning of new points of interest) ;

(b) Port Charges (Under the Telecommunications Interconnection (Port Charges) Regulations 2001, as amended from time to time); Is

(c) Infrastructure charges (charges for infrastructure provided by the interconnection provider, i.e. colocation charges, etc.)

28. The RIO Model contained in the Telecommunications Interconnection Regulation (Reference Interconnection Offer) of 2002 stipulates the following with respect to the cost of interconnection: "12.3.1 The cost of modernization/modification of interconnection networks to comply with the service requirements of the service should be However, mutually negotiated sharing agreements should be allowed for the costs of upgrading/modifying interconnection networks between service providers.

12.3.2 Two years after the establishment of the initial interconnection, the question of who will bear the cost of the necessary additional resources will be negotiated between the service providers. The general principle followed in these negotiations is that each party should bear the incremental costs incurred for the additional ports needed to meet the QoS standards related to its outgoing traffic to the other party."

29. Reproduced below are the relevant clauses of the Licenses that address the question of who will bear the cost of interconnection: Basic Services Clause 17.11, NLD License Clause 17.9 and ILD License Clause 17.10: the update/modification of interconnection networks to meet service requirements will be provided by the service provider seeking interconnection. However, mutually negotiated sharing agreements for the cost of upgrading/modifying interconnection networks between service providers should be allowed."

Clause 28.4 of the CMTS License, Clause 27.3 of the UASL and Clause 28.2 of the UL: "Network resources, including the cost of upgrading/modifying interconnection networks to meet the service requirements of the licensee, shall trade with each other in light of orders and regulations issued by the TRAI from time to time."

30. The question of whether or not to continue with the interconnect provider/interconnect provider concept is quite controversial due to the fact that the concept in its current form generally requires the interconnect provider to pay the interconnect cost to the interconnect provider at perpetuity or less for a specified initial period. In this context, the following question was asked for consultation of the CP actors: Question: Is there a need to continue with the current concept of interconnection applicant/interconnection provider? If so, what should the criteria be?

31. In response to the question above, some stakeholders supported the continuation of the browser/interconnect provider concept, while others suggested deletion of the browser/provider concept.32. Opponents of the concept of browser/interconnect provider are of the opinion that the provision of interconnect is a mutually beneficial arrangement for both parties performing the interconnect and therefore there should be no concept of browser/interconnect provider and that both parties They must bear their own costs. for the provision of interconnection, considering that the cost of the interconnection link between the two networks must be shared by the interconnected parties. These stakeholders were of the view that the current concept of browser/interconnect provider has resulted in an anti-competitive situation where interconnect providers can dictate terms for interconnecting browsers. A stakeholder opposed to the browser/interconnect provider concept argued that the browser/provider concept was relevant in the early days of liberalization, when only an incumbent TSP had to bear the cost of upgrading just to provide interconnection to all new entrants at that time; at that time, the capacity of the exchanges was limited and implied enormous costs to provide interconnection to the other TSPs; therefore, a cost causation principle was used and this led to the concept of seeker/provider; However, currently, there is already competition in the market and there is no such capacity restriction in the exchanges of new technologies, so the concept of seeker/provider is archaic. This actor, however, maintains such points of view only with regard to the interconnection between access service providers and has defended that the National Long Distance Operator (NLDO) and the International Long Distance Operators (ILDOs) must always be treated as applicants vis-à-vis access service providers.33. On the other hand, a large number of stakeholders have supported the concept of a browser/interconnect provider. In support of their point of view, they provided the following arguments: (a) The interconnection provider should build capabilities in its own network for the interconnection seeker in the initial phase of the interconnection. Creating these capabilities has cost implications for the interconnect provider. Therefore, it must be assumed by the applicant for a predefined period (by mutual agreement).

(b) The interconnection browser may use a different technology than the one used by the provider. Thus, the provider may have to modify its network to facilitate interconnection with the browser. The concept of browser/interconnect provider helps shift the responsibility for bearing the cost of such technological changes to the browser interconnect.

(c) The browser/interconnect provider concept is prevalent throughout the world.

34. However, stakeholders who support the broad 'concept' of browser/interconnect provider are not unanimous in 'describing' the concept. The views of these stakeholders on 'the period during which the concept of browser/interconnect provider should be applied' can be summarized as follows: be only one criterion for defining the browser/interconnect provider, i.e. the The existing TSP is the interconnect provider and a new TSP is the interconnect finder and will remain a finder forever regardless of market share; all other definitions are prejudiced, mischievous, and chaotic. A public sector service provider argued that the status of PSUs as 'interconnect providers' should be perpetual as they are established service providers.

(b) View 2: Concept to apply for the first two years in case of new entrants: Many stakeholders were of the opinion that interconnect provider/seeker status should apply only when a new entrant launches the service for the first time in a given licensed country. service area (LSA), for an initial period of two years from the date of launch of commercial services. After two years, each party will bear the cost of its outgoing traffic, including the capacity built in the first two years; this includes the cost of interleaving the media.

(c) View-3: Concept to apply differently for different service segments: Some stakeholders suggested the following method to implement the seeker/provider concept:

(i) For the interconnection between two access service providers, the late entrant must be considered an applicant for the interconnection during the initial period of two years, after which the cost must be assumed by both parties based on the respective outgoing traffic. .

(ii) For the interconnection between the access service provider and NLDO/ILDO, NLDO/ILDO shall be considered as an applicant for interconnection in perpetuity.

(iii) If the license of an access service provider is renewed after the 20-year term, it must no longer be considered as an applicant for interconnection in the new interconnection contract.

35. In assessing the suitability of the browser/interconnect provider, the Authority noted that the concept of browser/interconnect provider has prevailed since the inception of competition in the telecommunication services sector in India. In addition, the licenses for the Base service, the NLD service, and the ILD service recognize the status of the interconnection browser as distinct from the interconnection provider (with respect to interconnection cost).36. It was observed that, in any interconnection agreement, the interconnection service provider that benefits most from the interconnection assumes the role of interconnection requester. For example, when the government granted licenses to private companies to offer mobile telephony in India, the basic service providers viz. The Department of Telecommunications (now BSNL) and MTNL were the owners of the sector. At that time, cellular service providers would benefit most from interconnection with core service providers, since cellular service providers were starting from scratch and core service providers had quite a large subscriber base. This was one of the reasons why cellular service providers assumed the role of interconnection seekers before basic service operators.37. A similar situation occurred when the Government granted new licenses for cellular services and introduced third and fourth operators into the cellular services market. In this case, the new entrants were seeking interconnection not only with basic service operators, but also with existing cell phone operators. When the National Long Distance (NLD) and International Long Distance (ILD) sectors were opened to private participation in the country, the new NLDO and ILDO sought to interconnect access service providers (both basic and cellular)38. The interconnected parties in the access-to-access (A2A) interconnection (where both parties are access service providers) maintain a peer-to-peer relationship. In this relationship, at the same time that they cooperate through the execution of interconnection contracts, at the same time they compete in the market, generally, for the same set of customers. In the initial period of interconnection between a new entrant and an incumbent, there is a significant asymmetry in outgoing and incoming traffic at the POI. However, once the new entrant gains a valid market share, the two interconnected parties begin to approach symmetry in traffic at the POI. Therefore, beyond a certain point in time after the interconnection is established, not only the seeker of the interconnection but also the provider of the interconnection begin to receive the benefits of interconnection through positive network externalities. Clearly, the argument that new entrants benefit most from interconnection is only valid in the short to medium term.39. Taking into account the comments of the interested parties and the subsequent analysis, the Authority decided to implement the following mechanism: to enter into an interconnection contract, ports must be searched in the POIs of the other service provider to meet the demand for incoming and outgoing traffic. at points of interest.

(b) After two years from the date of initial interconnection establishment or February 1, 2018, whichever is later, all existing ports in a POI shall be converted to carry one-way traffic such that the amount number of ports to send outbound traffic from each service provider to the other service provider is proportional to its average outbound traffic over the previous three months; and after converting the ports, each service provider must search for ports to meet the demand of their outgoing traffic.

3. What details must a new TSP provide to enter into an interconnection contract?40. In response to the question of what details a new TSP must provide when requesting to enter into an interconnection agreement, stakeholders expressed a variety of views. At one extreme is an interested party who argued that the Authority should not prescribe details/documents that a new entrant must provide to the existing service provider; rather, they must be mutually agreed and negotiated by the interconnection service providers. At the other extreme are some interested parties who have suggested that a new TSP should provide a great deal of detail and documentation, including the following: (a) letter issued by the Department of Transport citing the MSC SPC for each LSA;

(b) letter issued by DOT citing MSISDN/TFN levels/fixed number serial level assignment for subscriber provisioning;

(c) company profile and market share;

(d) TEC interface approvals for all equipment to be connected for interconnection;

(e) network architecture with low and high level POP details;

(f) probable reasonable demand projection for the E1 capacity of the interconnection location for six months after commercial launch (locations must be provided with detailed address and latitude-longitude);

(g) probable date of beginning of commercial operations;

(h) proposed services to be offered and proposed connectivity (with justifications);

(i) Interconnection technology, e.g., TDM/IP, SMPP, ISUP, SCCP, etc.;

(j) details of the means of transport, such as satellite, microwave, PDH, SDH, DWDM, ATM, etc.;

(k) Request for KYC documents from the service provider, viz. Service Tax Certificate/PAN Card/GST Registration Certificate etc.

(l) a copy of the Company's Articles of Incorporation;

(m) a copy of the statutes,

(n) the last annual report of the Company,

(or) a list of DIN trustees,

(p) a certified copy of the Council resolution,

(q) original power,

(r) sample signature,

(s) copy of the Certificate of Incorporation with CIN

41. Between the two extremes mentioned above there are some service providers who have suggested that a new TSP should only provide certain documents when seeking interconnection. One suggested that the new TSP only needs to provide two documents, namely: (a) a copy of your License Agreement; and (b) the location of its switches/infrastructure, while another interested party has stated that the proposed services to be provided by the new entrant must also be provided by the new entrant.42. In considering the views of interested parties, the Authority noted that where the documents and details to be provided by the new entrant when seeking interconnection are left to mutual negotiation between the interconnecting parties, this could lead to a situation where As the existing service, the provider may employ delay tactics by obtaining a large amount of unnecessary detail. At the same time, the Authority is aware of the fact that existing service providers require certain details and documents from new entrants before entering into interconnection agreements for reasons such as the following: (a) To verify that the requesting service provider has license for the service for which the interconnection is requested;

(b) Know the location of the POI and the interconnection technology of the requesting service provider.

43. Taking into account the comments of the interested parties and the additional analysis, the Authority decided to prescribe that a service provider that wishes to enter into an interconnection agreement with another service provider must submit an application to that service provider together with -- -(a) a copy of your license agreement;

(b) designation of the services for which the interconnection is intended;

(c) proposed locations of your points of interest; Is

(d) name of the technology that will be used for the interconnection in each POI.

4. What should be the term to enter into an interconnection contract?44. As previously described, the Authority, through the issuance of the 2018 TIR, decided that interconnection service providers have a period of 30 days to sign an interconnection agreement between them through mutual negotiation under the 2018 TIR as of from the date a service provider sends a formal request (along with the necessary details and documents) to the other service provider.5. Is there a need for a bank guarantee (BG) in the Interconnection Agreement? If so, how to determine the amount of BG?45. In response to the question about the need for a bank guarantee5 in interconnection contracts, several opinions were received from interested parties. While some stakeholders opined that there is no justification for seeking bank guarantees in interconnection agreements, some others argued that there is a great need for bank guarantees. Between these two parties there is an industry association and a TSP who have argued that the bank guarantee issue does not require any regulatory intervention.46. Opponents of providing a bank guarantee in interconnection agreements are of the opinion that there is no requirement to obtain a bank guarantee in the interconnection agreement, since both parties to the interconnection receive the benefit of the interconnection. One stakeholder was of the opinion that, in general, there is limited exposure (ie the value that can be lost) in interconnection agreements; however, in the case of access provider interconnection contracts with ILDO, there may be significant financial exposure and therefore there is a need for bank guarantees in such contracts. An interested party asserted that the provision of bank guarantees is not justified except in the following two cases, namely: (a) An interconnecting TSP is using POIs only to terminate traffic and is in the net pay position at all times (for example, in case of interconnection with autonomous NLDO/ILDO) and,

(b) An interconnection TSP in arrears of payment for more than 10 days during three consecutive months of the year.

47. On the other hand, defenders of granting bank guarantees in interconnection agreements have argued the following in support of their position: (a) Bank guarantees are necessary to securitize the net amount receivable from the interconnection TSP. Even the licensor follows this practice to securitize its net receivables for license fees and spectrum charges.

(b) Certain TSPs, upon closing their operations, did not pay their interconnection fees to the interconnection TSPs. The provision of bank guarantees is necessary to prevent such eventualities.

48. Public sector TSPs, while supporting the provision of bank guarantees, argued that bank guarantees should be provided by private TSPs and not the other way around. A public sector TSP also provided a letter from the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) requesting to obtain adequate bank guarantees from other TSPs prior to the launch of services, where necessary; and obtain additional bank guarantees during the course of its operations, when necessary. Another public sector TSP stated that bank guarantees must be obtained from interconnected TSPs for the purposes of audits and investigations by various statutory bodies.49. Proponents of leniency on bank guarantees have been of the opinion that all commercial aspects of interconnection should be left to the interconnected TSPs for mutual agreement on a reciprocal basis.50. When examining the adequacy of granting bank guarantees in interconnection contracts, the Authority learned of reports that many TSPs, upon withdrawing from the operation of telecommunications services in the country due to the cancellation of licenses or other commercial reasons, did not pay the charges for the use of the interconnection service and other charges owed by them to other TSPs. At the same time, the Authority also came to know of reports that certain incumbent TSPs applied for bank guarantees in the order of Rs. ten lakh per E1 link in access to access interconnection agreements.51. Based on the comments of the interested parties and subsequent considerations, the Authority decided to prescribe a cap on the bank guarantees that a TSP may request from another interconnected TSP in accordance with the following scheme: A bank guarantee is a guarantee of a credit that guarantees that a debtor's responsibilities will be met. That is, if the debtor does not settle a debt, the bank covers it.

Fuente: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bankguarantee.asp

The service provider that has requested the execution of an interconnection contract will be obliged to provide a bank guarantee, for a period of six months, counted from the date of establishment of the initial interconnection, for the total number of ports claimed in said term, if so required by the service provider that was requested to enter into an interconnection contract: Except that the value of this bank guarantee will be determined in the manner provided in Annex-I of this regulation.

B. Six months after the date of establishment of the initial interconnection or February 1, 2018, whichever is later, the responsibility to provide the bank guarantee will be determined as follows:

(i) the interconnection usage fees paid between the two interconnection service providers in the two months prior to the end of six months from the date of initial interconnection establishment or February 1, 2018 shall be calculated, whatever is later. and the provider that must pay the charges for interconnection use, prior adjustment, to the other provider, must grant a bank guarantee for a period of six months, if the other provider so requires;

(ii) the bank guarantee will be limited to the amount of charges for interconnection use owed by the service provider after the adjustment referred to in the preceding clause; Is

(iii) this process of determining the responsibility of the service provider in providing the bank guarantee must be repeated every six months.

52. Given that the charges for the use of the interconnection are settled monthly between the TSPs, the Authority understands that, during a period of six months from the date of establishment of the initial interconnection, the maximum amount of the bank guarantee to payable by a service provider must be equal to the maximum net IUC owed by the service provider during a period of two months. In the table below, an attempt has been made to estimate the maximum net difference in minutes sent from one service provider to another service provider over two months per E1.

53. Given that the maximum amount payable by the requesting service provider to the other service provider in two months per E1 link would be obtained by multiplying the applicable interconnection usage fee by the maximum net MOUs from the requesting service provider to the other service provider (assuming all voice traffic flows from the requesting service provider to the other service provider and none in the opposite direction) in two months per E1, the Authority decided to prescribe the maximum limit of bank guarantee per E1 connection at the POI for a period of six months from the date of establishment of the initial interconnection as follows: Maximum limit of bank guarantee per E1 link at a POI (in Rs.) = 8,00,000 multiplied by the rate of use of interconnection per minute applicable to traffic carried on the E1 link

54. By way of illustration, for E1 connections between two access service providers, the maximum limit of bank guarantees per E1 connection at the POI, at the current IUC rate, can be calculated as follows: Maximum limit of bank guarantee per E1 connection at a POI (in Rs.) = 8,00,000 * Rs. 0.06 = rupees 48,000

55. By way of illustration, the bank guarantee to be established from the six months following the date of establishment of the initial interconnection or until February 1, 2018, whichever is later, may be calculated as follows. (a) If the IUC due from Service Provider-1 to Service Provider-2 for the previous two month period is Rs. 50 Lakh IUC payable by Service Provider-2 to Service Provider-1 for the period of the preceding two months is Rs. 35 lakhs;

(b) then Service Provider-1 is required to pay a maximum bank guarantee of Rs. 15 lakh for a period of six months if required by the 2 service provider.

6. Should the interconnection contract between the TSPs continue to be valid when one of them acquires a new license?56. In the last three or four years, many TSPs have acquired new licenses after their previous licenses expired. Previously, these TSPs have filed declarations with the Authority indicating that their interconnection agreements with the public sector TSPs were co-terminal with their previous licenses and, therefore, new interconnection agreements must be entered into after the expiration of the previous licenses. and the beginning of new. licenses. ; however, even after several rounds of discussions with public sector TSPs, they have not been able to finalize new agreements with public sector TSPs and traffic at POIs is exchanged without any formal agreement. In this context, the following question was raised in the CP for stakeholder consultation: Question: Should an interconnection agreement between TSPs continue to be in force if an interconnected TSP acquires a new license when a previous license expires? Alternatively, should new agreements be entered into at the specific request of either party to the interconnection?

57. In response to the previous question, a wide range of responses was received from interested parties. A set of interested parties has argued that existing interconnection agreements between TSPs should continue to operate when an interconnecting TSP acquires a new license after the expiration of a previous license. The second group of stakeholders is of the opinion that a new contract should be entered into when an interconnecting TSP acquires a new license after the previous license expires. A variant of this view is that if both parties to the interconnection state in writing that they continue to abide by the same interconnection terms and conditions, the interconnection agreement may continue, however, if either party requests a review, a review must be sign a new agreement. entered into by the interconnected TSPs. The third group of stakeholders argued that there is no need for any regulatory intervention in this matter; Interconnected TSPs should be free to decide for themselves issues related to bilateral agreements.58. Stakeholders who support the continuation of existing interconnection agreements between TSPs when an interconnected TSP acquires a new license after the expiration of a previous license made the following arguments: (a) As long as there is continuity in interconnectivity, the terms and conditions conditions of the agreement the existing interconnection between the TSPs must continue to operate.

(b) The expiration of the existing license and the issuance of a new license is a commercial aspect since the disconnection of the interconnection is not effected and no new interconnection demands are made. Furthermore, the equipment is normally not replaced or even the existing system is not modified in any way. Therefore, only a few technical changes to the license / alteration of the license cannot constitute a sustainable basis for the breach of the existing agreement between the parties, since it was concluded on mutually agreed terms.

(c) Existing interconnection agreements do not contain a termination/renewal clause as a result of license renewal.

59. Interested parties who argued that a new agreement should be entered into when an interconnecting TSP acquires a new license after the previous license expires provided the following arguments in support of their view: (a) 20 years is a long time and many technology-related changes Changes in the marketplace, licensing, regulation, and legislation may have occurred that require changes to the contract. Therefore, new agreements must be entered into when existing agreements expire upon license expiration. However, Interconnect Seeker/Provider status will not apply to these new Interconnect Agreements.

(b) The interconnection agreement between the TSPs is legally based on valid licenses held by the interconnecting TSPs. Upon expiration of the license of any of the interconnection TSPs, the existing interconnection agreement will not continue to be legally valid unless both interconnection TSPs agree and register it in the form of addendums to the existing interconnection agreement. Otherwise, the interconnection TSPs must enter into a new interconnection agreement.

60. In considering the matter in question, the Authority took note of the fact that when the Government grants a new license to a licensee after the expiration of a previous license, the same resources (series of numbers, MSC and SP codes, etc. . ), or approvals for lawful interception and SACFA releases to the licensee, etc. continue to operate and therefore the termination of an interconnection agreement need not be linked to the expiration of an old license agreement of either party when that party has already entered into a new license agreement.61. In any case, the reasonable interests of interconnection service providers in existing interconnection agreements would remain protected as the provisions of the 2018 TIR take precedence over existing interconnection agreements between service providers.7. Should the existing interconnection agreements be allowed to migrate to the new structure that will emerge as a result of this consultation process?62. Since the Authority has already decided that the provisions of the 2018 TIR will take precedence over existing interconnection agreements, the issue of the applicability of the new interconnection framework to the existing interconnection agreement has now been resolved.8. Should interconnection agreements and points of interest be service specific or service independent? In the case of a merger of PDIs, what methods of detection, prevention and penalization of any traffic manipulation by TSPs should be implemented?63. Under the existing terms of the interconnection agreements, UASL's full mobility, limited mobility, and fixed network have separate points of interest with public sector TSPs. Said points of interest are treated independently for all purposes, including installation costs, port fees, etc. that any infrastructure taken under a license must be shareable with the same licensee who is also authorized to provide other services. In this context, the following questions were raised in the CP for stakeholder comments: Question: Whether the interconnection and interconnection agreement should be service-specific or service-independent (i.e., a TSP can send any type of traffic at an interconnection point that is permitted under the terms and conditions of the license granted to you)? What are the advantages/disadvantages of having service specific points of interest when TSPs are equipped with call data recording (CDR) based billing systems?

Question: If POIs are merged, what methods to discover, prevent and penalize any traffic tampering by TSPs (where higher IUC traffic is recorded as lower IUC traffic in the CDR of the originating TSP) should they be implemented?

64. In response to the above questions, several responses were received from interested parties. With the exception of one stakeholder who stated that the issue of standalone or service-specific points of interest should be left to TSPs in accordance with their mutual interconnection agreement, other stakeholders expressly supported the provision of service-specific interconnection. and the interconnection agreement or objected to such provision.65. Proponents of the provision of specific interconnection services and interconnection agreements have stated the following to substantiate their views: (a) With respect to the specific interconnection service agreement: While the License may permit the provision of a wide range of of services, the interconnection The agreement must be specific to the service because the interconnection of different services involves different technical and commercial aspects. The interconnection contract includes the charges incurred in the establishment of an interconnection network, such as port fees, installation fees, etc. These fees vary depending on the applicable configuration/interconnection scenario and therefore there may not be a standard interconnection agreement that covers all scenarios. Charges must be agreed on a case-by-case basis.

(b) Regarding service-specific interconnection (interconnection points/transit groups): The type of traffic that one interconnection TSP delivers to the other interconnection TSP at the POI depends on the terms of the interconnection agreement. The ATSP may have a POI at a designated location for various services with another TSP; however, trunk groups (TGs) must be kept separate for different services to ensure that only traffic for services destined for a given TG is delivered. Although TSPs are equipped with a CDR-based billing system, a unified POI without demarcation would induce TSPs to manipulate CLIs, resulting in a loss for the terminating TSP. In such a situation, the TSP will have no way to check and block such traffic. Routing, numbering, IUC rates, etc. they are also all service-specific and any attempt at service-agnostic interconnection would lead to misuse and arbitrage. The CDR at the end of the exchange/network does not have the ability to identify the location of the calling subscriber, which leads to billing disputes between TSPs.

66. On the other hand, advocates of agnostic provision of interconnection services and interconnection agreements have advanced the following arguments in support of their position: The Unified License and therefore interconnection agreements should not be insisted on multiple. There must be a single interconnection agreement for all services permitted under the terms and conditions of the License signed by the TSP with specific provisions for each type of License authorization, such as NLD, ILD, etc.

(b) Regarding service-independent interconnection: Service-specific points of interest lead to inefficient use of resources, as there will be a level of unused capacity at multiple points of interest. The requirement for service-specific points of interest stems from the requirement to distinguish between the type of calls terminated in a TSP network, since different types of calls have different IUC rates. However, with enhanced CDRs, the same goal can be achieved without needing to have service-specific POIs. Each TSP must maintain CDRs that record source and destination numbers, source and destination call type, ie, wireline, wireless, FWA, Internet telephony. Once these CDRs were exchanged at the end of the month, the IUC payable would be easily determined and there would be no need to resort to service-specific POIs and the POIs could be service-independent. This would increase the efficiency of the network and would also achieve the goal of being able to determine the correct type of call for purposes of determining the final IUC bill.

67. The Authority, when examining the adequacy of the provision of specific services or independent interconnection services and the interconnection agreement, took note of the following: (a) Interconnection agreements are entered into by TSPs that have been granted any of the following licenses in the country:

(i) Access Service License (ie BSO/CMTS/UASL);

(ii) License for NLD services;

(iii) License for ILD services;

(iv) Unified License with authorization for at least one of the access/NLD/ILD services.

(b) Currently, termination rates for - national calls from fixed networks; wireless house calls; and international calls; - They are different.

(c) In the past, there have been allegations about some TSPs making higher IUC calls as lower IUC calls through manipulation of the caller's CLI.

(d) CDR-based billing systems cannot detect if the caller's CLI has been tampered with.

68. Taking into account stakeholder feedback and further analysis, the Authority is of the opinion that service providers should be able to enter into a multi-service interconnection agreement; however, the question of service-independent or service-specific POIs should be left to mutual negotiation between interconnection service providers. Thus, the Authority, through this regulation, imposes on the service provider, who makes the request for the execution of the interconnection contract, the name of the services for which the interconnection is sought at the time of the request.9. Is there a need for a coordination committee to facilitate effective and expedited interconnection among TSPs?69. On the issue of the need for a coordination committee(s) to facilitate effective and rapid interconnection between TSPs, most stakeholders are of the opinion that there is no need for a coordination committee(s). These actors have stated that the issue of interconnection is a bilateral issue that should be left to mutual negotiation between the interconnection TSPs under the general interconnection regulatory framework; after all, the option to address TDSAT is available to TSPs to seek adjudication of inter-TSP disputes. Some stakeholders indicated that the Authority already seeks reports on interconnection problems and holds meetings with corporate executives from TSPs to resolve issues. On the other hand, one stakeholder opined that there is an urgent need to have a steering committee to facilitate effective and expeditious interconnection between TSPs; the Committee should be empowered to intervene if any TSP fails to meet the deadlines and to force the TSP to meet the deadlines by imposing financial sanctions on the TSP.70. The Authority took note of the fact that problems related to interconnection between TSPs continue to arise at various stages, even when the formal interconnection agreements between them are well established. When these matters are brought to the attention of the Authority by interconnected TSPs, the Authority attempts to facilitate the TSPs with a view to ensuring effective interconnection between them. Such a mechanism to ease interconnection problems has worked reasonably well so far. In case of impasse between service providers, they approach the TDSAT to seek adjudication of disputes between them. As the current mechanism has worked reasonably well, the Authority did not see any merit in introducing any Coordination Committee scheme to resolve interconnection issues. At the same time, the Authority is aware of the fact that new service providers sometimes face difficulties in entering into interconnection agreements and obtaining the necessary ports at points of interest. With a view to facilitating an effective and expeditious interconnection, the Authority has decided to stipulate that it may, from time to time, issue instructions it deems appropriate to service providers on any aspect of interconnection for which provisions have been established pursuant to this regulation. 10 Under what circumstances can a TSP disconnect points of interest?71. In response to the aforementioned question, a wide variety of responses were received from stakeholders. While one stakeholder opined that no TSP should be allowed to disconnect POIs under any circumstances, other stakeholders suggested that an extreme step such as disconnection of POIs should not be taken except in exceptional circumstances. On the other hand, several stakeholders claimed that disconnection of points of interest should be allowed in certain justifiable circumstances.72. Stakeholders opposing the disconnection of POIs argued that disconnection of POIs is against the interests of the consumer and also violates the license conditions; .; the disconnection of the POIs will only be allowed by order of the Authority or Licensor. Some other interested parties have argued that the disconnection of points of interest is an extreme step that should not be taken except in exceptional circumstances such as: (a) termination of services by the licensee; (b) the licensee terminates the applicable POP; (c) based on mutual agreement; or (d) for breach of the interconnection contract.73. Stakeholders, who supported disconnection of POIs for justifiable reasons, cited the following reasons as justifiable for disconnecting POIs: (a) When a TSP diverts traffic, i.e., the TSP delivers the traffic, which must be delivered to a Designated POI, to other POIs destined for other services, primarily to pay lower termination/carriage rates;

(b) When a TSP transits traffic through a third party, that is, the TSP delivers its traffic to the interconnected TSP through another TSP without its consent;

(c) When a TSP transfers calls without CLI/CLI incorrect/CLI tampered with to pass higher IUC calls to lower IUC calls;

(d) When a TSP provides a service not defined in its license;

(e) When the TSP does not pay the IUC in the terms of the agreed interconnection;

(f) When a TSP uses the services against national security or in violation of laws, License terms or regulations;

(g) When the network of a TSP adversely affects the normal operation of the network of the interconnected TSP;

(h) When a TSP commits a violation of the confidentiality provisions of the interconnection agreement;

(i) When a TSP is declared bankrupt or insolvent;

(j) The defaulting party ceased to be the licensee pursuant to Section 4 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.

74. The Authority, in evaluating the POI disconnection provision, noted the following:1 Government-issued licenses require, among other things, that interconnected networks connect and remain connected to their applicable Systems.

2 The Authority, see its Dispatch of 12.31.2003, that is, it determined that a TSP that intends to disconnect the POI must notify the disconnection of the POI with an adequate term (not less than 10 days). M/s BSNL filed an appeal with the TDSAT against the aforementioned Board (Appeal no. 2 of 2004). TDSAT, see order of 04.21.2004, revoked the TRAI Board except for the notice period (not less than 10 days) to disconnect the POI.

3 The Authority has received numerous representations from various TSPs in the past, arguing that some TSPs unilaterally disconnect POIs in certain circumstances based on their own interpretation of terms and conditions for non-payment of fees, etc. Such disconnection of POIs results in the blocking of services to consumers.

75. Taking into account the comments of the interested parties and the additional analysis, the Authority understands that (a) the disconnection of the PDI should not be used to prevent exceptional circumstances; and (b) when necessary, it must be done only after due process. Consequently, the Authority decided to determine that a service provider, before cutting off a POI, must: (i) notify the other service provider fifteen business days in advance, justifying the proposed disconnection;

(ii) if you are not satisfied with the response to the notice of cause issued in accordance with the previous clause or do not receive a response to the notice of cause, notify the service provider within fifteen business days, specifying the date of disconnection of the IP; Is

(iii) not to disconnect the POI before the end of the notice period given in clause (ii) above:

Provided that the previous provision does not apply if a POI is disconnected with mutual consent or at the direction of the Licensor or the Authority.11. If there is a need to review the level of interconnection mentioned in the Guidelines attached to the IRP Regulation, 2002-76. In response to the question of the need to review the interconnection levels, many stakeholders have stated that there is a need to review the interconnection level, in particular those related to the PSTN. On the other hand, public sector TSPs have argued that current levels of interconnection should be maintained.77. The Authority has examined the views of interested parties and has observed that certain permit provisions, transit/transportation rates and numbering system, etc., have a significant influence on the levels of interconnections. The Authority is of the opinion that there is a need for further deliberation on the issue of interconnection levels.12. What should be the framework to ensure timely provisioning/growth of E1 ports?78. In 2005, the Authority issued an Interconnection Provision Instruction, through which it instructed all TSPs to provide interconnection at the request of the interconnection applicant within 90 days after the corresponding payment made by the interconnection applicant. It should be noted that, in response to the Authority's PCP of 10.14.2015, some TSPs indicated that the 90-day term is counted from the date of payment of a collection notice issued by the service provider against a firm requirement of a requesting service provider. ; however, some service providers, in many cases, do not raise the demand note for significantly long periods of time and, therefore, the maximum term of 90 days to provide the interconnection becomes fruitless. On the other hand, some TSPs have stated that interconnection requesters sometimes tend to make unreasonable demands for the provision of interconnection ports, which becomes difficult to meet in short periods of time. In this context, the following question was posed to solicit input from stakeholders: Question: What should be the framework to ensure timely provisioning/growth of E1 ports? Provide a complete framework with timelines, including the following aspects:

(a) Minimum number of E1 ports to start the service;

(b) Maximum term for the issuance of the collection note by the interconnection provider;

(c) Maximum term for the payment of the E1 ports demanded by the interconnection seeker;

(d) Notice of provisioning of E1 ports requested by the interconnection provider;

(e) Allocation of space for the placement of transmission equipment;

(f) Maximum term for the establishment of transmission links by the interconnection search engine;

(g) Term for acceptance tests;

(h) Deadline for the issuance of the final commissioning letter by the interconnection provider; Is

(i) Maximum period for starting traffic at the POI after the allocation/extension of the E1 ports already paid for.

79. In response to the previous question, two sets of responses were received from interested parties. While one group of stakeholders claimed that there is no need for any further regulatory intervention on the provision and increase of interconnection ports, the other group of stakeholders argued that there is an urgent need for clear and unambiguous deadlines for each step of the interconnection. Some stakeholders also noted that the framework to ensure timely provisioning/scaling of ports should be process oriented, compliance with which should be closely monitored by the Authority.80. An interested party, who understands that no other regulatory intervention is necessary regarding the provision and expansion of interconnection ports, stated that the expansion is a complex process that involves multiple domains such as core and transmission; higher capacity requirements could be in terms of switch ports, a single card in the transmit box or cover an entire transmit ring/network; the procurement process for central and transmission equipment typically takes 6-8 weeks from order to delivery and another 2-4 weeks for the justification, ordering, installation and commissioning process, depending on whether it is a update at the card level or at the network level. Therefore, the 90-day term set forth in the Authority's Directory of 07.06.2005.81 is reasonable and justified. On the other hand, an interested party who argued that there is an urgent need for clear and unequivocal deadlines for each stage of the interconnection, stated that the Authority's Instruction of 07.06.2005 does not make much sense, since the incumbent TSPs do not agree to traffic forecasts and requests to increase points of interest from the new TSPs; most importantly, established service providers do not issue demand notes to new TSPs, as a result interconnection seekers are unable to make the corresponding payments; Established TSPs only issue sparse ports for POI augmentation, and that too at their own discretion.82. The stakeholder, who argued that the framework to ensure the timely provisioning/increase of ports should be process oriented, stated the following: (a) The demand should be reasonable: the demand for interconnection ports should be made by the interconnection together with the justification traffic because the provision of interconnection ports does not require the increase of capacity only in the POIs but also in the access network. Since the interconnect browser compensates the interconnect provider only for the cost of the interconnect capacity accumulated in its traffic, a substantial amount of the investment made in the access network to handle the additional traffic will be wasted if the provider's actual requirement of services is too high. than projected demand.

(b) The interconnection provider must carry out 'due diligence' before accepting the demand: considering the fact that the interconnection provider has an existing network, which may require expansion and other changes to accommodate the interconnection applicant's demand , the interconnection provider should perform required due diligence with the help of historical traffic trends at the points of interest. This is important to ensure that an interconnect provider does not have to invest in building unnecessary capacity on its network.

(c) Initial E1s for the pre-launch phase should be limited to 1-2 E1s to test interconnectivity between networks.

(d) The interconnection provider must inform the location of the points of interest so that the interconnection seeker can make timely plans and arrangements.

(e) Provision of space, energy and infrastructure: If the contract provides for the provision of space, energy and infrastructure to the applicant for the interconnection, the feasibility of assigning space, energy, etc. it must be verified by the interconnection provider within a specified period of time. If this is not feasible, the applicant for the interconnection should be obliged to make alternative arrangements within a defined period.

83. Stakeholders who support the need for clear and unambiguous timelines for interconnection and those who advocate for a process-oriented framework to ensure timely port provisioning/expansion have suggested timelines for various aspects of port provisioning and expansion. The time periods suggested by many of them are quite different.84. The Authority, when examining the need for a framework for provisioning and scaling of interconnection ports, became aware of the fact that provisioning and scaling of ports at points of interest has always been a contentious issue among interconnection service providers. . Several TSPs have, on numerous occasions, brought to the attention of the Authority the problem of non-cooperation and obstruction by licensees. Therefore, the stakeholder's assertion that the Authority should set clear and unambiguous deadlines for each step of interconnection and should guide it towards the process to ensure effective and speedy interconnection does not seem entirely unjustified. At the same time, it does not seem prudent to micromanage the various aspects of the sourcing and augmentation process.85. Based on stakeholder feedback and additional analysis, PREPA has decided to implement the following framework to ensure provision of initial interconnection and port expansion at points of interest on a time-limited basis: (a) One provider of services, upon receiving the request for ports and space collocation, if applicable, must issue a letter of acceptance and a notice of demand, if any, within five business days following receipt of the request.

(b) The service provider, upon receipt of the account statement, must pay the amount within three business days following the date of receipt of the account statement.

(c) The service provider, who issued the acceptance letter, shall inform the requesting service provider about port provisioning and colocation space allocation, if any,-

(i) within five business days of the date of issuance of your letter of acceptance, if a collection note has not been issued; Is

(ii) within five business days following the date of receipt of payment by the service provider requesting the bill of lading, if it has been issued.

(d) A service provider, upon receiving notification of port provisioning and co-location space allocation, if any, shall, within three business days of receipt of the notification, notify the other service provider on the establishment of the transmission link between the POIs of the two service providers.

(e) The service provider, upon receiving the summons regarding the establishment of the transmission link between the POIs, must, within five business days following receipt of the summons, carry out acceptance tests and issue a final commissioning letter. in service of the ports to the other party. service provider.

86. For illustrative purposes, the following table shows the different deadlines to be met in terms of provision of the initial interconnection and increase in ports in the POIs, in the event that a notice of demand is issued by the service provider , who requests the provision of the initial interconnection or increase of ports is placed:

13. Should separate time periods be prescribed for port provisioning for (a) fixed telephony networks and (b) mobile/IP networks?87. With the exception of three stakeholders, all other stakeholders who spoke in response to the question above opposed the requirement of separate time periods for port provisioning for fixed networks and IP/mobile networks.88. Stakeholders who opposed the requirement of separate time periods for port provisioning in fixed line and mobile/IP networks expressed the following views: (a) Interconnection takes place in the core network, whether it is fixed or mobile/IP network and therefore there is no justification for separate time periods for technology-based port provisioning.

(b) Regulations must be technology independent.

(c) The interconnection of fixed and mobile networks is no different. Especially now with the possibility of interconnection over IP networks, the cost and complexity involved in interconnections has been reduced substantially.

89. One interested party, in support of prescribing separate time periods for port provisioning in fixed line and mobile/IP networks, stated, inter alia, that the PSTN fixed line networks in the country are predominantly owned by PSU, i.e. BSNL and MTNL, with legacy networks. The capacity of these plants is limited and their expansion requires time and implies higher costs. On the other hand, there is no capacity constraint on the new technology switches implemented by many TSPs in their mobile networks. Therefore, separate time periods may be prescribed for port provisioning for fixed networks and mobile/IP networks.90. It would be pertinent to mention that the PSTS of the public sector, in response to the question, stated that the terms for the provision of ports in fixed networks and mobile/IP networks should be the same and there should be no distinction by technology.91 . The Authority, in considering the adequacy of separate timeframes for port provisioning in fixed and mobile/IP networks, took note of the fact that the various stages of the interconnection process are, in general, neutral to the technology of the service providers. services. . Consequently, the Authority decided not to prescribe separate time periods for port provisioning for fixed networks and IP/mobile networks.14. Is port hardening allowed at higher levels, like STM-1 over E1?92. In response to the question above, with the exception of one stakeholder, who advocated for initial interconnection as well as increased points of interest at the STM-1 level, the other stakeholders expressed their views as follows way: (a) The increase in the port is already in force allowed at the STM-1 level and therefore does not require a regulatory prescription.

(b) The increase in STM-1 or other levels will be mutually agreed by the Parties instead of being mandatory.

(c) Depending on the traffic requirement, reinforcement at the STM-1 level may also be allowed.

(d) When the existing POI exceeds 63 E1, a further increase in the STM-1 level may be made, subject to technical feasibility in both TSP nodes.

e) The Telecommunications Interconnection (Port Charges) Regulations 2001 establishes port charges based on E1 ports.

(f) The increase in ports must be based entirely on the necessary capacity on both sides.

(g) Port augmentation may be allowed at higher levels, such as STM-1 instead of E1. This leads to lower hardware costs and much better bit rates and is capable of carrying both circuit-switched and packet-switched calls. For smaller requirements, the existing practice of E1 level ports should be continued.

93. The interested party, which sought the regulatory mandate to provide the initial interconnection as well as the POI augmentation at the STM-1 level, asserted that in order to meet the high standard of POI traffic in the STM-1 environment Currently, even during the early stages of the network, the mandatory initial interconnection capabilities must be reviewed for an STM-1; even for port scaling on a modern switch, the minimum unit should be in terms of STM-1.94. The Authority is aware of the fact that a new entrant may not necessarily require an STM-1 (63 E1 equivalent) capability in the initial stages. Also, the requirement to increase POIs may not necessarily be as high as the capability of the STM-1 in all cases. In this scenario, requiring interconnection at a minimum level of STM-1 may be counterproductive, as it may result in wasting resources in certain cases and may also require the requesting service provider to pay unnecessarily high port charges.95. At the same time, the Authority is aware that increasing the points of interest at the STM-1 level would generally be beneficial for interconnecting TSPs for the following reasons: (a) Most interconnection equipment (i.e. Media Gateways, MSC, etc.) of the TSPs are equipped with STM-1 ports. The ratio of STM-1 ports to E1 ports on such equipment is growing in favor of STM-1 ports.

(b) STM-1 ports are not only cost effective, but also require much less rack space. As a result, the same rack/shelf of equipment can accommodate much higher interconnect capacity if it contains STM-1 ports compared to the scenario where it contains only E1 ports. Therefore, interconnection at the STM-1 level can be a win-win proposition for both interconnected TSPs.

96. In light of stakeholder comments and further consideration, the Authority decided to prescribe that a service provider must provide STM-1 ports at points of interest, if any service provider requests the provision of such ports for increase POIs, provided that both service providers can agree to increase POIs to any higher or lower level, such as DS-3 or STM-16.15. How to ensure that inflated port demand is not handled by a TSP?97. In response to the question above, stakeholders expressed a wide variety of views. While some stakeholders opined that there is no need for a regulatory prescription on the issue because such issues can be resolved by mutual agreement, others argued that it cannot be considered how and why a requesting service provider would place an inflated claim on the service provider. interconnection; if the actual traffic is less than the demand, both interconnecting TSPs can mutually deprovision the additional ports. Most other stakeholders responded with suggestions to ensure that inflated port demand is not handled by a TSP. A number of views expressed by these stakeholders are summarized below: (a) Vision-1: The increase should be based on current capacity utilization of more than 70% during network peak hours (NBH) of consistently over the past week. The amount of increase should be a reasonable increase that brings utilization in the range of 50-70%.

(b) Opinion 2: Some interconnection seekers tend to project inflated demands due to their ambitious traffic projections. Meeting these inflated demands would be a costly affair and could also lead to the creation of superfluous capacities at the port, radio, and switching levels, as well as other unnecessary investments. Therefore, it would be up to the interconnection search engine to justify the demand from the technical and commercial point of view of the ports and it would be up to the provider to agree with the calculations made by the interconnection search engine.

(c) View 3: To ensure that the requesting TSP does not make an inflated demand for ports, port charges should be abolished. If, even after three months, the average peak utilization of the initial POI is less than 10% continuously for one month, the Port Charges, as prescribed by the TRAI, will be applied to the interconnection applicant for a period six months. In case, even after the expiration of the six-month period from the last POI increase, the average POI peak hour utilization remains below 30% for one month, then the TSP may withdraw such capacity increase port.

98. The Authority, in examining the matter, became aware of the fact that the issue of inflated demand has always been quite contentious among the interconnected TSPs, often leading to disputes between them. While demand for an excessively high number of ports is likely to result in unnecessary network spending, denying reasonable demand under the guise of calling such demand inflated would result in congestion of points of interest and thus Therefore, it would create inconveniences for the consumer. Therefore, it would be necessary to establish clear rules to determine how reasonable the port demand is in a POI.99. With a view to ensuring optimal use of expensive network resources, the Authority decided to establish the following with respect to the placement of port requests for the provision of initial interconnection and POI augmentation: a. Initial port provision request: After the interconnection contract is executed, the service provider that requested the interconnection contract may request the other service provider to provide such number of ports in the POIs that meet the requirement of their exit and entrance traffic in the points of interest during a period of three months from the date of the initial interconnection.

B. Request for Increased POIs: A service provider may request additional ports at a POI to the other service provider if the projected capacity utilization of the ports at that POI is likely, by the end of thirty days from the date of the request, is greater than 70% of the ports in the POI and that the projected capacity utilization of the ports in the POI will be determined based on the daily traffic of the previous thirty days in the POI during peak hours: provided that the service provider requests a number of additional ports that are likely to bring the capacity utilization of the ports at the POI to less than 60% by the end of thirty days from the date of request.

16. If the interconnect browser agrees to bear the full cost of the equipment required for the upgrade in advance, the TSP must provide the requested ports regardless of the traffic at POI?100. In response to the question above, three stakeholder views emerged. The first point of view is that the matter should be left to the discretion of the TSPs themselves and should not be prescribed by the Regulator. The second view is that POI provisioning and scaling should be driven solely by traffic on the POI, and therefore the proposition suggested in the question is not justified. The third view is that an interconnecting TSP must provide the requested number of ports if the other party is willing to pay the full cost of the equipment required for the increase upfront.101. Stakeholders who argued that it would be unjustifiable to force interconnected TSPs to offer the requested ports regardless of the traffic at the POI if the other party agrees to bear in advance the full cost of the equipment required for the increase have put forward the following arguments in support since their point of view: (a) The interconnection must be optimal and efficient and cannot be given carte blanche at the request of one of the parties. It should be noted that the License establishes that "... The Interconnection Agreements will provide, among other things, the following: (a) Satisfy all reasonable demands for the transmission and reception of messages between the interconnected systems." Thus, the reasonableness of the interconnection demand is a sine qua non condition of interconnection licenses and contracts. The interconnection agreements provide for the measurement of traffic during peak hours on the agreed routes to assess future capacity requirements. Therefore, there can be no case for increasing the interconnect TSP ports, regardless of the volume of traffic at the POI.

(b) The total cost of the equipment includes capital expenditure and operational expenditure on network elements such as BTS, BSC, MSC, transmission links, interconnection ports, passive infrastructure such as tower, etc. The interconnection finder only pays the port fee, and that too, for a period of two years. If the traffic is less than the required capacity, the provider's cost of implementing the additional network is wasted. Therefore, the provision of the port must be justifiable and based on reasonable traffic projections corroborated with actual traffic.

102. On the other hand, the stakeholders who supported the mandate of the interconnecting TSPs to provide the requested ports regardless of the traffic at the POI, if the other party agrees to bear the full cost of the equipment required for the increase in advance, declared their The following arguments support your point of view: (a) If a new entrant or a requesting TSP provides projections in advance and agrees to bear the full cost of the equipment required for the upgrade in advance, the other TSP must provide the requested ports regardless of volume of traffic in the POI. Potential underutilization of capacity, and therefore trapped capital, may be an interconnect provider's only fear in delaying port provisioning (otherwise, in the case of adequate utilization, the provider's best is to also create this capacity). By paying for this capability, the browser is fixing this problem and therefore the provider must provide the requested ports regardless of the volume of traffic at the points of interest.

(b) With sufficient time required to upgrade the equipment, there should be no constraints on provisioning (in terms of capacity) as the interconnection provider receives the cost in advance from the interconnection requester.

(c) Depending on the technical feasibility of the interconnect provider, if the interconnect provider agrees to bear the full cost of the equipment required for the upgrade in advance, the interconnect provider should be able to provide the requested ports regardless of the volume of traffic on the POI . However, this should scale over time based on the provider's back-end capabilities and related operational issues. The demand of the search engine must be validated by Traffic Engineering in the assumptions made for the forecast of traffic and number of subscribers.

103. The Authority, when examining the aforementioned matter, pointed to the fact that when an interconnecting TSP provides ports in a POI, it must incur not only the cost of the ports, but must also plan the deployment of a radio network proportional (BTS, BSC, transmission links) and essential equipment to meet the increase in traffic and, therefore, the increase in ports must be based on a justifiable demand well corroborated with real traffic. At the same time, the Authority is of the opinion that the interconnected TSPs should be allowed to mutually decide on the bulk augmentation of a POI, whereby one TSP assumes in advance the full cost of the equipment required for the augmentation by the other TSP. Consequently, the Authority has decided to leave the aforementioned issue to the interconnected TSPs to decide mutually.17. Should the financial disincentive be imposed for not providing the initial POI and not increasing the POI within the stipulated period, etc.?104. The following question was raised for consultation with PC stakeholders: Question: Whether financial disincentives should be placed on TSPs to

(a) failure to enter into an interconnection agreement within the stipulated period;

(b) fail to provide an initial POI;

(c) does not increase the POI within the stipulated period;

d) for non-compliance with any clause provided for in the regulations.

If so, what should be the value of these financial disincentives?105. In response to the previous question, while some stakeholders supported the need for financial disincentives, other stakeholders were of the opinion that there is no need to impose any financial disincentives on TSPs on issues related to interconnection.106. Stakeholders who opposed the imposition of financial disincentives on TSPs presented, among others, the following arguments in support of their point of view: (a) entering into an agreement, provision of initial POI, increase of POI and compliance with the provisions prescribed in the regulations imply a continuous effort at street level by both interconnected TSPs, which makes it very difficult to determine the cause of the delay in the real settlement/increase scenario. Therefore, it would be frivolous, unfair and unfair to impose a penalty on the interconnection provider, taking into account its provision of quality services to customers. The provider cannot be held unilaterally responsible as the interconnection involves two networks. Any action for non-compliance may only be brought by the non-compliant party, after due investigation.

(b) No financial disincentives should be placed on TSPs as interconnection provision depends on various parameters including technical feasibility/network upgrade etc.

(c) There is no need to prescribe any financial disincentives as TRAI's existing practice to resolve any issues between operators is working well and should therefore continue. In the event that any of the parties is not satisfied with the resolution provided by the TRAI, the parties also have the right to resort to the TDSAT or any other High Court for the adjudication of said dispute. In addition, TRAI may recommend to the DoT an appropriate action in accordance with the license conditions.

107. On the other hand, the interested parties that supported the imposition of financial disincentives to TSPs in matters related to interconnection presented, among others, the following arguments: (a) Currently, established TSPs can block interconnection, the provision of POIs and POIs increase with impunity without a financial burden being placed on them. Therefore, there is an urgent need for TRAI to impose punitive financial disincentives of Rs. 5 lakh per day of default from incumbent TSPs if they fail to (a) provide interconnection agreements on time; (b) provide initial points of interest to interconnection applicants within a prescribed period of time; (c) increase points of interest within the stipulated time frame; and (d) for violation of other terms of the regulations and its licences. Only after the inclusion of such punitive financial disincentives will established TSPs begin to comply with the terms of their License and the Interconnection Regulations.

(b) Delay and denial of interconnection by existing TSPs to the new entrant violate license conditions, disturb level playing field principles, stifle competition, and harm innovation and consumer interest. Therefore, there is a need to prescribe a strong penalty as a form of deterrence, for not providing initial interconnection or for not increasing interconnection capacities in a timely manner.

108. The Authority, in examining the appropriateness of the need to impose financial disincentives in matters related to interconnection, became aware of several cases in the recent past where new entrants have stated to the Authority that (a) established TSPs they do not enter into an interconnection agreement in due time and form; and (b) they do not generate interest points in a timely manner, as a business strategy to ensure that they do not have to fill in against these new TSPs. Given that the Authority has already established a framework for the conclusion of interconnection agreements, as well as for the provision and timely increase of POIs, it seems imperative to establish a dissuasive mechanism to guarantee the applicability of said framework. Consequently, the Authority has provided that if any service provider violates the provisions of these regulations, they must, without prejudice to any sanction that may be imposed by virtue of their license, or the provisions of the Law or the rules or orders that issues, or on instructions given by it, pursuant thereto, shall pay an amount, as a financial disincentive, not to exceed Rs. 1 lakh per day per licensed service area, as determined by the Authority: provided that no payment order of any amount by way of financial disincentive is made by the Authority, unless the service provider has had a reasonable opportunity to represent against non-compliance with the regulations observed by the Authority.18. How should Interconnection Usage Charges be settled and how should late payments be handled between TSPs?109. Regarding the form of liquidation of the IUC, various opinions have been received from the interested parties, which are summarized below: (a) Vision - 1: Mutual interconnection agreements should govern the issue of the liquidation of the IUC .

(b) Opinion - 2: The settlement of the IUC should be done on a net basis.

(c) Opinion - 3: The current gross settlement method should be maintained. This is recommended not only to facilitate documentation to claim deductions from past charges, but also in view of future GST regulation, which requires CENVAT to be available only after the TSP has issued the invoice, GST payment has been made to the government and uploaded the required details. about it on the government website.

110. Furthermore, with regard to the handling of the IUC arrears, stakeholders expressed a wide variety of views, a summary of which is provided below: (a) View - 1: The issuance of late payments between TSPs should also be dealt with on a bilateral basis.

(b) View - 2: Any undisputed amount not paid by the TSP within the stipulated period must be increased with late payment interest.

111. In view of the comments of the interested parties and the subsequent analysis, the Authority decided to leave the issues related to the settlement of the IUC and the delay in the payment of the IUC to a mutual agreement between the providers of the interconnection service. The Authority expects interconnection service providers to address IUC payment delays in a reasonable manner.19. What regulatory policies and measures should be taken to encourage TSPs to move to IP-level interconnection?112. In response to the question above, with the exception of a few stakeholders, the vast majority of stakeholders have either stated that there is no need for any regulatory prescription for TSPs to encourage migration to IP-tier interconnection, or stated that it is premature to address the issue of mandatory interconnection at the IP.113 level. Stakeholders who supported the requirement for policies and regulatory measures to foster interconnection at the IP level have stated, among other things, the following: (a) The Authority shall prescribe guidelines for the gradual and phased migration to IP-level interconnection. IP.

(b) Currently, the cost of the media portal required for the interconnection between the IP-based network and the TDM network is borne by the TSP with the new IP-based network technology. To stifle competition, mobile service providers, while having IP-based networks, do not provide IP-based interconnection. The real goal will only be achieved if IP-based interconnection is mandated and the appropriate regulatory framework for IP-based interconnection is in place.

114. The following is a summary of the comments from these stakeholders, which did not support the need for policy and regulatory measures to encourage interconnection at the IP level: (a) It is premature to address this issue because interconnection at the IP level can effectively only occur when the networks of all TSPs have migrated from circuit-switched to packet-switched. A separate consultation needs to be launched on the subject of IP interconnection.

(b) Regulators around the world have moved towards technology neutrality. In India, technology neutrality is enshrined in NTP-2012/NTP-99 and existing UAS/CMTS/UL licences. Mandatory deployment of a certain technology would be contrary to the principles enshrined in the NTP and license agreements.

(c) TSPs in India committed large investments in existing TDM based networks based on the initial license mandate and these investments were made for longer time horizons. A migration mandate for IP interconnection would lead to redundancy of currently deployed networks, which have a residual life of 5-10 years. Therefore, any regulation for mandatory IP interconnection will result in the unnecessary retirement of existing assets without any corresponding technical-economic benefits for existing TSPs. A migration to IP interconnection will also result in a very large cost burden for TSPs, as it will involve the implementation of network elements such as media gateways, signaling gateways, soft switches, session border controllers, and data transport network support, etc.

d) The prevailing technological ecosystem is changing very dynamically, making it difficult to predict the emergence of new advanced technologies. Investments made to build IP networks may become redundant in the future if new network technologies emerge. Therefore, preference for any of the technologies will place restrictions on the flexibility of TSPs to choose the most suitable technology and may result in sub-optimal use of the infrastructure.

115. The Authority, when evaluating the need for policies and regulatory measures to encourage TSPs to migrate to IP-level interconnection, realized the fact that most of the existing interconnections in the country are currently based on technology of circuit switching. Most of the country's telecommunications networks (both fixed and wireless) have traditionally been optimized for voice traffic. On the other hand, new age telecommunications networks are becoming more and more optimized for data traffic. These networks make use of packet switching. Some of these networks also carry voice traffic. It is expected that in the future, when telecommunication networks migrate to all-IP networks, the interconnection for voice services will also be based on IP.116. It should be noted that the Authority, by recommendation of 11.02.2016, made recommendations to the Government in order to allow IP-based Interconnection. These recommendations were accepted by the Government and, consequently, the Licenses were modified allowing IP-based interconnection on 04.19.2016. The modified Clause 27.3, General Conditions of Chapter 1, Part I of the Unified License reads as follows: "27.3 The interconnection between the networks of different Licensees to carry circuit-switched traffic shall follow the national standards of CCS No. 7 and for carry IP-based traffic traffic in accordance with Telecommunications Engineering Center (TEC) standards and as amended from time to time by the Telecommunications Engineering Center (TEC) and also subject to the technical feasibility and technical integrity of the Networks and will be within the general framework of the regulations/interconnection instructions/orders issued by TRAI/Licensor from time to time For Internet operation between circuit-switched network and IP-based network, Licensee shall install Media Gateway Switch In addition, Licensor may instruct LICENSEE to adopt any other standards, technical issues icas issued by TEC regarding interconnection”.

117. The Authority also noted the following: (a) Most TSPs have IP-based core networks. However, network elements in POI are still predominantly circuit-switched, largely due to legacy reasons. Although the licenses now allow for IP-based interconnection, not much progress has been made in that direction.

(b) Currently, both dial-up networks and IP-based access networks are used to provide voice telephony. In the recent past, many TSPs have made announcements for the introduction of IP-based access networks in the near future.

118. Based on stakeholder feedback and further analysis, the Authority is of the opinion that further discussion is necessary on the issue of IP-based interconnection.20. Is there a need to establish a framework for Interconnect Exchange to eliminate bilateral interconnection problems?119. In response to the question above, with the exception of two stakeholders, all stakeholders stated that there is no need to establish a framework for the Interconnect Exchange. These interested parties cited, inter alia, the following reasons in support of their claim: (a) As the interconnection regime in India has evolved bilaterally, there is no immediate need to establish an interconnection exchange framework in the latter stage, as it would serve no purpose. useful purpose.

(b) The interconnection switch will represent an additional cost burden for the industry without any additional benefit. This is because most TSPs have established bilateral points of interest after making large investments and therefore interconnection switching will be an additional/unproductive cost burden. Direct peering, both for TDM and IP technology, is the only cost-effective option in the large volume that points of interest currently handle. This is evident from the fact that TSPs have established peer-to-peer connectivity, rather than using any kind of transit/peering points, not only for TDM connectivity but also for IP connectivity. Therefore, the option of exchanging traffic only through the interconnection exchange should be ruled out from the outset.

(c) TSPs are currently connected through points of interest in various cities and towns. POI locations are currently based on low-cost routes. Interconnect Exchange will avoid using the shortest path, which will increase latency and congestion on the network. The introduction of interconnection switching will also imply the redesign of the transmission network for POI traffic, which implies additional costs and large write-offs.

(d) TRAI in its Directorate of "Direct Connectivity between Service Provider Networks" see Process no. direct .

(e) The required interconnection exchange will have a very large capacity, equivalent to the combined size of the STP networks implemented by all the TSPs. Interconnect Exchange cannot be compared in any way to MNP exchange as the size and scale of an MNP exchange is only 5-7% of subscribers opting into MNP each month.

(f) The failure of the interconnection switch would cause the fall of the entire telecommunications network.

120. The two stakeholders who supported the need to establish the Interconnect Exchange requested, inter alia, the following to reinforce their views. (a) An interconnection exchange would significantly help speed up the interconnection process, since a new TSP would not have to negotiate individual interconnection agreements with each TSP, who, being its competitors, have no reason to cooperate.

(b) Given the number of delays that have occurred in obtaining interconnection agreements, the interconnection swap will remove all bilateral interconnection issues and remove a significant barrier to entry into the telecommunications industry, thus opening up the telecom industry. telecommunications to new entrants, which will increase competition and benefit end consumers. The Authority must provide a glide path to move towards an interconnection exchange over a period of time. A glide path is proposed once all the TSPs have already established the interconnection and have assumed the necessary costs and installed the infrastructure to establish the interconnection. Therefore, enforcing Interconnect Exchange would be an additional cost for TSPs, which can be incurred with a proper access path.

121. The Authority, when examining the suitability of the Interconnect Exchange, became aware of the fact that TSPs have established a large number of peer-to-peer points of interest in each LSA in accordance with the licensing and regulatory framework; a significantly large investment has been made in the establishment of said points of interest and in the means of interconnection between them; a regulatory mandate to route all traffic between carriers through the Interconnect Exchange would require TSPs to restructure their transmission network, and therefore, prima facie, such a mandate would have a substantial cost implication for TSPs. The introduction of the Interconnect Exchange could also have implications for the current numbering and routing system. After careful consideration, the Authority has decided not to make any prescription in relation to the issue of Interconnect Exchange, at present.F. Review122. The Authority will closely monitor the application of these regulations by service providers. The Authority, if it deems it necessary, may revise this regulation from time to time.